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1. INTO THE DEBT QUAGMIRE 
1.1. INTRODUCTION
This study deals with the ways in which default-debtors cope with severe debt prob-
lems. The point of departure is the simple observation that debt problems raise con-
siderable tension everywhere they come into existence due to the economic, ethical, 
social and political issues involved. Leaving persons, firms or public institutions un-
paid for delivered goods and services is unacceptable for obvious reasons. The obvi-
ousness about it suggests that a cardinal convention in society is challenged. We shall 
refer to the norm in question as the ‘repayment norm’, which says that debts must be 
repaid in time according to standing agreements. If a larger proportion of debtors — 
and it probably does not have to be very large — violates the principle, it not only 
does injustice to everyone who actually complies with the norm, but could also lead to 
the collapse of society as we know it. Debt and its hazards are of paramount impor-
tance to the preservation of any existing social order.  
Over the last two or three decades, modern capitalist societies around the world have 
been haunted by growing numbers of private individuals who do not handle their debt 
burdens. Instead, they struggle with serious deficits under varying institutional condi-
tions including legal statutes, creditor practises and existing — or non-existing — 
social security nets. Besides dealing with the creditor side, basic needs must be met 
on a daily basis — such as food, clothes, transportation and a place to live. Over time, 
enduring debt problems damage one’s personal integrity and reputation, and threaten 
to inflict substantial economic and social downfalls on the default-debtor and his 
household. Coping with debt problems is therefore a desperate struggle for no less 
than one’s material, social and moral standing. 
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Scholars have called upon metaphors like “the indebted society”, “credit society” and 
“risk society” to characterise the spread of debt problems — some have even warned 
against the “re-emergence of poverty”. Such statements express that the scope, distri-
bution and repercussions of over-indebtedness many places have reached unheard-of 
proportions. As a consequence, much effort has been made to identify the causes and 
effects of the phenomenon. Curiously enough, however, the ways in which people 
actually cope with their debt problems have not enjoyed the same attention. This, of 
course, does not mean that such knowledge is irrelevant or unimportant. Quite on the 
contrary, if we are to remedy over-indebtedness as a social problem, we have to un-
derstand the logic involved in the everyday struggling with debt quagmires. 
This study aims at delivering such insights. 
1.2. THE ANALYTICAL CHALLENGE
In the 11th century, the Persian mathematician, philosopher, astronomer and poet 
Omar Khayyam advised his contemporaries to “take the cash and let the credit go”.
The principle has had a bearing in economic life well into the 20th century — includ-
ing in the West. But not anymore; although scepticism and reluctance against credit 
may still have an impact in pockets of society, it is generally a rather poor guideline 
for managing economic careers. The rule of the day seems more like the opposite: 
“take the credit and let the cash go”, or, in modern terms: “buy now, pay later”.
However, there is every reason to underline that the change of norms does not affect 
the repayment norm as such; debts are still to be repaid in time and in accordance 
with ongoing agreements between the debtor and his creditor(s). 
As shall be argued throughout the study, normative constraints are embedded in his-
toric time and space, and appear as more or less appropriate relative to the social 
environments in which they claim validity. Moreover, a shift of overall doctrines in 
economic life from “save first, pay cash” to “buy now, pay later” presupposes a 
process whereby credit is made readily available to the general public. Most Western 
capitalist societies underwent this kind of change during the 1970’ies and 1980’ies. 
As a result, credit became a major device — indeed, the device — for allocating 
scarce resources, goods and services among the population. This even goes for disad-
vantaged social categories; access to financial services including certain forms of 
credit has become a prerequisite for including persons of limited means into main-
stream economic and social life (Kempson and Anderloni 2007).  
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The “buy now, pay later” principle is commonly associated with consumption — and 
hence the use of consumer credit. But of course, its validity also extends to the acqui-
sition of capital-intensive items such as cars, homes and education. From an individ-
ual’s point of view, taking on debts has typically become no less than a necessity 
because coveted consumer goods as well as opportunities to acquire and secure assets 
are generally too costly to be obtained by cash alone. From society’s point of view, 
credit is convenient because it plays a key role in economic growth; in modern, capi-
talist societies jobs and welfare simply depends on people’s willingness to use credit 
to pursue appropriate economic careers. However, as credit is made generally avail-
able to the public the result is that more people take on more debt. The unintended 
side effect is that the number of default-debtors increases as well. 
The forthcoming analysis is based on the view that credit is institutionalised practise 
and as such carefully organised, formally regulated and embedded in economic and 
legal as well as social contexts. The institutionalisation of credit also defines expecta-
tions as to how those who fail to meet their obligations should act, thereby translating 
the repayment norm into practical prescriptions. For instance, market constraints 
impose default-debtors to immediately report any problems that occur, and to provide 
the creditor side with all information needed for them to secure their interests. They 
are of course also expected to act in accordance with any legal statute that applies to 
the particular situations they are in. However, evidence from many countries — in-
cluding the data to be used for this study — shows that they not always comply. In-
stead, creditors often complain about default-debtors who make poor decisions and 
behave financially imprudent. This even involves defaulting on renegotiated repay-
ment schedules — i.e. any second chance offered to them — whether established 
bilaterally or enforced by the courts.  
The ambition of this study is to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework and 
carry out an empirical analysis that not only gives us a better general understanding of 
how people cope with debt quagmires, but also offers explanations on why default-
debtors sometimes act in economically unwise ways. In particular, it is argued that an 
adequate understanding of the debt problem phenomenon presupposes a social rather 
than an economic perspective and that any set of remedial steps to solve, ease and 
prevent serious instances of over-indebtedness must be based on knowledge about 
how social orientations impact economic decisions in times of hardship.   
14          INTO THE DEBT QUAGMIRE
1.3. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
The study is to be based on interviews with Norwegian default-debtors in 2001.1
Taken together, these are persons whose debt problems cover a time span of more 
than fifteen years — from the mid 1980’ies to the day of the interviews and beyond. 
As such, their stories are conditioned by time- and space-specific institutional con-
straints. In particular, they handle their debt problems within the frameworks of for-
malised market regulations and legal arrangements. By introduction, a brief descrip-
tion of the most dominating features of these systems is needed to set the stage for the 
study and put the empirical data on coping behaviour in perspective.  
1.3.1 THE MARKET INSTITUTION: DEBT CRISIS AND BEYOND
As just pointed out, the shift from cash-based to debt-based household economies 
presupposes that credit is in fact generally available to everyone who is willing and 
can afford to pay for it. In Norway, the credit market was deregulated in the mid-
1980’ies. Until then, the amount of money that banks and finance houses could lend 
to private borrowers was politically controlled and delimited (Lunde and Poppe 1991: 
32-33). As a consequence, only the best customers were granted loans. Under such 
circumstances, debt problems were practically non-existent. But the regime also had 
some disadvantages; for instance, homes were increasingly paid “under the table”, 
which indicated that the needs, aspirations and increasing wealth among Norwegian 
households were sub-optimally utilised as an engine for economic growth (Reve 
1990; NOU 1989). Inspired by Thatcherism in the UK, the right-wing political parties 
saw it as an ideological issue; everyone should have the right to own a home and 
otherwise be free to choose what to do with their own money. The regulated credit 
market became a symbol of social-democratic assaults on personal freedom, and was 
defined as a target area for change.  
When the social-democrats lost the election in 1981, a succession of two governments 
led by the conservative party implemented a series of economic reforms. First, the 
housing market was deregulated in 1984, and the housing cooperatives were allowed 
to dissolve into homeownership units. As a result, many became proprietors of assets 
that could be converted into cash on the market or used as collaterals for loans. Next, 
the deregulation of the credit market was implemented through a succession of re-
forms between 1984 and 1986. The two combined into what has been called the 
‘housing spiral’; the accumulated demand for homes were now met by more items for 
                                                          
1 Cf. chapter 4 for a detailed presentation and discussion of the sample. 
CHAPTER 1: INTO THE DEBT QUAGMIRE          15
sale and extensive access to credit financing. The result was that more people became 
homeowners, and that many of those who already owned a home took the step into 
better housing facilities. The process also powered consumption, as parts of the loans 
were obviously used for such purposes (Poppe 1990: 33-35). But the reverse of the 
medal was that the housing prices went sky-high and created substantial increases in 
the households’ debt loads. In the initial phases it did not matter much since the real 
interest rates were negative for large income groups as late as in 1987. But following 
the tax reform of 1986, credit eventually got a price — a development that many 
households had not taken into account (Lunde and Poppe 1991: 48-51).  
Another important aspect of the process was that the deregulation also powered 
credit-financed buying and selling of shares, and encouraged the establishment of 
small firms of all sorts. As it turned out, many of these activities lacked foundation in 
real values. Moreover, when the social-democrats — who were back in power follow-
ing the 1987-election — implemented their retrenchment policies and devaluated the 
Norwegian currency, it coincided with the international recession starting with the 
New York stock exchange collapse in October 1987. The combined result was devas-
tating. As business bankruptcies started to spread and many industries had to reduce 
their activities due to the changes in the international competitive conditions, unem-
ployment rose to unheard-of proportions. And so did the interest rates. During 1988, 
the housing market collapsed. As a result, people who for various reasons could no 
longer pay the price for their loans lost the ticket out of the difficulties as homes could 
only be sold at a loss. The same year, debt problems were publicly recognised as a 
social fact and the ‘debt victim’ conception entered the Norwegian discourse (Tufte 
2005: 21-22). 
The troublesome times that followed — simply known as the ‘debt crisis’ — lasted 
for nearly six years, and was particularly noticeable between 1989 and 1993 during 
which many people lost their homes. To illustrate, during the peak year of 1990 alone 
22.119 forced sales were carried out in addition to an unknown number of families 
who voluntarily sold their homes to avoid the extra burdens — and losses — associ-
ated with court orders.2 As for the households, Rokhaug (2004: 19) points out that the 
debt crisis is more appropriately referred to as the ‘mortgage crisis’ due to the domi-
nating causal mechanism involved. Still, a wider perspective underlines that the prob-
lems were more fundamentally rooted in structural problems in the national economy 
and challenges in the international environment such as rising oil prices, turbulence in 
foreign exchange markets and speculations against the Norwegian currency (Steigum 
                                                          
2 Source: Brønnøysundregistrene. 
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2004-29; Gerdrup 2004-154; Moe 2004). The depth of the crisis is underlined by the 
fact that several of the major commercial and savings banks had to get emergency 
funding from the banking system’s own security net as well as from public funds, and 
that the three largest commercial banks were in fact taken over by the state between 
1991 and 1993 (Wilse 2004; Statistics-Norway 1999). In retrospect, the aggressive 
competition for borrowers and market shares in most segments of the credit market 
seems to be a major drive behind the ‘debt crisis’ (Knutsen, Lange, and Nordvik 
1998; Lie 1998; Wilse 2004:181). 
The impact of these years can hardly be underestimated; banks and finance houses as 
well as individual borrowers and society as a whole got a first-hand lesson about the 
hazards of credit. It has generally led to improved banking practises including the 
tailoring of financial products and a more realistic customer counselling based on 
advanced credit score systems and a better understanding of the risks involved. Also, 
as shall be highlighted shortly, it has brought about improved legislation and public 
services. Still, the increased dependency on a number of markets has left the house-
holds more exposed than ever to system level forces; a large-scale crisis is a suffi-
cient, but not a necessary pre-condition for developing debt problems.  
Between 1994 and 1998 the recession was replaced by an upturn in the Norwegian 
economy; the unemployment rates started to decline as did the interest rates. By 
1996/1997, the housing prices returned to the 1987/1988 level and continued to in-
crease almost exponentially thereafter. Under such conditions, Rokhaug (2004: 24-25) 
argues that property can hardly cause large-scale financial problems even in case of 
events such as unemployment, divorce and failing health since it is almost always 
possible to sell at a profit. However, the positive development in the housing market 
has increasingly led banks and finance houses to back up purchases of homes with 
loans that exceed the market value of the mortgage (Kredittilsynet 1998, 2002, 2005, 
2006). This, of course, contributes to the rise in prices as well as debt loads, and con-
serves the housing market as a risk zone. A lesson that was not learned by the debt 
crisis is to turn to fixed interest rates; unlike many other countries, loans on mortgage 
in Norway are still predominantly given at floating rates.  
Besides being characterised by periods of substantial growth, the post-crisis credit 
market is distinguished by technological innovation and development of new financial 
products. One of the most important trends is the expansion of consumption debts — 
in particular powered by the spread of various types of credit cards for which the total 
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volume of outstanding debts increased by factor 3.8 between 1990 and 2001.3 An-
other trend is that credit has spread into new social groups — in particular women and 
younger age cohorts. These are also the categories that have come trooping into the 
money collectors’ files since the end of the 1990’ies (Lindorff 2001, 2003, 2006). The 
joint output from rising housing prices, new sophisticated financial products, exten-
sive access to unsecured loans and the spread of credit into new groups is a substantial 
increase in overall debt volumes; whereas 12% of the households had debts exceeding 
twice their total incomes in 1986, the proportion had increased to 23% by 2004. Also, 
the percentage of households without credit decreased from 28% to 18% in the same 
period. The debts loads are highest among units with small children (Statistics-
Norway 2006).  
Parallel to these developments, another economic upturn took place between 2003 
and 2007. The period is marked by a combination of all-time low interest rates, hardly 
any unemployment and favourable wage settlements, in sum leading to yearly in-
creases in real wages for most groups (Poppe 2006). However, these are trends that do 
not concern the forthcoming empirical analyses since the interviews were done in 
2001. The recent positive developments are therefore not commented in any further 
detail. 
1.3.2 THE STATE INSTITUTION; LEGISLATION
In cases of default, society places its machinery of power at the creditors’ service. 
History knows the full range of penalties for failing to repay debts, including various 
forms of physical punishment, enslavement and even death penalty (Cohen 1982; 
Hilton 2004; Calder 1999; Tufte 2005).4 As for Norway, default-debtors risked im-
                                                          
3 Source: Finansieringsselskapenes forening (The Association of Norwegian Finance Houses).
Total credit card debts per 31.12.1990: 2.828 billion NOK; per 31.12.2001: 10.735 billion 
NOK. If also consumer loans are added to the outstanding debts to the organisation’s finance 
house members, the grand total is about 15 billion NOK by December 2002. 
4 The potential hazards associated with debt are recognised throughout history and across mul-
tiple cultural settings. This is not the least demonstrated by the fact that the concerns have even 
found their ways into major religious texts, such as the Book of Deuteronomy where all citizens 
are imposed to erase all debts older than seven years (provided that the default-debtor is not a 
foreigner), and the Koran where the use of interest rates is banned. In ancient Greece and 
Rome, those who failed to pay their dues risked being enslaved, sold and killed. Physical pun-
ishment and loss of civic rights continued in most societies well into the nineteenth century. 
One of the reasons for the hard penalties was a lack of distinction between good-intended and 
bad-intended default-debtors. When it eventually was introduced, dishonest default-debtors 
became the targets of tough treatment, such as in medieval Britain where they risked being 
placed in the pillory, have their ears cut off and even killed (Kilpi 1998: 9-10; Tufte 2005: 69-
70; Ryan 1995: 11-13). 
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prisonment up to 1874. Some types of debts were also linked to specific sanctions, 
such as in the case of tax arrears where people had to provide the military with lodg-
ing until the dues were settled. In modern legislation, certain types of debts still hold a 
unique position as they are backed up with particularly hard penalties. Hence, failing 
to pay maintenance was punished with forced labour as late as 1955, and to this day 
people who do not meet their child maintenance obligations risk imprisonment if the 
offence is found to be ill-intended rather than related to a lack of economic means 
(Rokhaug 2004: 146-147).  
Since 1983, when default as such was decriminalised, the Norwegian legislation has 
three general characteristics; firstly, it establishes a system for debt recovery; sec-
ondly, it sets the limits for such practises by protecting the default-debtor from unfair 
treatment and granting him certain rights; and thirdly, it institutes a range of opportu-
nities for partial and comprehensive solutions. As for the debt recovery system, it 
initially involves a routine of warnings and requests — each step associated with 
deadlines and charges to be covered by the default-debtor. Unpaid claims eventually 
end up in the court system where additional charges are added. Whereas public credi-
tors have special authorisation and typically run the process themselves according to a 
simplified and more direct debt recovery routine, private creditors such as banks and 
firms increasingly hire debt-collection agencies for the job. Due to the high — and 
frequent — charges involved, debt recovery has been a lucrative and growing busi-
ness for years. From the default-debtors’ point of view, it is an expensive process — 
in terms of money as well as compared to other countries such as Sweden and Den-
mark (Rokhaug 2004: 147-154; Tufte 2007). 
When unpaid claims are formally clarified as legally enforceable — e.g. by court 
decisions, administrative resolutions or simply by debtor consent — the creditors may 
take the claim to the local enforcement officer who is authorised to distrain property, 
movables and income, and carry out forced sales and wage deductions. Depending on 
the type of clarification, there are instituted routines for making complaints about 
such steps. But often there is not much to be done. Also, default-debtors with compli-
cated problems and multiple claims against them may have to deal not only with the 
“ordinary” enforcement officer but also four other authorities with the right to make 
distrainments — viz. the units responsible for recovering public claims such as taxes, 
fines and child maintenance arrears. This, in turn, may complicate matters considera-
bly, as for instance when several wage deductions combine to leave the default-
debtors without sufficient means to meet adequate subsistence levels. In such cases, 
the authority with the lowest prioritised claim has the duty to give notice and take the 
necessary initiatives to adjust the deduction. Unfortunately, the notification system is 
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not good enough. As a result, it is often up to the default-debtors to make complaints, 
and until the corrections are made they risk ending up depending on social security 
(Rokhaug 2004: 154-178).  
However, default-debtors are not left without any form of protection from creditor 
behaviour. In particular, there are limitations as to what and how much of their pos-
sessions and incomes that may be accessed. The rules are complicated and cannot be 
commented in any detail here. But generally, default-debtors are allowed to keep as 
much of the incomes that are necessary to meet an adequate subsistence level, and to 
hold on to possessions that are required to cover basic needs. The problem is that the 
terms ‘adequate subsistence levels’ and ‘basic needs’ are disputable. For instance, in 
debt recovery there are no fixed income thresholds; typically, social security levels, 
debt settlement rates or some other rule of thumb are taken as points of departure for 
making decisions in each individual case. In addition, factors such as the default-
debtor’s housing expenses, the number of people living in the household, and the 
extent to which he does his best to repay his creditors, are considered (Jacobsen and 
Steindal 1999: 5-6). As for property, the main rule is that it must be sold to the benefit 
of the creditors, but sales only takes place after careful economic and judicial consid-
erations and a long process of warnings and opportunities to protest and negotiate 
(Rokhaug 2004: 158-159). Besides, whenever a home is put on a forced sale default-
debtors are sometimes entitled to a replacement arranged by the municipality. Even 
though all of these examples show that the default-debtors have rights, their leeway is 
nevertheless strictly confined. Therefore, in severe cases of enduring debt problems 
more fundamental solutions ought to be found. 
Norwegian legislation offers possibilities for bankruptcies as well as debt settlements. 
A basic difference between the two is that whereas the former is designed to serve 
creditor interests, the latter aims at restoring the default-debtors’ economic situation. 
Also, even though there are exceptions, bankruptcies are almost exclusively used 
against companies since such processes are expensive and must be covered by the 
creditors if there are no real values left in the bankrupt's estate — which often is the 
case for private persons (Rokhaug 2004: 184-185, 188-189). As far as this study is 
concerned, bankruptcy is more of a route into severe debt problems rather than a way 
to settle economic scores because processes against small firms typically involve 
private property and other assets used to guarantee for the company’s funding. As a 
result, many former owners of such businesses are personally dragged into insur-
mountable financial problems when they go bankrupt, after which they end up becom-
ing part of the debt recovery processes just described above. 
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In practise, the only way for over-indebted private persons to get out of the difficulties 
is through a voluntary or enforced debt settlement. The Debt Settlement Act, which 
was introduced in 1993 as a direct response to the effects of the debt crisis, offers an 
opportunity to be set free from hopeless debt loads by committing oneself to a thrifty 
life for a limited period of time — normally five years. Not everyone can get a debt 
settlement. But those who qualify according to the requirements of the Act and for-
ward a proposition in accordance with its rules have a right to be granted one, and can 
therefore — if necessary — force his creditors into an agreement. The main criterion 
is that the default-debtor is permanently unable to repay his debts. This is basically a 
matter of calculation where the inputs are the applicant’s incomes, expenses and as-
sets, and the output is a conclusive assessment about his capabilities of paying. Such 
conclusions also take into consideration the future prospects for improvements, in-
volving such factors as age, education, health, and labour market developments (Rok-
haug 2004: 296-301). Another criterion is that a debt settlement must not be morally 
offensive to the general public. This is a matter of a number of circumstances, as for 
instance the proposed standards of living, the character of the debts, and the default-
debtor’s behaviour with respect to his willingness to put his cards on the table, negoti-
ate and free incomes and assets to the benefit of the creditor side. However, assess-
ments about blame are by and large invalid; the intention of the Act is precisely to 
offer a solution even to those who have behaved irresponsibly in the past (Moe 2003: 
371-382).  
Once granted, a debt settlement implies that the default-debtor can only keep an ap-
portioned part of his incomes to cover basic needs. As the rest is set aside to repay 
debts, this is where the interests of the creditors lie; they may now receive a dividend 
from people who perhaps have not paid them anything for years. Even in the many 
cases where there is nothing to divide between the creditors, an independent, profes-
sional review of the economic situation is usually considered helpful and reassuring.5
As for the default-debtors, they have the right to keep a well-defined portion of their 
incomes, including means to cover reasonable, special needs such as medicines, 
medical treatment and visiting rights with their own children. Also, they have the 
right to a reasonable home and may keep a certain amount of money to cover housing 
expenses. They may even remain homeowners if a sale is not to the benefit of the 
                                                          
5 This does not mean that the creditor side is satisfied with all aspects of the Debt Settlement 
Act. Of course, as holders of partial interests they have views on most issues affecting their 
dividend such as subsistence levels, special needs and property sales — generally as well as in 
concrete negotiations. But they are not opposed to debt settlements as such, and see the advan-
tage in bringing long-lasting cases of default to an end through a professional system. 
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creditors and they are able to pay interest rates on the mortgage during the debt set-
tlement period (Moe 2003: 245). As for other capital-intensive items such as cars, a 
sale is only avoided if the value is low and special needs are documented. However, it 
should be noticed that a debt settlement does not provide the default-debtors with any 
“fresh” money from public budgets. Therefore, many of them are left to live on in-
comes below the minimum threshold. 
A forced debt settlement puts an end to years of economic troubles; at the close of the 
five years all remaining debts are written off with the exception of mortgages if the 
agreement includes a homeownership. As far as the forthcoming analysis is con-
cerned, applying for and completing a debt settlement is therefore to be regarded as a 
weighty coping strategy. But the default-debtors’ coping behaviour naturally involves 
a much wider array of activities. It is important to underline that a debt settlement is 
the “receiving end” of a wider institutionalised security net; before it comes to this 
point, many administrative units and statutory services have typically been called 
upon to provide various types of solutions to the financial problems.  
Among these, the social security offices play an important role. By tradition, they 
provide economic emergency aid to citizens with pressing needs. In most municipali-
ties, this is also where economic counselling can be accessed free of charge. This is a 
statutory service, but its location is not ideal as people generally feel stigmatised by 
having to line up with social clients of all kinds.6 Still, a high number of default cases 
are handled by economic counsellors each year, including assisting the clients in 
extrajudicial negotiations with the creditor side to try to establish voluntary repayment 
schemes. Such talks are also required in order to qualify for a forced debt settlement 
later. In addition, default-debtors may permanently or temporarily access a wide range 
of support programmes — more or less irrespective of the presence of a debt settle-
ment. Good examples are unemployment support, sickness benefit, benefit to single 
parents and free legal assistance. Sometimes, default-debtors may qualify for special 
lending programmes designed to provide a home to targeted groups that otherwise 
would be excluded from adequate living standards. Such options activate a number of 
administrative units among which the Employment Agency, the National Health Ser-
vice, the National Insurance Service and the State Housing Bank are the most impor-
tant. The latter also offers comprehensive economic counselling to customers who can 
no longer afford to pay for their mortgages (Rokhaug 2004: 28-39).  
                                                          
6 This is about to change as social security, the Employment Agency and the National Insur-
ance Service are currently being merged into a new unit called The Norwegian Labour and 
Welfare Organisation (NAV). This does not affect the study, though. 
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1.4. ‘SEVERE’ DEBT PROBLEMS
As stated in section 1.1, and further substantiated by the institutional description 
above, the focus in this study is on severe debt problems. But the notion of ‘severity’
is not easy to give a precise definition, and has been subjected to considerable contro-
versy in the Norwegian debate on debt problems (Poppe and Borgeraas 1992: 40-48; 
Tufte 2005: 27-32; Gulbrandsen 1993; NOU 1991). Obviously, ‘severity’ has many 
dimensions. One of them is time: financial problems that persist over long periods of 
time may be considered as more serious than those that do not; Another is money:
large deficits are normally regarded as more severe than more modest debts; Yet an-
other dimension is effects: problem careers with large consequences for those in-
volved are grimmer than instances where the impacts are less dramatic; a fourth as-
pect is subjective experience: individuals who are brought down by debt problems are 
often seen as being in worse situations than those who are not as affected.  
Many more dimensions could probably have been mentioned. However, this study is 
not dependent on a lengthy conceptual clarification, nor a sharp demarcation line 
between ‘serious’ and ‘not so serious’ debt problems. Instead, a pragmatic strategy is 
chosen whereby persons who have either obtained a debt settlement, or whose eco-
nomic situation would most likely qualify for one if they decide to apply, are taken as 
the proper target group for the forthcoming analysis. This brings the empirical basis 
of the study into a social segment that most people would readily characterise as be-
ing marked by ‘serious’ debt problems. It also means that many of the just mentioned 
shades of ‘severity’ are taken into the analysis, which is advantageous in a study of 
coping behaviour.  
As a general picture of the phenomenon to be analysed, figure 1-1 on the opposite 
side shows the scope of severe debt problems along two indicators; viz. the number of 
debt settlements and forced sales of homes during the 1990’ies and up to 2001 when 
the interviews for the study were done. As can be seen, during the peak years of the 
debt crisis the number of forced sales well above 15.000 as compared to the economic 
upturn in the latter half of the 1990’ies when it came down to around 3.000 a year. 
The debt settlement curve displays a slightly different trend as it peaks in 1997 and 
1998 at around 2000 granted settlements a year — well after the debt crises had come 
to an end. A number of factors contribute to the pattern; for instance, when the Act 
was introduced in 1993 many default-debtors were sceptical as to what a debt settle-
ment would imply in practise (Poppe 1994: 209-235). But the most important expla-
nation is time-lag; on the one hand, it takes time to have the cases processed as people 
start queuing up for help, and on the other it takes time for many over-indebted 
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households to come forward with their problems. The latter is not the least demon-
strated by the fact that the most typical debt crisis cases — i.e. financial difficulties 
following from losses of homes — made up a substantial proportion of the debt set-
tlement applications as late as 1999 (Poppe and Tufte 2005).  As a consequence, al-
though the curve is probably a good illustration of the time trend, it underestimates 
the actual scope of severe financial problems; the vast majority of households in such 
difficulties are not involved in court procedures. 
1.5. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS
With this, the stage for the study is set. The overall ambition is to offer a better under-
standing of how people cope with severe debt problems and why default-debtors 
sometimes act in economically unwise ways.  
The study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 looks at debt problems as a field of re-
search and defines the research questions. Chapter 3 deals with the theoretical aspects 
of the study, and proposes a framework for the forthcoming analysis. Chapter 4 is 
devoted to methodological issues and presents a design for the empirical analysis. The 
Figure 1-1: Forced sales of homes and debt settlements 1990-2001. Absolute numbers. Source:
The Brønnøysund Registry Centre. Debt settlements: Total of voluntary and forced settlements. 
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next three chapters analyse the empirical data by focussing on the following main 
topics: coping over time (chapter 5), the impact of social division (chapter 6), and 
moral defences (chapter 7). The eighth and final chapter discusses the empirical find-
ings in a theoretical perspective, and assesses how the produced knowledge may in-
form decision-making in some important areas.  
2. DEBT QUAGMIRES AS A FIELD OF 
RESEARCH
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Debt problems emerge within distributive systems. In modern societies, it is com-
monly distinguished between three such systems; viz. markets, governmental redistri-
bution and informal personal networks where gifts, goods and services are recipro-
cated (Polanyi 1957 [1944]). As a social phenomenon, debt problems are primarily 
seen as referring to debt items within the two former systems.7 However, since money 
is a main medium in all three distributive systems, economic difficulties related to 
such debts also affect informal relationships. The widespread impact of debt problems 
in many of society’s most important institutional arenas turns the phenomenon into 
one of the key issues of our time.  
This chapter reviews debt problems as a field of research. As shall be shown, it is first 
of all characterised by rich amounts of empirical studies — especially about causes 
and effects, but to some extent also about how people cope with the difficulties. In 
addition, there are noteworthy theoretical contributions. The aim of the review is to 
develop the research questions for the forthcoming analysis of coping behaviour. In 
doing so, it is primarily drawn upon literature from the peak years of debt problem 
                                                          
7 Of course, it is possible to end up in severe debt problems by primarily taking on too much non-market 
debt; one may for instance borrow considerable amounts from wealthy friends, take up loans in the black 
market or end up in financial difficulties through criminal acts. These are causal factors that are of marginal 
interest to this study. However, such debts are relevant in as much as unmanageable formal debt loads lead 
to non-market borrowing as a way of coping with the situation.  
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studies — i.e. those accomplished during the 1980’ies and 1990’ies when many 
Western countries went through periods of recession and faced unprecedented propor-
tions of over-indebted households. Beyond that, classic works from the 1960’ies and 
1970’ies are considered, as are certain recent contributions.  
Given the importance and complexity of the debt problem phenomenon, it potentially 
stands out as an obvious research field in many academic disciplines. For instance, 
psychology and social medicine aim at producing insights about health aspects of 
being in distressful life situations over time. Unfortunately, there are few such studies 
about the consequences of debt problems. A more obvious case, perhaps, is political 
and social economy since consumer over-indebtedness has severe consequences at the 
micro level as well as for the national economy as a whole. But as pointed out by 
Green (2004 chapter 1) the contributions from these disciplines are modest — espe-
cially when it comes to micro-level studies. As for law, there is a rich body of studies 
that partly focus on the establishment and interpretation of bankruptcy- and debt set-
tlement acts, and partly explore the relationships between such regimes and adjacent 
legislation. Also, there is much literature on international comparisons and the possi-
bilities for introducing standardised regulations across country borders.8 These works 
are largely discarded here, as they do not have direct relevance to the coping behav-
iour phenomenon as such. On the other hand, there is a wide range of studies from 
within the disciplines of sociology, anthropology and related social sciences such as 
household economics and certain practical applications rooted in law, politics, and 
social and economic counselling. With an emphasis on sociology, these are the con-
tributions that constitute the main focus in the review. 
The chapter sets out by identifying the main theoretical directions in debt problem 
studies. Next, the literature on empirical research is reviewed to identify the most 
important causes, effects and coping strategies. The studies explored are not directly 
comparable as they are based on different methodologies and sampling strategies. 
Still, they combine to produce a general impression of the status in the field. In the 
final section of the chapter, the research questions for the forthcoming analysis are 
defined.   
                                                          
8 Some of the key perspectives are covered in (Huls 1992; Niemi-Kiesiläinen 1995, 1997; Efrat 2002; 
Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Ramsay, and Whitford 2003). 
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2.2. THEORETICAL POSITIONS IN DEBT PROBLEM RESEARCH
Historically, modern research on economic problems among households is rooted in 
poverty studies. The link is well illustrated by the writings of the pioneer in the field 
— David Caplovitz — who in the early 1960’ies interviewed 464 poor households in 
New York about their economic practises and reported the findings in the famous 
book ‘The Poor Pay More’ (Caplovitz 1963). Over the next fifteen years, he ex-
panded the approach by writing two books about the connection between recession 
and over-indebtedness among blue-collar and white-collar families, thereby identify-
ing the modern debt problem phenomenon (Caplovitz 1974, 1979). In doing so, he 
drew upon a major feature in poverty research; viz. the focus on budgets. By defini-
tion, economic problems became a matter of imbalance between the totality of the 
households’ incomes and expenditures — rather than non-payment of individual 
claims. As a result, much of the research in the field came to focus on over-
indebtedness rather than debt problems; even though mortgages and unsecured credit 
are major entries in most budgets, they cannot be adequately studied independently of 
the overall economic situation.  
A second important influence has to do with the paradigmatic divide between indi-
vidualistic and structural explanations. Throughout history, views on poverty reflect 
both types of causal understandings. As for the former, liberal economic theory of the 
19th and early 20th century regarded the poor as largely responsible for their own mis-
ery — to the point that the Norwegian Poverty Commission of 1853, influenced by 
the English and Swedish systems, declared unemployed members of the work force as 
immoral and unworthy of poverty support (Seip 1984: 67-73). Wherever modern debt 
problems occur, similar moral discussions typically arise focusing on how default 
debtors have spent their money in the past and how they make their dispositions in the 
current situation. Causal explanations where the blame is pinned on the default-
debtors are probably quite common — especially on the creditor side where the con-
cept of ‘economic man’ as a rational, responsible and well-informed chooser in mar-
ket contexts is widespread. But such views are seldom expressed as paradigmatic 
points of departure for research. Still, moralistic undertones are well represented in 
Norwegian studies on debt problems by the writings of Gulbrandsen (1993; 1999; 
2005) whose main point is that debt problems largely emerge from ill intent.  
A theoretically more potent position could depart from the kind of ideas advocated in 
an early work by Cayne and Trebilcock (1973). They acknowledge a number of struc-
tural reasons why ‘the poor pay more’ — e.g. no access to high-street markets, low 
education and information flaws. Still, they conclude that less — not more — regula-
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tion is the remedy; only humanitarian interests and the need to protect innocent third-
parties should lead to restrictions on individual freedom. In theory at least, this would 
leave all market actors — including those involved in debt disputes — largely respon-
sible for their own acts. However, such liberal views are far-between in debt problem 
research. 
Instead, studies in the field predominantly lean on what may be called the socio-
political tradition in poverty research. The approach has two characteristics. Histori-
cally, it represents a gradual turn to structural explanations and the need for govern-
ment-initiated solutions. The ground-breaking works of Rowntree (2001 [1901]; 
1942) may serve as illustrations, as they identify low income and unemployment as 
the major causes of poverty and lay the foundation forpolitical reforms as the best 
way to combat socio-economic deprivation. Analytically, the tradition is marked by 
systematic attempts at establishing multi-level explanatory models where structural as 
well as individual-level factors are included. Again, Rowntree may serve as an illus-
tration as he distinguishes between primary and secondary poverty — the former 
referring to systematic exclusion from access to a decent income and the latter to 
’useful’ and ‘wasteful’ individual spending (Rowntree 2001 [1901]).  
Debt quagmires are not known as vigorous points of departure for elaborate theory 
building. But the few there are, are largely based on the above principles. In what 
follows, contributions from three key authors are briefly highlighted; whereas the 
American sociologist David Caplovitz is the classic in the field, Janet Ford and Udo
Refiner are two of his major collaborators in Europe. Additional contributors could 
have been reviewed as well. However, the three are chosen for their importance to 
current European research on over-indebtedness and debt problems, and for their 
contributions to the forthcoming analysis of coping behaviour.  
2.2.1. DAVID CAPLOVITZ: THE MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH
Caplovitz has not become the classic reference in research on over-indebtedness and 
debt problems because of some well-formulated meta-theory about debt problems; in 
fact, his contributions may at first sight seem chiefly empirical. Still, it is precisely the 
strong empirical basis of his analyses that theoretically establishes financial difficul-
ties as a social phenomenon rather than individual flaws — at a time when no such 
insights has been systematised.  
Caplovitz’ point of departure is the significant growth in mortgages and consumer 
credit in post-war USA. He notices, for instance, that the volume of non-farm mort-
gages increased more than five-fold between 1950 and 1968, and that the amount of 
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non-secured loans nearly quadrupled during the same period (Caplovitz 1969: 641-
642). In several writings, Caplovitz (1963; 1969; 1974; 1979) shows that people from 
most social layers take on credit and hence commit themselves to a ‘buy now — pay 
later’ way of life — including low-income and poor households, although for differ-
ent reasons and through other sources than the better-offs. An important premise for 
this to take place is a shift in the occupational structure from one dominated by an 
entrepreneurial middle class to one marked by a new salaried and suburbanised mid-
dle class with a strong urge for consumer goods to symbolise social position. An 
accompanying premise is a bureaucratisation of the work institution to regulate em-
ployment contracts and wages. A third factor is the emergence of a normative accep-
tance for using credit as way to finance lifestyle needs and homeownerships to bridge 
the imbalance between income cycles and life cycles. Yet another condition is the 
development of a corresponding credit institution that is willing to serve these de-
mands (Caplovitz 1969: 643). As pointed out by Ford (1988: 38), Caplovitz’ account 
is ‘.. framed in terms of affluence and consensual norms’.
As system level processes combine to produce growing credit volumes, they also 
substantially increase the risk for debt problems at the household level. Caplovitz 
argues that whenever such risks materialise, the causal mechanisms are fundamentally 
related to budgets; by definition, debt problems are instances of imbalance between a 
given unit’s incomes and expenditures. Already in the first major analysis on low-
income and poor consumers, he insists that it is not the volume of credit in itself, but 
rather the ratio of debt to income — i.e. the relative debt burden — that constitutes 
the risk element; for high ratio values means that there is less surplus and flexibility to 
sustain unexpected reductions in incomes or rises in expenditures. As a starting point 
for a causal model, it follows that any explanation on the spread and distribution of 
debt problems becomes a quest for mechanisms that may alter the value of the ratio. 
In order to obtain a valid basis for such analyses it is required that all incomes and all 
debts — not only mortgages — are included in the ratio. Also, assets such as savings 
and insurance should be considered (Caplovitz 1963: 105-115).  
Based on the debt to income ratio, Caplovitz demonstrates that debt problems emerge 
in the interplay between socio-economic changes, household-level processes and 
individual qualities. To illustrate, about half of the informants in the “Consumers in 
Trouble” study are affected by income losses following from events such as unem-
ployment, temporary redundancy and bad health. This, in turn, may lead to what Cap-
lovitz calls ‘voluntary over-extension’, which refers to situations where the debt bur-
den has gotten out of hand precisely because the denominator of the ratio has dimin-
ished — thereby rendering previously unproblematic credit unmanageable. A related, 
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second mechanism is called ‘involuntary over-extension’. These are households that 
have experienced some kind of unexpected expenditure like medical bills, hospitalisa-
tion or death of a relative — i.e. a rise in the ratio’s numerator due to the acquisition 
of new debts. Quite frequently, creditor misbehaviour such as fraud, deception and 
unclear payment schedules, is part of the processes leading to over-extension. But 
Caplovitz also makes a distinction between inability and unwillingness to pay among 
borrowers, and finds that irresponsible behaviour on the debtor side contributes to the 
difficulties in five percent of the cases (Caplovitz 1974: 49-55).  
Moreover, Caplovitz argues that the ability to withstand changes in the debt to income 
ratio varies across social divisions. In ‘Making Ends Meet’ — a study based on data 
from the economic downturn in the 1970’ies — he demonstrates how recession (high 
unemployment rates) and inflation (escalating expenditures) create financial difficul-
ties particularly among poor and blue-collar households, and to a lesser extent among 
white-collar families and retired people. This is due to the unequal distribution of 
resources along traditional class divides: those with higher incomes, better education 
and wealthier social networks are more likely to fence off economic problems and 
avoid the more severe consequences of the crisis (Caplovitz 1979: 53-87).9 The pat-
tern also fits well with previous results based on data from the less turbulent 1960’ies; 
for instance, the proportion of ‘Consumers in Trouble’ varies according to income, 
occupational educational status and race (Caplovitz 1974: 14-25). 
Already in the late 1960’ies, Caplovitz (1969: 641) makes a point of the fact that 
modern societies largely rest upon the institution of consumer credit as a vehicle for 
creating employment and economic growth. During the 1980’ies he becomes increas-
ingly aware of a long-term market trend whereby close-ended loans are replaced by 
open-ended credit as the dominant form of consumer debt. As opposed to negotiating 
loans for single deliveries of goods and services, people are now able to make multi-
ple purchases by instalment without having to apply for credit each time. This is made 
possible through a sophisticated system of account overdraft facilities and credit 
cards. Indeed, modern banks and financial institutions encourage their customers to 
take advantage of the new opportunities as such debts may be treated as high interest 
loans at a later point in time. Caplovitz (1992; 1992a) finds that during the 1980’ies 
credit cards become a major source of default among consumers. 
                                                          
9 Based on panel data covering the whole high-inflation period (1973-1982), a study by Aldous et. al (1991) 
largely supports these results. But compared to Caplovitz, a stronger association is found between retire-
ment and over-indebtedness as well as between disability and over-indebtedness. 
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2.2.2. JANET FORD: THE INDEBTED SOCIETY
During the 1980’ies, Caplovitz’ ideas start inspiring a growing research interest for 
over-indebtedness in Europe. An outstanding example is Janet Ford whose study of 
‘The Indebted Society’ (1988) elaborates his theoretical perspectives in a UK context 
and offers a fresh look at key aspects of the debt problem phenomenon including 
homeownership and coping behaviour — the latter of which shall be considered in 
section 2.5.   
Much like Caplovitz, Ford’s study is embedded in research on poverty and low in-
come groups. In particular, the budget approach is fundamental as a tool in the em-
pirical analyses; based on detailed data about the informants’ incomes, expenses and 
economic decisions financial difficulties are thoroughly linked to system-level proc-
esses (Ford 1988: 80-86). Also, credit is established as a social phenomenon by trac-
ing its roots back in time — from being a coping strategy among the poor and lower 
classes in the 18th and 19th century, to being the most common way of financing 
homes, life necessities and luxury commodities for all households in the 20th. Ford 
finds many of the same factors behind the development of a credit society in the UK 
as Caplovitz did for the US — including shifts in the occupational structure, rising 
incomes and suburbanisation. But she also mentions additional conditions not men-
tioned by Caplovitz — in particular state intervention in a number of areas such as 
legislation, insurance and welfare provision, all serving to stabilise the system and the 
use of credit as non-problematic for people with income (Ford 1988: 37-40).  
The income condition is important, especially since Caplovitz’ contention about poor 
people taking on credit for reasons of compensatory consumption is found to be an 
insufficient — perhaps erroneous — explanation. Instead, Ford argues that growing 
unemployment and the emergence of a large, secondary labour market characterised 
by temporary or part-time work contracts and low wages lead to a dual credit market: 
one for affluent and one for poor households. To the two streams of borrowers corre-
sponds to two differently motivated economic careers; for as the affluent act upon 
social constraints linking material goods to status, the unemployed, low-paid and poor 
rely on credit for subsistence. This corresponds to ‘upwardly mobile’ and ‘down-
wardly mobile’ credit careers respectively (Ford 1988: 184-186).10 So, whereas taking 
on debt enables most people to adopt affluent lifestyles and even build up assets, the 
downwardly mobile are subjected to a peculiar mechanism where some credit gives 
                                                          
10 In addition, a third, intervening type — ‘maintenance’ credit careers — is mentioned according to which 
new commitments are only taken on when all previous debts are repaid. Such a practise can be associated 
with affluence as well as poverty (Ford 1988: 185). 
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access to more credit until it cannot be sustained any more, whereupon they become 
excluded from a wide range of life chances and exposed to socio-economic depriva-
tion. 
As Ford turns to study downwardly mobile credit careers, she bases the analysis on a 
micro-macro model. The micro level is made up by households and individuals. The 
macro environment in which they operate is not only financial, but is also marked by 
influential political and social dimensions. These are both domains for developing and 
shaping beliefs, attitudes and preferences about goods and services. At the political 
level, systems are established to encourage desirable practises. At the social level, 
property and specific items of goods and services are linked to status and social es-
teem. These processes also influence the way creditors create and market credit of-
fers; not as abstract products but as possibilities to achieve socially coveted goals 
(Ford 1988: 59).  
Unlike Caplovitz (1979: 173-184), who generally finds property to be a buffer against 
debt problems, Ford argues that downwardly credit careers often is related to unsus-
tainable homeownership. The reason is that also low-income households are encour-
aged to own their own homes by political and social influences. As for the first, the 
availability of credit has been a condition for achieving an ideologically coveted goal 
for the British government during the Thatcher reign; viz. an expansion of home-
ownerships into all social classes (Ford 1988: 7, 86). In addition, cutbacks in the 
quantity and quality of local authority rentals, rising rents and long waiting lists have 
urged people into buying homes instead of renting them (Ford 1988: 87). As for the 
social influences, the freedom to choose homeownership establishes itself as a wide-
spread value in the 1980’ies, and individual buyers typically come to hold a general-
ised, positive attitude towards owner-occupation. Hence, Ford’s low-income infor-
mants all associate their investments with achievement and social success. Many of 
them also have long-term plans for further movement up the social ladder by buying 
better homes in the future (Ford 1988: 87). However, homeownership in the lower 
classes lacks a sufficient financial foundation; as unemployment spreads and labour 
market reforms create more short-time jobs at the expense of full-time employment, 
owner-occupation is rendered unsustainable. Also, public support programmes prove 
insufficient as protection against over-indebtedness. As a result, ‘.. more and more 
people are not paying what they owe’ (Ford 1988: 40).  
A major point made from this study is that it is not only the debt to income ratio that 
is problematic; the income level is just as critical (Ford 1988: 79). Indeed, the higher 
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the income, the higher debt-to-income ratios can be sustained — even though the 
value of the ratio itself may seem appalling.  
2.2.3. UDO REIFNER: PROCEDURAL POVERTY
Being a jurist, much of Udo Reifner’s theoretical work falls outside the scope of this 
presentation. Still, he earns a place here because of his ideas about ‘procedural pov-
erty’. The concept was originally proposed in a juridical essay, and refers to certain 
key features of the way credit is regulated — and hence: functions — in modern capi-
talist societies (Reifner 2000b). As a supplement to Ford’s ‘downwardly mobile credit 
careers’, Reifner’s emphasis on the regulative aspect of credit leads to the identifica-
tion of a parallel, fundamental mechanism responsible for the emergence of socio-
economic deprivation among default-debtors.  
The point of departure is that credit is institutionalised in a market environment as a 
major instrument for distributing goods and services among the population. But as 
such, it becomes a double-edged sword. On the one hand, credit is inclusive as it 
gives access to a wide range of socially coveted items — ranging from life necessities 
to luxuries, from mere consumption to investment. In modern economies, social par-
ticipation and identity are largely secured on markets, and the willingness to borrow 
money for such purposes is a major driving force in the development of national 
prosperity. On the other hand, as social careers become subjected to market fluctua-
tions, credit can also be excluding. Whenever a debtor is turned into a default-debtor, 
a series of sanctions come into play, all of which are negative and increasingly puni-
tive up to the point where further access to credit is blocked. As a consequence, the 
possibility to participate in even ordinary social activities quickly narrows and threat-
ens to jeopardise the social identity.  
This is exactly what the concept of ‘procedural poverty’ is about: a deprivation spiral 
rooted in market regulation. Reifner delimits the phenomenon by making a distinction 
between ‘procedural poverty’ and ‘status poverty’; whereas the latter refers to the 
traditional and largely permanent socio-economic deadlock, the former affects the 
layers of the population that do not belong to the traditional poor, but nevertheless 
risk ending up among them because of insufficient means to borrow for investment. 
Reifner argues that a cheaper life can only be accessed through favourable financing 
products, and that those who are systematically excluded from such access necessarily 
suffer deprivation over time. In line with Caplovitz’ (1963) argumentation in ‘The 
Poor Pay More’, he also points out that those who do not qualify for high street credit 
products pay for those who do by having to make use of the more expensive and oth-
erwise less advantageous sub-prime markets (Reifner 2000b: 25). ‘Status poverty’ is, 
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in other words, the end-station, while ‘procedural poverty’ is a generative mechanism 
that, if not counter-acted in appropriate ways, leads to material and social deprivation 
that increasingly share the hallmarks of the traditional poor and eventually park the 
default-debtors among them.  
A further clarification of the phenomenon is obtained by distinguishing between two 
types of economic units. The first are the ‘investment households’ — i.e. those who 
are able to take advantage of other kinds of capital than their own labour by saving 
money and using credit as a means to build up assets like property and education. The 
second type is called the ‘cash-flow households’, who at any point in time receive 
inflation-adjusted salary and nothing else. As a consequence, they are largely unable 
to save and invest, and instead find themselves left to consume most of the credit they 
take on (Reifner 2000b: 10-11). The distinction between the two household types 
corresponds to the difference between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ credit; the 
former referring to loans used for building up assets and the latter to commitments 
taken on for consumption (Reifner 2003). On the whole, this primarily associates 
‘procedural poverty’ with unsecured and unproductive debts in cash-flow households.  
It is only when these distinctions are treated as ideal types that a generalised and pow-
erful mechanism shows itself. For among the majority of households, credit market 
behaviour is a composite phenomenon with elements of both investment and cash-
flow strategies. Hence, as consumer credit is attractive across social divisions, unse-
cured debt may accumulate beyond manageable levels even in affluent families. 
Equally important, investment households risk having secured loans turned into unse-
cured commitments. The typical illustration is when the invested, productive credit is 
rendered unproductive by forced sales of homes at prices lower than the mortgage. 
Another example is small-firm bankruptcies where the business is secured in private 
assets. This leaves those affected with unsecured and more expensive debt loads, and 
hence with nothing but expenditures.  
Unsecured credit is not necessarily a catastrophe. But the moment it exceeds the 
households’ economic capacity the danger is definitely there since it exposes them to 
‘procedural poverty’ mechanisms. From then on the debt load accelerates to unheard-
of levels through accumulated interests, money collection fees, penalty fees, court 
fees and again interests on top of that. As a consequence, access to even ordinary 
goods and services get more expensive as money becomes scarce and access to fur-
ther credit is largely denied — up to the point that even necessary needs eventually 
become inaccessible. As compared to Ford’s notion about ‘downwardly credit ca-
reers’, Reifner’s contribution is that such processes are not only embedded in market 
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forces, but also in a legal system that institutionalise the distributive system in ways 
that pass the buck in its entirety to the default-debtor side. The end result is socio-
economic exclusion with no escapes — unless the very system is changed and the 
risks are radically re-distributed among the creditors and debtors alike (Reifner 
2000b: 33).  
2.2.4. BRIEF SUMMARY
Based on three illustrative contributions, the excursion into debt problem theorising 
has shown that the phenomenon is thoroughly embedded in the wider societal system. 
As its social, financial, political and legal connections have been explored, a new, 
modern type of socio-economic deprivation has been identified; viz. one caused by 
the turn to credit as a major distributive mechanism, the subsequent exposure to mar-
ket forces and the institutionalisation of credit in capitalist societies. The understand-
ing of the phenomenon has evolved from the poverty tradition and onto wider system 
analyses involving concepts such as consumption, investment, recession, unemploy-
ment, homeownership and social class. This does not mean that individual responsi-
bilities are neglected in debt problem theorising; as pointed out, Caplovitz himself 
was among the first to quantify the extent to which the default-debtors are to be 
blamed for the debt problems they experience. But it does mean that the role of the 
individual is predominantly placed within a wider institutional perspective and subor-
dinated contextual influences.  
Still, debt problems have not been the point of departure for elaborate theory building. 
A partial reason is perhaps its roots in poverty research — a discipline marked by a 
continuous quests for causal explanations and politically acceptable solutions. It could 
also be due to the swift spread of financial problems as a mass phenomenon across 
modern capitalist economies. Again, an urgent need for discovering causal mecha-
nisms and practical steps to counteract the effects becomes a driving power and major 
financial source for systematic analyses. Anyhow, debt problems have first of all been 
subjected to extensive empirical research. 
2.3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: CAUSES OF DEBT PROBLEMS
Given the complexity of the phenomenon, the empirical research on causal mecha-
nisms is correspondingly complex, using multiple debt problem indicators of varying 
precision levels. One reason for that is the composite nature of the budget approach, 
which correctly defines over-indebtedness as a mismatch between the households’ 
totality of incomes and expenditures. Another contributing factor is the many differ-
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ent views about how serious default situations should be in order to qualify as cases of 
severe over-indebtedness. Such considerations open up for a variety of indicators — 
ranging from exclusive measures of credit arrears to wider definitions where also 
lacking payments of rent, utility and other household bills are included (Kempson, 
Anderloni, and Finney 2007). It falls beyond the scope of this presentation to review 
the multitude of measurement instruments in use. Instead, the aim is to broadly iden-
tify the typical causes as they are reported in Norwegian and international research. 
Even though generative mechanisms operate in context-specific environments, the 
overall impression is that many of the main causes are found in most countries — but 
with different impacts depending on historical time and place.  
Being true to the theoretical roots, the debt-to-income ratio shall serve as the organis-
ing principle for the review. The focus is, in other words, primarily on destabilising 
factors with respect to incomes and expenses. In addition, findings related to political 
reforms and individual shortcomings are considered. 
2.3.1. THE DENOMINATOR: INCOME
Income as a causal factor is typically studied by applying either one of two ap-
proaches; one that looks at economic problems among low-income families and one 
that focuses on market-related changes in income. As for the first, it is based on the 
simple understanding that incomes may be too small to in the long run support a fam-
ily and typically adopts a wide definition of over-indebtedness. The approach is par-
ticularly noticeable in countries with large low-income populations, such as the UK, 
US and Germany. As pointed out in several British studies, these are households 
typically faced with a daily choice between paying debts and other bills or spend the 
money on food, clothes and other basic needs (Kempson 1996; Kempson, Bryson, and 
Rowlingson 1994). Another characteristic documented by German research is that the 
proportion of income spent on life necessities such as rent is very high (Reifner and 
Veith 1998: 43-49),  and that lone mothers, single person households and families 
with poorly educated providers are over-represented among the default-debtors from 
this layer of the population (Korczak 1991, 1997). In spite of scarce means, low-
income households are not excluded from borrowing opportunities, but take on credit 
for other purposes than the better-offs; instead of investing in property and promoting 
a consumer lifestyle, they typically borrow money to cover life necessities and other 
fairly basic needs like washing machines and television sets. Also, they have a 
stronger tendency than others to borrow money to smooth income fluctuations and to 
pay bills and debts (Herbert and Kempson 1995; Kempson 1996; Kempson, Bryson, 
and Rowlingson 1994; Morris and Ritchie 1994; Speak et al. 1995). 
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Low income as an underlying causal factor is related to procedural poverty mecha-
nisms. Low-income and poor households are typically left to make use of expensive 
credit sources. To illustrate, US trends in the 1990’ies show that interest rates are 
considerably higher in the so-called high-risk or sub-prime markets, as are additional 
charges such as credit insurance (Spagnole 1992; Canner, Passmore, and Laderman 
1999; Gruenstein and Herbert 2000). Other normally expensive sources include mail 
order, hire purchases, licensed and unlicensed moneylenders, doorstep sellers and 
pawnbrokers. Besides, low-income households typically rely on frequent payment 
schedules since this reduces the chances for ending up in debt problems. As demon-
strated by British studies, such arrangements raise the price of credit — and hence the 
goods and services being accessed by borrowing (Kempson, Bryson, and Rowlingson 
1994; Rowlingson 1994).
As opposed to the permanent low-income situation, the focus on changes in income 
deals with a more direct and immediate causal mechanism. On the macro level, it is 
typically related to market fluctuations — particularly in the demand for labour. As 
unemployment leads to dramatic reductions in the households’ incomes, the links to 
economic problems is rather obvious — whether based on macro level or individual 
level data. In an early report, the Building Societies Association in Britain (BSA 
1985) finds that both possessions and arrears doubled between 1979 and 1985, as did 
unemployment. During the early 1990’ies, a macro-level time lag pattern according to 
which a growth in financial problems takes place in the wake of unemployment peaks 
are found in several countries including Austria (Mitter 1992), Italy (Landi and Sam-
buccini 1992) and the Netherlands (Gründler 1992). Still, individual level studies 
reveal a much more direct relationship between the two phenomena. To illustrate, 
Norwegian studies from the 1990’ies show that — even when controlling for socio-
economic variables like income, family type, debt situation and ominous life events 
— the risk for over-indebtedness increases by nearly 140% in case of job losses, and 
escalates even further if it coincides with other events of economic importance such 
as major jumps in interest rates (Poppe 1999a, 1999b, 2004c). Studies from Germany 
(Korczak 1991, 1997; Reifner and Veith 1998), UK (Berthoud and Kempson 1992; 
Kempson 2002; Kempson and Atkinson 2006), France (Auclair 1992) and nine other 
countries including the USA (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 2000, 1989; Reifner 
and Ford 1992) arrive at similar conclusions. As for Sweden (Klingander 1995; 
Björnberg et al. 1997; Dellgran 1996), Finland (Sunila and Järvelä 1994; Iivari and 
Heinonen 1997; Muttilainen and Tala 1998) and the US (Sullivan, Warren, and West-
brook 2000) analyses show that unemployment is not only one of the major causes of 
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payment problems, but also a common reason for people to turn to seek debt counsel-
ling and apply for debt settlements and bankruptcies. 
Not only recessions, but also restructuring processes in the labour market may lead to 
redundancy and reduced incomes for many households. Of particular interest is a 
major trend in capitalist labour markets since the late 1980’ies generally known as 
‘flexibilisation’. The term refers to shifts in the types of jobs offered — from tradi-
tional full time and long-term employment to flexible contracts; i.e. part-time jobs, 
temporary work and self-employment. The problematic aspect lies in the fact that the 
jobs offered in the flexible segments of the marked are low-paid. They are also unsta-
ble positions. In liberal market settings such as the UK, many employees find them-
selves in a downward spiral, subjected to frequent job losses and re-employment at 
lower salaries (Gregg and Wadsworth 1995; Ford 1988, 1989; Ford and Wilcox 1998; 
Ford and Burrows 1999). In the US context, the restructuring processes are referred to 
as ‘job skidding’ and ‘job erosion’; whereas the first is about re-employment in lower 
paid and less stable jobs, the latter implies removal of key tasks, pay cuts and reduced 
work-hours. In addition, ‘job-polarisation’ may take place whereby wage-earners 
who were previously occupied in middle-level positions are left to choose between 
unemployment and re-employment in less attractive jobs (Sullivan, Warren, and 
Westbrook 2000: 16-18, 82-107). In Norway, such trends are indeed modest. 
For some, self-employment may be an alternative. But unfortunately, this does not 
necessarily stabilise the income situation. A particularly worrying feature of small 
businesses is that the capital needed often come in the form of private mortgages. In 
many countries including Norway a major cause of severe debt problems are found to 
be small firm failures (Poppe and Tufte 2005: 26).  
There are of course a number of life events that are not as directly related to labour 
market developments as unemployment and restructuring processes. Among these is 
bad health. The effects on the households’ income — and in turn: on the likelihood of 
developing debt problems — depend on many factors such as who in the family falls 
sick, the extent to which the capacity to work is affected, the permanence of the situa-
tion and the presence of an adequate institutionalised safety net. The latter probably 
accounts for the relatively modest effect that bad health seems to have on over-
indebtedness in Norway (Poppe 1999b) — even though long term and severe prob-
lems like cancer do have decisive impacts on the family’s economy (Borgeraas 2005; 
Borgeraas, Brøyn, and Gudbergson 1996). But as is shown below, these ramifications 
may not only stem from loss of income, but also from increased expenditures.   
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2.3.2. THE NUMERATOR: EXPENSES
During the late 1970’ies and 1980’ies — and somewhat earlier in the US — most 
capitalist countries of the West have deregulated their credit markets. As a result, 
credit is offered in the form of easily accessible mass products, fabricated by an in-
creasingly sophisticated and competitive banking industry. This, in turn, has led to 
substantial increases in consumer debt and mortgages at the household level. To illus-
trate, the total credit volume among households in Norway increased from NOK 153 
billion in 1981 to 450 billion in 1988 when the deregulation process had been brought 
to a successful close — an overall growth factor of 2.9 (Stortingsmelding 1989-90: 
58). Another example is Germany where consumer credit volumes increased tenfold 
between 1970 and 1991, or alternatively if mortgages are included, doubled from 
1987 to 1997 (Huls et al. 1994: 10; Reifner and Eichler-Weiskorn 1992; Reifner and 
Veith 1998). Similar developments are documented in most Western countries  in-
cluding Scandinavia (Konsumentverket 1991; Muttilainen 1991; Pulkkinen 1988), 
France (Auclair 1992), Austria (Mitter 1992), Switzerland (Gründler 1992), the US 
(Luckett and August 1985), Belgium, Ireland, Greece, and even countries where 
households traditionally are reluctant to take up loans such as Spain and Italy (Huls et 
al. 1994).  
Research from many countries has generally reported positive, macro level correla-
tions between post-deregulation credit volumes and the spread of over-indebtedness 
(Huls et al. 1994). At least three major types of mechanisms seem to be operative. 
Firstly, increased market competition and easy access to financial products may sim-
ply provide some households with too much credit. Secondly, however reasonable 
given debt loads may seem at the time of the borrowing, any such commitment ex-
poses the households to market fluctuations and make them less resistant to reces-
sions, increasing prices and powerful life events. Thirdly, the growth in credit volume 
has not only taken place because financial products have been made generally avail-
able to households with spending power; creditors have also marketed tailored prod-
ucts into new and more risky segments of the population. In Norway, this has resulted 
in growing numbers of defaults among young consumers and women — groups that 
previously had limited access to credit or no access at all (Lindorff 2003).  
Rising credit volumes are primarily related to mortgages. This, of course, presupposes 
a deregulated housing market. Initially, many countries had systems implying that a 
certain proportion of homes were kept off the market through political regulation and 
institutionalised instruments such as building societies, state banks, housing coopera-
tives and welfare programmes. The deregulation of such systems involves judicial 
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measures of various kinds. In the UK, for instance, the relaxation of controls over the 
building societies in 1986 was a key step. Another was the ‘Right to Buy’ scheme 
encouraging local authorities to unroll their ownership of rentals by selling them to 
the tenants (Forrest and A. 1994; Kempson 1996; Ford and Burrows 1999). Similar 
developments took place in Norway. Here, an important step was the implementation 
of new legislation in the early 1980’ies permitting independent housing co-operatives 
to dissolve at the same time as the maximum prices on flats belonging to public build-
ing projects were lifted (Barlindhaug and Skogstad 1990). Deregulated housing and 
credit markets combine to increase debt loads at the household level primarily 
through a ‘homeownership loop’ whereby people sell and buy homes and the propor-
tion of homeowners grows. But there is also a secondary ‘consumption loop’ through 
which property is used as security to finance non-productive purposes such as cars, 
holidays and other capital-intensive items (Poppe 1990: 33-35; Lunde and Poppe 
1991: 41-42; Ford 1988: 20). 
Another factor behind growing credit volumes is the development of numerous finan-
cial products whereby one may pay for consumption through borrowing. In particular, 
advanced risk-assessing technologies and market segregation strategies have enabled 
flexible and tailored credit products (Thrift and Leyshon 1997; Burchardt and Hills 
1998; PFRC 2000) — especially in the form of card facilities which in turn is largely 
responsible for the spread of consumer credit around the world (Ritzer 1995; Reifner 
and Veith 1998). On the one hand, this is welcomed by business interests and house-
holds alike as it simplifies consumption and enhances profit and national prosperity. 
On the other hand, there is little doubt that it also represents a major route into over-
indebtedness. For a start, the fact that loan offers and card facilities flourish lead to 
increasing debt burdens and more vulnerable risk profiles. Also, credit card debts are 
about the most expensive form of credit there is. In addition, risk-assessing technolo-
gies are widely used to sell capital-intensive goods into social groups that were previ-
ously excluded from credit-based purchases (PFRC 2000; Sullivan, Warren, and 
Westbrook 2000; Goldstein 1999; Gruenstein and Herbert 2000). In fact, at the turn of 
the century the fastest growing group of credit card customers in the US have incomes 
below the poverty line (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 2000: 23-24). Not surpris-
ingly, these data show significant increases in card debts among bankrupts between 
1981 and 1997 (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 2000: 108-140). A recent Norwe-
gian study indicates a similar growth in consumer debts among applicants of debt 
settlements between 1999 and 2004 (Poppe and Tufte 2005).  
Besides borrowing, there are of course many other factors that increase expenditures 
and sometimes destabilise — a perhaps already strained — budget. Among these are 
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unexpected bills related to system-level processes such as tax adjustments and sudden 
jumps in energy prices (Poppe 1997b; Poppe and Borgeraas 2003b), and daily life 
incidents like unforeseen car repairs and telephone bills (Klingander 1995).  
There are, on the whole, a number of powerful events that may turn the lives of those 
concerned up-side down and redefine the conditions under which economic careers 
are pursued. Bad health has already been mentioned as affecting the households’ 
incomes, but long-term physical and mental sickness may also severely increase ex-
penditures due to a need for costly medicines, rehabilitation and disability — in par-
ticular in countries with poor health insurance (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 
1986: 166-175; 2000: 141-163; Grant 1995). As for Norway, the Norwegian Cancer 
Association reports that the patients’ situation is little understood by social workers at 
the municipality level, and that financial problems may develop following from a lack 
of tailored public support (Borgeraas 2005; Borgeraas, Brøyn, and Gudbergson 1996).  
Another widely documented life event effect in many countries — including the US 
(Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1986, 2000) and a number of European countries 
(Huls et al. 1994) such as Finland (Sunila and Järvelä 1994), Sweden (Dellgran 1996), 
Norway (Poppe 1999b), UK (Ford 1988) and Germany (IFF 1998; Reifner and Veith 
1998) — is divorce and relationship breakdowns. In as much as this leads to over-
indebtedness and debt problems, it generally follows from the fact that economic 
resources, before counting as one, now is divided into two and often uneven parts. 
Just as bad health, relationship breakdowns typically affect both the income situation 
and the expenditure profile of those concerned. A particularly impacting aspect of this 
type of event is homeownership; if property has to be sold as part of the process, the 
outcome obviously depends on the market situation. Another critical aspect is that 
couples splitting up sometimes take on additional and often costly credit underway to 
pay for bills (Klingander 1995; Freddy 1997; Goldstein 1999).  
2.3.3. POLITICAL REFORMS
The conditions for economic action at the household level largely depend on political 
decision-making. It follows that any economic or economy-related reform may 
change these conditions in positive or negative ways. In as much as they contribute to 
problematic end results at the household level, three general features seem to be par-
ticularly important. The first is that reforms have retrospective effects; favourable 
economic dispositions made under previous conditions may now become disadvanta-
geous. To illustrate, a Norwegian tax reform carried out in the late 1980’ies aimed at 
curtailing the amount of tax-deductable interests on loans, thereby restricting credit-
based private consumption. But the change of rules did not only affect future borrow-
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ers; as the real costs of credit generally increased, tax expenses were raised for a ma-
jority of Norwegian households (Hansen and Koren 1990; Statistics-Norway 1990; 
Poppe and Borgeraas 1992: 57-58). Similar retrenchmentsare observed in other coun-
tries as well, such as Sweden (Klingander 1995) and the UK (Kempson 1996). 
A second critical feature is complexity; reforms are always implemented in specific 
contexts and may therefore interact with coincidental changes and other reforms. The 
Norwegian deregulation process may serve as an example. As it were, the housing 
market was deregulated first, then the credit institution, and finally came the just 
mentioned tax reform. The result was accelerating housing prices, a corresponding 
exponential growth in credit volumes at the household level and the development of a 
competitive culture within trendsetting financial institutions — eventually leading to a 
bank crisis where the three largest commercial banks were taken over by the govern-
ment (NOU 1992; Reve 1990, 1992; Knutsen, Lange, and Nordvik 1998; Vale 2004). 
In retrospect, many writers have argued that the consecutive order of events should 
have been the opposite, starting out by the tax system and ending up with the housing 
market. Done in this way, a more realistic real interest rate would probably have es-
tablished itself much earlier, which in turn would have delimited the amount of credit 
taken on by firms and households (Isachsen 1990; Steigum 1990; Lunde 1990a). 
Instead, the debt problems created in the wake of these reforms are to this day sub-
jected to court proceedings and debt settlements (Poppe and Tufte 2005: 27).  
The third feature about reforms is that they are motivated by political goals and inter-
ests. The most obvious example is probably the deregulation processes, which are 
directly related to liberal ideas about the ‘freedom to choose’ and the ‘right to own’.
But even though the majority of the population may appreciate competitive markets 
and enjoy becoming homeowners and moneyed consumers, the number of over-
indebted households has also risen — particularly in the lower end of the social strati-
fication system. Privatisation is another example; British Telecom, British Gas, the 
water companies and the electricity companies were for instance sold to private inves-
tors during the 1980’ies and early 90’ies, leading to rises in prices on the services 
offered. Again, even though a majority of the population may profit in the long run 
from improved services, some parts of the population obviously find the growing 
prices difficult to handle: in 1994 alone some two million households defaulted on 
their water bills (Herbert and Kempson 1995). In Norway, a liberalisation of the en-
ergy supply was carried out in the latter half of the 1990’ies, linking each household 
to fluctuating prices in the newly established Scandinavian energy market. The im-
pacts on the number of default-debtors are unknown, but to date probably modest 
(Poppe and Borgeraas 2003b).  
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2.3.4. INDIVIDUAL SHORTCOMINGS
Even though existing research is rich on documentation of structurally embedded 
causal mechanisms, individual shortcomings are not overlooked. As already men-
tioned, Caplovitz (1974: 85-90) estimates the proportion of irresponsible debtors to be 
about five percent. The category includes personal qualities like bad faith, forgetful-
ness, refusals to pay for merchandise that is stolen or broken, and economic disorder. 
Whereas the latter is a rather innocent quality, bad faith — as when the debtor loses 
interest in paying — and payment refusals are instances of immorality. Still, having 
empirically identified the existence of such misbehaviour and estimated its scope, 
Caplovitz finds it paradoxical that such a small minority stands out as the prototype of 
the creditors’ image of the default-debtor.  
Much in the same spirit, a UK analysis finds that those who show bad intent and un-
willingness to pay either hold back money on principle; or withhold payment of debts 
to their ex-partners; or deliberately work the system to see if they can avoid payment 
altogether; or run away from their responsibilities by blaming the creditors for their 
debt problems. Since the study is based on qualitative interviews, the proportion of 
‘won’t-pays’ is not estimated for the British population as a whole (Dominy and 
Kempson 2003). A Norwegian study finds that many of the same types of individual 
flaws lead the courts to set aside debt settlements. Also, criminal acts — or suspicions 
thereof —  are among the grounds for such dramatic court decisions (Poppe 2005a).  
Somewhat in contrast to the Caplovitzean approach, certain recent studies based on 
quantitative survey data argue more crudely. For instance, Goss and Souleles (1999) 
claim that the risk-composition of the US households has not worsened during the 
mid-1990’ies and that the upward trend in the number of bankruptcies is likely to be 
due to a change in attitudes. They go on to argue that it has become less stigmatising 
to default on bills and financial commitments, and as a consequence socially easier to 
declare bankruptcy. Quite analogous to this line of reasoning, a Norwegian study 
finds that immoral attitudes are more widespread among default-debtors than others, 
and that the increasing numbers of late payers between 1995 and 1997 are due to 
significant rises in defaults among people who are reasonably well off (Gulbrandsen 
1999). In a more recent study, immoral attitudes and unwillingness to pay are again 
found to be main causes behind the rising numbers of late payments from 1997 to 
2004 (Gulbrandsen 2005). 
A considerably less moralistic approach departs from the view that over-indebtedness 
may result from lack of skills (Reifner and Veith 1998: 49-51); as financial products 
get more numerous and sophisticated, success in economic careers and avoidance of 
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debt problems increasingly depend on personal proficiencies. A recent British study 
defines ‘financial capability’ as concerning skills in four domains; viz. money man-
agement, planning, product selection and information — each of which are measured 
empirically by a number of indicators and combined to form an index (Atkinson et al. 
2006). In as much as poor financial capability leads to over-indebtedness and debt 
problems, steps should be taken to improve knowledge in weak groups. Hence, under 
the heading ‘financial literacy’, German research argues the need to develop better 
banking, debt counselling services and tailored training programmes for households in 
vulnerable city districts (Reifner 2001: 6). A recent American study indicates that 
such initiatives may work, as recipients of debt advice services are found to have 
reduced their reliance on credit and to use bank accounts more sensibly (Elliehausen, 
Lundquist, and Staten 2007). In Norway, a better understanding about private econ-
omy is achieved from teaching it in primary — and until recently: upper secondary — 
school (Borgeraas 1995, 1998; Borch 1997).  
2.3.5. BRIEF SUMMARY AND A NOTE ABOUT DYNAMICS
International and Norwegian research largely document that many of the same causal 
factors are operative across national settings. This is not surprising as economic prob-
lems occur on increasingly globalised markets. Also, the most important causal fac-
tors are structural mechanisms capable of changing the households’ income situation 
and expenditure profiles in fundamental ways. As for the former, the most impacting 
factors relates to persistently low incomes and changes in incomes — including un-
employment, restructuring processes in the labour market, risk-exposed self-
employment and certain life events such as bad health. As for expenditures, the de-
regulation of the markets for credit and housing, increasing debt volumes, unsustain-
able homeownerships, credit cards, unexpected bills, divorce and health problems are 
among the key mechanisms. In addition, political reforms and certain individual 
shortcomings are found to be causes of over-indebtedness and debt problems.  
As already pointed out, the impacts of these factors typically vary across national 
contexts and historic time and place. In addition, it is well worth noticing that prob-
lem-generating processes tend to accumulate in certain households. To illustrate, a 
Swedish study based on interviews with recipients of debt advice recipients finds that 
unemployment combines with divorce in one of five cases, and that a similar propor-
tion scores high on an index where multiple causal factors are included (Dellgran 
1996). The complexity of such processes also implies that the causal relationships are 
equally complex. For instance, a UK study finds divorce and relationship breakdowns 
to be both a cause and a consequence of economic problems (Ford, Kempson, and 
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Wilson 1995). Another example of a two-way relationship is unemployment; some 
may develop debt problems from losing a job, whereas others may lose the job be-
cause of debt problems — and find it difficult to get re-employed (Caplovitz 1974: 
62-63; Spagnole 1992; Baden-Württemberg 1995). As shall be demonstrated in the 
forthcoming analysis on coping behaviour such dynamics are operative in Norway as 
well.
2.4. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: CONSEQUENCES OF DEBT PROBLEMS
Given the importance of a sound economy and the central part that the various mar-
kets play in that respect, it is no surprise that the consequences of developing over-
indebtedness and debt problems are very serious. Just as for causes, the general im-
pression is that many of the same major effects are found in most countries, even 
though the scope and distribution may vary depending on historical time and place. 
And again, the empirical research in the field is rich and varied. The review is there-
fore delimited to broadly identify the typical impacts in four areas; viz. economic 
consequences, social consequences, personal consequences and impacts for society as 
a whole.  
2.4.1. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
Starting out with the economic consequences, they include financial losses, strained 
creditor relationships and dramatic changes in market opportunities. As for the for-
mer, the impacts may be severe indeed, involving foreclosures and the loss of firms, 
homes, cars and other assets. If relatives or friends have provided security for the 
debt, third-parties may lose property as well. The most severe consequences typically 
occur at the later stages of the debt problem career and may vary according to struc-
tural conditions; e.g. foreclosures are more common during recessions than in times 
of high demand (Björk 1994: 513-514; Webb and Wilcox 1991). Still, money collec-
tion routines are always hard to stand up to. Caplovitz (1963: 155-167; 1974:163-165) 
points out that many default-debtors — particularly those from poor and low-income 
strata — do not understand the system and therefore are unable to anticipate the steps 
taken against them. Also, he shows that creditors sometimes use inexpedient methods 
such as calling the debtor at all hours of the day, telling employers and neighbours 
about the problems, using illegal contracts to “settle” the controversies, and exercising 
physical violence. More recent studies from for instance Norway (Vabø 1994) and the 
UK (Dominy and Kempson 2003) indicate that a variety of methods are in use to 
maximise success rates in specified default-debtor segments, and that protective legis-
lation is necessary if acceptable collection practises are to be ensured.  
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During such processes debtor-creditor relationships change as non-payment is a 
breach of contract and a moral offence. But beyond that, certain aspects of debt re-
covery may create misunderstandings and even distrust. One of them is the fact that 
different creditors react differently upon defaults; in particular, whereas unsecured 
debts tend to be subjected to aggressive money collection routines, loans against col-
lateral — normally the largest claims — often call for more relaxed enforcement 
practises. Hence, in the UK Ford (1988: 125) finds that large creditors like the build-
ing societies typically react late upon default, and that the defaulters therefore tend to 
pay other, less important debts. In Norway, a similar pattern is detected. In addition, a 
deep scepticism in debtor-creditor relations is found to emerge from a number of 
circumstances including lack of common understanding about the causal picture, 
difficulties in coming into contact with one-another, doubts about the opposite party’s 
intentions such as the willingness to pay and  the preparedness to reach out a helping 
hand, enduring negotiations, temporary solutions and poor knowledge about the im-
plications of re-negotiated contracts (Poppe and Borgeraas 1992: 165-190). 
But debt recovery has implications far beyond individual debtor-creditor relationships 
as it is punitive by nature and linked to mechanisms that over time may lead to finan-
cial exclusion. People with bad payment records increasingly find themselves having 
difficulties in accessing mainstream credit offers. Instead, they either have to do with-
out or explore sub-prime and sub-sub-prime markets, including unlicensed money-
lenders and criminal circles. This does not only mean more expensive credit but also 
less consumer protection and higher risks for additional financial troubles (PFRC 
2000; IFF 2000; FSA 2000). Beyond credit, financial exclusion also affects other 
services of great importance to the households. For instance, banks may close down 
accounts because they are overdrawn or deny people regular savings accounts or 
transaction accounts due to bad credit histories. Households on their part may volun-
tarily choose to give up such facilities following drops in income or growing payment 
problems, partly because mainstream financial services are unsuitable for modest 
incomes and partly for reasons of non-payments and fear for having their savings 
seized (Åbyhammar and Nordenanckar 2000; Bloch et al. 2000; FSA 2000: 29, 68-
70). In as much as payment problems lead to financial exclusion, it implies more 
expensive and tedious bill paying. Also, lacking basic bank facilities makes it harder 
to get a job, having a home content and health insurance, and to plan for old age 
through life insurance and (extra) pensions (PFRC 2000; IFF 2000; FSA 2000). In the 
long run, limited access — or no access at all — to financial services may lead to 
social exclusion. 
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2.4.2. SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
The most important social consequences of developing over-indebtedness and debt 
problems concern family relationships, social status and exclusion from participation 
in ordinary activities. Starting out with the former, Caplovitz (1974: 283-285; 1979: 
119-137) found that economic problems may in fact both strengthen and destroy fam-
ily spirit depending on the pre-crisis situation: happy marriages are of course more 
resistant to hardships than unhappy ones. Still, research leaves little doubt that eco-
nomic stress may interrupt family stability and increase the tension between spouses. 
Hence, an Australian analysis of bankrupts in the Melbourne area found that a large 
majority of the married couples had arguments over their debt problems that often 
resulted in separation or threats of separation (Ryan 1995: 117-119). Correspond-
ingly, a UK study indicates that in about half of the cases where the default-debtors 
split up from their partners, the arrears pre-date the separation, which in other words 
makes relationship breakups just as much an effect as a cause of economic problems 
(Ford, Kempson, and Wilson 1995). 
In any case, the situation for the children is of particular concern. Norwegian research 
indicates that they are sensitive to the social humiliation that often comes in the wake 
of economic deprivation, and that their ability to participate in activities on equal 
terms with friends and classmates is a constant worry among default-debtors (Wær-
stad 1994: 158-160). But not only are the children subject to their households’ lack of 
money. They are also exposed to the uncertainties following unstable family situa-
tions and the general physical and mental state of their parents. Although many par-
ents claim that their relations with the children have improved, psychological research 
generally supports the conclusion that economic deprivation typically leads to a less 
nurturing and more punitive and inconsistent child-raising behaviour. This is largely 
explained in terms of the anxiety, irritability and depression that a lasting lack of 
means is likely to create in parents (McLoyd 1990: 322-327).  
Severe economic problems further lead to changes in social status and reputation. 
Social stigma, shame and embarrassments are likely to be central elements of many 
default-debtors’ everyday lives. Also, fear for downward mobility is a chief concern 
among middle class households (Ford 1988: 126-130; Sullivan, Warren, and West-
brook 2000: 25, 31-32; Ryan 1995). Involuntary reductions in status may in fact be 
quite traumatic to the individual. A Finnish study, for instance, notices that over-
indebted consumers are typically compelled to give up status-related goods and ser-
vices, which is often considered to be among the most stressful aspects of living under 
strained economic conditions (Jarva 1993). More or less along the same lines, several 
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Swedish analyses demonstrate that accumulating deprivation involves material losses 
as well as a weakening of social relationships, which over time results in changed 
social identities. This, in turn, may imply loss of freedom and control over one’s own 
life. Moreover, once being in a default situation, the new status may interfere with the 
efforts to find solutions; the more the identity is tied to habits and styles that must be 
changed in order to overcome over-indebtedness, the more difficult it is to actually 
implement the necessary steps and avoid further downfalls (Eneroth 1991; Edström 
1995; Dellgran 1996). 
Enduring over-indebtedness and debt problems are also known to delimit the de-
faulters’ social lives. One of the reasons is of course the persistent lack of money; 
hence, Caplovitz (1974: 286-287) finds that his informants are compelled to save in 
on social activities  — including entertainment, eating out and vacations (Caplovitz 
1979: 94-97). More recent research suggests that such steps may lead to social exclu-
sion following from personal disempowerment as well as structural obstacles to par-
ticipation in normal social activities (Poggi 2003: 2). Several Norwegian studies link 
development of social isolation to similar processes. Also, in as much as fencing off 
rather than solving problems is the main order of the day, fear for creditors may be a 
contributing factor, as may efforts to hide the difficulties from friends, colleagues and 
even close family members (Poppe and Borgeraas 1992; Vabø 1994, 1996; Wærstad 
1994, 1995; Enger 1998). Processes of growing social isolation, apathy and traumas 
are also reported from a number of other countries like the UK (Ford 1988: 123-130) 
and Sweden (Starrin et al. 1995; Dellgran 1996; Björnberg et al. 1997).  
2.4.3. PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES: HEALTH
Given the constant worries about bills, incomes and social responsibilities, research 
on personal consequences have particularly focused on physical and psychological 
health impacts. In his pioneering studies, Caplovitz (1974: 280-283) reports that many 
default-debtors suffer from tensions, headaches, insomnia, upset stomachs and loss of 
appetite. He also finds that especially non-whites, families from the lower classes and 
those who are hardest hit by the economic downfall experience a shortage of positive 
feelings and go through high degrees of mental strain (Caplovitz 1979: 137-157). 
Correspondingly, two Swedish studies focusing on recipients of debt counselling 
report that most clients have impaired health and suffer from multiple problems such 
as headaches, stomach-aches, depressions, nervousness and insomnia. Also, after 
developing financial difficulties they have increased the use of tranquillisers (Starrin 
et al. 1995; Björnberg et al. 1997). Bad diets — even hunger — due to a lack of 
money may add to the complications (Nykनnen et al. 2004).  
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As for physical aspects of impaired health, particularly worrying results are given by 
a Swedish analysis as it indicates a causal relationship between debt problems and 
severe health threats like heart attacks, gastritis, gastric ulcers, headaches and psycho-
logical disturbances. Default-debtors run a risk of falling sick that are up to six times 
higher than average scores in the general Swedish population. The study also looks at 
symptoms frequently used as effective predictors of myocardial infarction, including 
vital exhaustion (long-term running out of power), cynical distrust (bitterness, suspi-
ciousness, distrust) and anger-in (not letting out one’s feelings). Over-indebted per-
sons score approximately 20% higher on these indicators than do others.  Moreover, 
in overall health screening default-debtors score extremely low — in fact close to the 
results typical for disabled persons, people over 75 and chronically sick individuals 
(Ahlström 1998). Similar indications of severe health problems are reported from the 
UK (Nettleton and Burrows 2000). 
The psychological impacts are also documented in a number of studies. For instance, 
Ford (1988: 119-123) finds that defaulters typically are haunted by embarrassments, 
constant worries, shock, panic and apathy — at the core of which are feelings of 
shame and fears for being stigmatised. A Finnish study about debt advice clients re-
ports that they often suffer from depressions, lack of concentration, insomnia and 
overstrains. Also, difficulties in interpersonal relationships, increased abuse of intoxi-
cants, suicidal thoughts and other mental disturbances are recorded among them. 
(Sunila and Järvelä 1994). Similar problems are found among Australian bankrupts, 
whose daily lives are marked by widespread anxiety and frequent crying, stomach 
troubles, loss of appetite, increased intake of alcohol, and in many cases depressions, 
frustrations and aggressive behaviour (Ryan 1995: 114-116). In the light of these 
results, it is hardly surprising that, according to a German study, debt problems tend 
to have negative effects on work motivation (Baden-Württemberg 1995).  
Whether taken to the point of failing health or not, enduring economic problems are 
traumatic. One of the reasons is a feeling of personal insecurity. To illustrate, data 
from both Sweden and the UK suggest that the traumas following from repossession 
of homes are not so much related to the material loss as it is to the change in personal 
identities and belonging (Almquist 1989; Saunders 1990; Björk 1994; Nettleton and 
Burrows 2000). Another reason is self-blame. A Swedish study notices that this is a 
particularly striking feature in cases where consumer credit dominates the debt portfo-
lio. Those being in trouble because of mortgages, on the other hand, are less inclined 
to blame themselves (Klingander 1995). A similar pattern is suggested by a compari-
son of German and Norwegian default situations. German defaulters struggle more 
with individual blame and moral denunciation than Norwegians do — the difference 
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being that debt problems in Germany typically involve large proportions of consump-
tion debts whereas mortgage arrears dominate in Norway (Backe 1997). Still, self-
blame seldom take over completely as most people feel that they have been subjected 
to events beyond their own control. Defaulters may even deny that they have made 
any mistakes at all, but that is rare (Klingander 1995).  
2.4.4. IMPACTS FOR SOCIETY
Over-indebtedness and debt problems generate a whole range of effects that aggregate 
to total costs for society as a whole. To arrive at an overall assessment of direct and 
indirect costs for society as a whole is probably impossible. But a quick look at se-
lected indicators suggests that the impact is massive. For instance, as many default-
debtors are found to be at risk for developing myocardial infarction, it is estimated 
that the total cost per patient in Sweden is about £55.000 over a five-year period, 
measured in 1997-currency. In Germany and USA the price tag could very well be 
twice or three times as high (Ahlström 1998). Another indicator is business results for 
banks. A calculation based on 1996-statistics finds that the total losses for Finnish 
banks that year at least amounts to some FIM 700 million plus an additional 38 mil-
lion in case processing costs (Muttilainen 1997). In the UK, it is estimated that mort-
gagors took on losses amounting to a total of nearly £4 billion between 1990 and 1997 
(Ford and Burrows 1999; Ford, Kempson, and Wilson 1995). As the defaults continue 
to grow, scholars such as Ford (1988) and Green (2004) generally see the amount of 
outstanding, unsecured credit as representing a major risk for the British economy. 
Yet another type of costs is associated with the potentials for changes in individual 
attitudes. In his study about the effects of inflation and recession, Caplovitz (1979: 
187-241) reports that those who are hardest hit blame politicians and big business for 
the situation, and therefore lose confidence in federal government as well as commit-
ment to key American values such as free enterprise. Sometimes the frustration trans-
lates into conspiracy theories, as when some informants claim that inflation and reces-
sion are deliberately created in order to discipline the work force. Correspondingly, 
UK studies mention the political costs of over-indebtedness involving ideology 
breakdowns, reduced trust in the government and changing voting patterns. Other 
findings indicate that debt recovery practises are related to changes in the default-
debtors’ attitudes: in general, people become more in favour of delayed payments the 
less understanding creditors are (Berthoud and Kempson 1992; Pattie, Dorling, and 
Johnston 1995; Whyley, Kempson, and Herbert 1997; Ford and Burrows 1999). In 
cases of harassment, Australian (Ryan 1995: 145-164, 218-225) and US (Jacob 1969; 
Stanley and Girth 1971) studies suggest that improperpressure from individual credi-
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tors may trigger default-debtors to petition for bankruptcy, thereby escaping the 
claims made against them. 
2.4.5. BRIEF SUMMARY AND A NOTE ABOUT DYNAMICS
International and Norwegian research document a wide variety of severe conse-
quences of over-indebtedness and debt problems. Starting out with economic impacts, 
these include material losses, exacerbated creditor relations and financial exclusion. 
As for the social consequences, family life is severely affected, both in terms of 
strained partnerships and worsened conditions for the children. Also downward social 
mobility, deteriorating networks and exclusion from ordinary everyday activities are 
prominent. On the individual level, impaired physical and psychological health is 
common, as are feelings of insecurity and self-blame. As for society as a whole, over-
indebtedness and debt problems lead to considerable economic losses and waste of 
resources. There are also political costs involved as the default-debtors’ attitudes 
towards society may change towards distrust and new voting patterns. 
Just as in the case of causal processes, many of the main effects take place across 
national contexts — but in varying degrees depending on historic time and place. 
Also, there is almost certain to be multiple consequences as debt quagmires typically 
imply a succession of accumulating unfortunate events. To illustrate, the afore-
mentioned study on Australian bankrupts notices that two thirds of those having their 
health affected by debt problems suffered from three or more of the impacts listed 
(Ryan 1995: 117-118). Similar accumulations of economic, social and personal ef-
fects are also found in for instance Swedish and Finnish analyses of debt advice cli-
ents (Dellgran 1996: 79-88; Muttilainen and Tala 1998). Moreover, as the conse-
quences materialise, they also combine to impact future courses of events and hence 
become causes of future complications. Such dynamics shall be addressed in the 
forthcoming analysis on coping behaviour. 
2.5. COPING WITH OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AND DEBT PROBLEMS
Compared to causes and effects, coping behaviour clearly is the least studied aspect of 
over-indebtedness and debt problems. Still, it has been on the agenda since Caplovitz’ 
pioneering studies, and is largely seen as a type of consequence — more or less on the 
same level as economic, social and personal effects. The position has theoretical as 
well as empirical implications. 
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2.5.1. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON COPING BEHAVIOUR
As long as coping with debt problems is understood as a consequence of the processes 
that have caused the economic problems, the empirical challenge simply becomes a 
matter of identifying the steps taken to minimise and solve the economic, social and 
personal impacts that have occurred. As a result, a number of coping strategies have 
been recorded — chiefly as add-ons in causal analyses or wider accounts of the ef-
fects of over-indebtedness. In addition, extra information has been obtained by study-
ing specific problem-solving initiatives such as economic counselling and bankruptcy 
petitions. 
The perhaps most widespread set of strategies documented by research concerns the 
steps taken to increase incomes — temporarily or permanently. Hence, the unem-
ployed may try to find employment whereas the employed may work overtime or look 
for better paid positions or extra jobs. Education and job-training are other options. As 
for couples, these are strategies open for both partners to explore. However, structural 
constraints such as the availability of jobs, childcare and tailored welfare programmes 
may periodically render some of these options inefficient or inaccessible (Kempson, 
Bryson, and Rowlingson 1994). Still, when the recession peaked in 1992 more than a 
third of the Norwegian defaulter-households reported in a survey that the main pro-
vider or the partner or both engaged in working overtime or taking on a second job 
(Poppe and Ramm 1993: 80). Also, even though the statistical relationship between 
unemployment and undeclared work is contested (Tufte 1994: 80; Isachsen and Strøm 
1989; Arbeidsmiljø 1992; Økonomisk_Rapport 1993: 74), defaulters may of course 
seek out opportunities outside the formal labour market. In extreme cases, some may 
even turn to regular crime (Kempson, Bryson, and Rowlingson 1994). In addition, 
receiving support from family and friends are important, including food supplies, 
clothes for the children, dinner invitations, permission to use somebody’s car and 
favours like goods exchange, reciprocal cash loans and cash gifts (Klingander 1995; 
Kempson, Bryson, and Rowlingson 1994).  
Defaulters may also curtail expenditures in a number of ways. Saving in on variable 
costs such as clothes, shoes, individual spending and food are obviously among the 
most common strategies. Especially food budgets are known to be curtailed to the 
extremes, perhaps because it is one of the few budget items that are fully controlled 
by the household. In fact, renouncing on food may be the only strategy left for low-
income families and households that have been under pressure for a long time 
(Kempson, Bryson, and Rowlingson 1994). For the more wealthy defaulters, selling 
property and using savings are well-known strategies. At the peak of the debt crisis in 
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1992, about one fifth of Norwegian defaulter-households reported to have done this 
(Poppe and Ramm 1993: 80). Additional options include trying to reduce fixed ex-
penditures by negotiating with the creditors or simply terminate contracts if possible 
— including important commitments such as insurances (FSA 2000: 37).  
It is a well-known fact that unpaid bills and arrears are sometimes paid with borrowed 
money. To illustrate, in 1991 some 95.000 over-indebted Finnish families with mort-
gages took on additional credit to pay down debts (Timonen 1993). The strategy de-
pends on a number of factors, among which the structural availability of risk capital is 
crucial. By tradition, the US sub-prime market is particularly large, serving those who 
for various reasons cannot access high-street offers (Canner, Passmore, and Laderman 
1999: 715-716; Goldstein 1999: 9-10). There is also an alternative lending market in 
the UK (FSA 2000: 42-45). Additional sources of credit may include pawnbrokers 
(Caskey 1991; Caskey and Zikmund 1990; FSA 2000: 43) and illegal moneylenders 
(FSA 2000: 43). In the Nordic countries, default-debtors have traditionally had lim-
ited access to additional credit, but this has gradually changed in recent years.   
Yet another widespread set of strategies is seeking advice. As pointed out by Ryan 
(1995: 122-125), Australian families in financial trouble often consult informal net-
works; i.e. relatives, neighbours, friends and work colleagues. Defaulters also typi-
cally talk to professional money advisors in financial institutions, public services and 
independent organisations. In Norway, a free-of-charge debt counselling service is 
available at the social security offices. In most countries, professional help is obvi-
ously in great demand; whereas about 130.000 German households sought money 
advise due to financial difficulties in the mid-1990’ies (Reifner and Veith 1998; IFF 
1998), some 2.000-10.000 debt counselling cases were processed each year in Nor-
way between 1991 and 1995 — i.e. during some of the most turbulent years of the 
Norwegian debt crisis (Pedersen 1994; Tufte 1995: 89-91). Since then, the service has 
become more professionalised and widespread, and is in high demand even in periods 
of economic growth: in 2006, for instance, economic counsellors at the social security 
offices processed about 18.000 new cases (Poppe and Tufte 2007). 
Finally, bankruptcy and debt settlement petitions are possible strategies for defaulters 
in most countries. The US bankruptcy institution dates back to 1938, and offers con-
sumer repayment plans as well as partial and full discharge of most non-secured pri-
vate debts. Following the growth in over-indebtedness and debt problems, the same 
types of options have been introduced in Denmark (1984), the UK (1986), France 
(1989), Norway and Finland (1993), Sweden (1994) and Germany (1999). The actual 
content and principles advocated by these laws vary across national settings, which 
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make bankruptcies and debt settlements more or less attractive ways out of the debt 
quagmire  (Niemi-Kiesiläinen 1995: 69-91; Tufte 2005). 
2.5.2. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: THE ADD-ON PERSPECTIVE
As long as coping behaviour is treated as a consequence of predominantly system-
level causal processes, there is hardly any need to develop specific theories about 
such conduct. Instead, dealing with debt problems appears as empirical manifestations 
of the said processes — implicitly consistent with or explicitly explained by them. As 
a result, coping strategies tend to be added to the list of consequences rather than 
treated as a social phenomenon in its own right — hence the ‘add-on perspective’.
Both Caplovitz and Ford may serve as examples. Starting out with the former, part II 
of ‘Making Ends Meet’ has three chapters on the ‘Consequences of inflation and re-
cession’ at the household level, one of which is titled ‘Coping Patterns’. The chapter 
identifies five major strategies in use; viz. curtailment of expenditure, self-reliance 
and bargain hunting, income raising, sharing, and reliance on credit. Caplovitz shows 
how these strategies combine to form different patterns across social divisions; in 
broad outline, whereas poor households predominantly engage in curtailing expendi-
tures, self-reliance practises and bargain hunting, blue-collar — and to a lesser extent: 
white-collar — defaulters concentrate on trying to increase the incomes and reduce 
their expenses. Also, the harder the families are hit by inflation and recession, the 
higher the number of strategies in use. However, given the unequal distribution of 
chances on markets and access to resourceful networks, the output from these strate-
gies are less successful for poor households (Caplovitz 1979: 91-117).  
As for Ford’s book about ‘The Indebted Society’, there is a chapter on ‘Experiencing 
and managing arrears’ that, quite similarly, mentions eight coping strategies: viz. 
doing nothing, telling no-one, cutting basic consumption, cutting protection (e.g. 
insurances), cashing in savings and insurance, getting help from relatives, borrowing 
money, and seeking work. The study was designed to capture the dynamics of the 
debt problem situation, as the informants were visited three times by the interviewer 
over a nine month period. Still, the analysis does not develop a time perspective to see 
how the defaulters’ conduct develops as the debt problems aggravate. Instead, the 
implementation of strategies are largely seen as reactions to a single, but fundamental 
change in the informants’ economic situation; viz. from no problems to debt problems 
primarily due to major system level processes (Ford 1988: 118-146, 69-73). 
On the other hand, theories about coping behaviour are found in related fields of re-
search such as unemployment where a conception about sequential coping processes 
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was introduced as early as in the 1930’ies (Jahoda and Lazarsfeld 2002 [1933] ). 
Another noteworthy example is Newman’s (1989) cultural study of downward mobil-
ity. In ‘Falling from Grace’, she explores how US middle class informants from two 
different job cultures struggle with economic problems and identity crises after having 
lost their jobs. As coping behaviour is treated as strategic action rather than merely a 
consequence of being made redundant, it now appears as systematic attempts at resist-
ing downward social mobility and exclusion. As a result, the implementation of 
strategies jointly reflects a comprehensive orientation, involving family relationships, 
social networks, communities, structural conditions, normative constraints and cul-
tural values. Newman shows how social exclusion leads to insecurity and chaos that 
can only be solved by re-integration. However, as people slide down the social ladder 
it becomes increasingly difficult to find milieus that satisfy one’s expectations and 
values. A critical factor is how downward mobility processes are triggered: by a pub-
licly recognised injustice done to many or some individual tragedy. In the latter case, 
the person is typically left to solve the problems alone, which in turn delimits the 
scope of action and progressively lead to shame, stigmatisation and isolation.  
2.6. SUMMARY; QUESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
To sum up, research on over-indebtedness and debt problems has emerged from the 
poverty tradition. Among the most important influences is the budget approach 
whereby economic deprivation is understood as a persistent imbalance between the 
households’ totality of incomes and expenditures. Based on this view, research in the 
field has aimed at bringing forth information about especially three aspects; viz. 
causes, effects and coping. As for causes, the most important mechanisms capable of 
destabilising the balance between incomes and expenses have been located at the 
system level. The consequences of being exposed to such processes are severe, rang-
ing from economic losses and financial exclusion to social deprivation, personal inse-
curity and impaired health. Also, distrust in economic and political institutions is 
common. As for coping behaviour, this is the least studied aspect. It is symptomatic 
that no theory about such conduct has been developed. However, a number of strate-
gies have been identified empirically.  
In most analyses, coping behaviour is seen as a consequence of having developed 
economic problems, and hence as empirical manifestations of predominantly macro-
level causal mechanisms. The problematic aspect of the position is that coping is put 
on the same footing as singular events and end results — such as a forced sale, a bro-
ken marriage or a nervous breakdown. But coping is more than that; it refers to how 
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people who experience such events respond to them, learn from them and recognise 
them as premises for future action. Coping is, in other words, the action aspect of debt 
quagmires where causes and effects combine to form vicious circles. As such, it must 
be analysed within the frameworks of a theory of action.  
In the chapters to follow, knowledge about how people cope with severe debt prob-
lems is developed along these lines. Four key issues seem important. Firstly, there is a 
call for a dynamic perspective. At the household level, causes and effects jointly form 
processes where specific events produce specific consequences, which in turn become 
premises for future action as new conditions are established with the potentials to 
cause additional complications — or relief for that matter. The first research question 
for the forthcoming analysis is therefore, 
(i) How do default-debtors cope with debt problems over time? 
Secondly, a theory of action approach to coping behaviour implies that the defaulters’ 
conduct must be placed in a contextual perspective. The way people deal with finan-
cial problems is hardly decided by the sequences of causes and effects alone; obvi-
ously, much wider elements of the defaulters’ life situations influence their actions. 
This is primarily a matter of the presence — and absence — of resources in a wide 
sense. Hence, the second research question to be addressed is,  
(ii) What — if any — is the impact of social division on coping be-
haviour? 
Thirdly, the handling of debt problems raises the issue of normative constraints. In 
general, any action must be justified in order to be socially acclaimed. But since en-
during debt problems by definition represent breaches of contract and violations 
against the repayment norm, it becomes increasingly difficult to defend the situation 
to oneself and others. The third research question to be addressed is therefore, 
(iii) How is the continued lack of repayment justified? 
Finally, it should be demanded from a new theoretical approach that it improves exist-
ing knowledge about coping behaviour. Hence, the fourth and last question is, 
(iv) To what extent do these aspects inform a generalised under-
standing about how people cope with debt problems?  
With this it is time to turn to the analysis. The place to begin is to develop a suitable 
analytical model. 
3. THE SOCIAL ORIENTATION IN 
ECONOMIC LIFE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter proceeds to develop the analytical framework that is needed to address 
the research questions in section 2.6. The argument rests upon the proposition that 
credit-related practises are institutionally conditioned. The ambition is to account for 
a particular type of social interaction — viz. coping with over-indebtedness — by 
identifying the mechanisms that are likely to generate the ways in which defaulters 
handle their financial difficulties. The proposition implies that many of these mecha-
nisms emerge from the institutional constraints that condition such conduct.  
By introduction, it is further assumed that default-debtors — just like people in gen-
eral — are rational in the sense that they try to respond adequately to current norms, 
values and opportunities in their surroundings. However, the fact that the repayment 
norm is violated suggests that that the logic behind credit-related practises could be 
quite different under two qualitatively very unlike conditions: viz. when there are and 
when there are not enough means to handle the financial obligations. In what follows, 
the point is developed by arguing that that debt management in general, and coping 
with insolvency in particular, not necessarily rests on market-based constraints alone, 
but may also be influenced by entirely different sets of premises. 
The chapter sets out by specifying the theoretical challenge in more detail. Next, the 
attention is drawn to some key aspects of the rationality concept in mainstream mi-
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croeconomics and sociology. The intention is to explore the implications of applying 
the notion of utility maximisation in the analysis of coping behaviour. As the ap-
proach fails to deliver a comprehensive understanding, the chapter turns to Durk-
heimian-inspired as well as phenomenological and institutional theories to explore 
supplementary angles. Based on Habermas’ distinction between ‘system world’ and 
‘life world’, it is argued that coping with debt problems basically follows a social 
orientation. In the final sections of the chapter, such an orientation is spelled out in 
more detail using a concept of ‘standard packages’.
3.2. THE THEORETICAL CHALLENGE 
Credit-related practises are embedded in institutional settings. For a start, credit is 
typically accessed through professional organisations offering a multitude of products 
through sophisticated and formalised systems. These systems, in turn, are supported 
by a legal framework and society’s machinery of power. As each component adds up 
to form a national credit system, they also become parts of the global economy and 
international law. But the institutionalisation of credit goes well beyond the core eco-
nomic and legal systems; in particular, credit is a tool in social welfare and a means 
by which property, goods and services are distributed among the population — both 
of which are subjected to considerable political interest. Besides — or even better: 
above all — credit is embedded in cultural codes for when and how borrowed money 
should be used.  As a consequence, coping with unpaid debts necessarily becomes 
affected by multi-level institutionalised constraints. 
The default-situation evolves in market settings, and is therefore initially defined as a 
breech of contract between a debtor and his creditors. This provides the starting point 
for directing a number of expectations towards the defaulters. One of them is to im-
mediately report any difficulties in keeping the payment deadlines. Another is to 
always be available to the creditors and supply them with all necessary information so 
that they can maximise their chances to get the money back. The default-debtor is also 
obliged to negotiate solutions, change his lifestyle and sell assets in order to free 
means to the benefit of the creditors. And of course, in as much as new agreements 
are reached, he is expected to keep the re-negotiated repayment schedules.  
Expectations also follow from the surrounding legal arrangements. On the one hand, 
there is a large body of laws and regulations that are punitive by intent and actual 
effects. As shown in chapter 1, the default debtor is now legally exposed to money 
collection routines, wage deductions and court proceedings — all designed to back up 
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the creditors’ claims. But on the other hand, there is also legislation that defines cer-
tain benchmarks by which the parties may solve the problems — voluntarily or invol-
untarily. These include debt settlement schemes and norms for minimum subsistence 
levels and maximum wage deductions. In addition, a free economic counselling ser-
vice is established in each municipality to offer assistance in negotiations and, if per-
mitted, to propose tailored solutions based on social welfare programmes. 
Default-debtors are of course generally expected to respond to all of these constraints 
and opportunities. But equally important, in doing so the intent of honesty should be 
explicitly demonstrated — for instance by keeping a job according to one’s abilities 
and qualifications, taking on a second job if possible, and living frugally without 
hiding incomes and assets such as property and inheritance. The moral component in 
these expectations cannot be underestimated; just as the unemployed, who are de-
manded to submit to the norm of work by formally taking on the duties as unem-
ployed, defaulters are expected to show a similar compliance with the repayment 
norm through a number of less formalised, but still more or less clearly defined sets of 
actions.  
But ever since over-indebtedness became an issue in Norway during the debt crisis in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, default-debtor behaviour has emerged as a composite 
phenomenon. Apparently, over-indebted persons only act in accordance with the 
expectations to a certain extent. A communication breakdown between creditors and 
debtors was among the first effects to be observed; an early study reports that the 
parties tend to define the default situation differently, adequate information often 
lacks on either side of the table, and negotiations are tardy and difficult to accomplish 
as the defaulters tend to be temporarily unavailable (Poppe and Borgeraas 1992). 
Also, creditors see that over-indebted persons behave economically unwise — even in 
immoral ways, reluctant as they seem to act swiftly upon their problems, instead try-
ing to hide and find ways to avoid paying back what they owe (Vabø 1994). More-
over, default-debtors are found to hesitate — and sometimes refuse — to renegotiate, 
seek professional advice and apply for debt settlements (Poppe 1994; 1995: 233-237). 
Even in cases where such agreements are in fact formally established, many of them 
continue to lead a chaotic life, failing to meet payment deadlines, hiding incomes, 
frittering away inheritance and surpluses that should have gone to the creditors 
(Poppe 1997b, 2005a). The overall impression is, in other words, that many defaulters 
dig their own grave. 
In as much as that is the case, it is as disturbing as it is challenging; pushed to ex-
tremes, if the difference between those who avoid severe financial problems and those 
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who end up in over-indebtedness is that the latter group of people partly act in ways 
that systematically worsen rather than improve their economic situation, how can 
such behaviour be explained? A possible answer that immediately comes to one’s 
mind is that it results from stupidity, irrationality or even calculated, ill intent. But 
before such conclusions are drawn, the premises must at least be clarified. Also, the 
number of possible explanations should not initially be narrowed down to only a few 
— and perhaps biased — alternatives. Instead, the challenge must be approached 
from a broader perspective. 
3.3. MODELLING ECONOMIC ACTION 
As compared to the normal situation, which is without financial difficulties, coping 
with debt problems is about economic action under very different conditions. There-
fore, a theoretical approach is needed that accounts for the transition from one set of 
premises to the other as well as the continued struggle over time. In what follows, a 
simple conception of economic action is proposed that is based on two principal di-
mensions; viz. ‘intentions’ and ‘orientation’. Subsequent sections of the chapter fur-
ther sustain and develop the approach.  
As for the first dimension, it is asserted that human action is intentional. However, 
intent can be more or less explicit at the time the actor acts. As argued by Østerberg 
(1980: 9-59), this turns the twin concepts of ‘pre-reflective and ‘reflective’ action into 
a major theoretical distinction in sociology.11 In the former type of action, intent is not 
pronounced in advance. There is, in other words, no explicit plan; rather it takes form 
underway. In this way, the conduct appear as intentional in retrospect (Østerberg 
1980: 15). As opposed to this, ‘reflective’ action is characterised by aiming at achiev-
ing explicitly specified goals. Here, a plan is made in advance upon which the actor, 
so to speak, carries out a performance he has already enacted in his mind. This is how 
modern people like to present themselves; as logic actors who distinguish between 
intent and action, where the former conditions the implementation of the latter. Nev-
ertheless, such performances can only strive for, but never be completely freed from, 
pre-reflective elements; a plan is never that explicit or original (Østerberg 1980: 20-
21). Indeed, as shall be further sustained throughout the chapter, reflective actions 
presuppose pre-reflectivity. Durkheim was among the first who made this point as he 
                                                          
11 The Norwegian labels used by Østerberg are, directly translated, ’spontaneous’ and ‘circum-
stantial’ action, respectively (‘umiddelbar’ og ‘middelbar’). However, the core attribute of the 
division — which is also emphasised here — is the extent to which a given action is triggered 
by explicit intent. 
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argued that contracts alone do not enable utility-oriented market exchange. Instead, 
any such agreement stands on the shoulders of the habits, routines and customs of 
everyday life; i.e. the institutional contexts that give the contracts validity but without 
having any utility attributes in themselves (Østerberg 1980: 63-64).  
This immediately leads to the second dimension: ‘orientation’. Economic action is — 
more or less by definition — thought of as generally oriented towards economic pa-
rameters; i.e. market opportunities and economic conditions. But as just indicated by 
the ‘pre-reflective - reflective’ dichotomy, there is also a strong social component 
involved. Not only in that economic action presupposes the existence of workable 
everyday habits, routines and customs, but also in the sense that the very aims of such 
actions may more or less explicitly be defined and justified by social norms and val-
ues. For instance, homes are obviously not bought for economic reasons alone; factors 
such as type of dwelling, neighbourhood and distance to urban centres clearly have 
lifestyle-related aspects as well. In as much as that is the case, any given actor may be 
expected to be motivated by economic as well as social orientations. 
The two dimensions of economic action combine to form the model in figure 3-1 
above. Beginning with square (1), these are actions that are motivated by rational 
economic considerations and carried out according to some kind of pronounced, pre-
defined plan. The second square also refers to planned action, only this time to those 
implemented to achieve socially defined goals. As opposed to this, the third square is 
reserved for routinised and diffuse conduct that does not follow any explicit plan but 
still in retrospect appears to be responses to economic values and conditions. Finally, 
square (4) represents the corresponding type of action with respect to social consid-
Figure 3-1: Types of economic action. 
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erations; i.e. the multitude of more or less automated conduct that emerges from 
within frameworks of social norms and values to impact the way money is spent. 
Moreover, economic actions are not atomistic; they are always carried out in socio-
economic contexts. This is indicated by the thick dotted frame surrounding the four 
types of action identified by the model. Contextual determinants influence conduct 
through what may be regarded as ‘cemented actions’ — including taken-for-granted 
rules, legislation and material structures. As far as the analysis of coping behaviour is 
concerned, the basic distinguishing difference between the normal and the debt prob-
lem contexts is the lack of economic means, which introduces entirely new sets of 
institutional conditions for economic action. Some of these are briefly described in 
chapter 1.3. As shall be demonstrated empirically in subsequent chapters, the shift 
also affects the defaulters’ social relationships and hence changes the conditions for 
acting in a wide range of situations — including non-market contexts.  
As a tool in empirical analysis, this relatively simple model of economic action im-
plies a focus on the connection between individual action and the contexts in which it 
unfolds; indeed, this is where the explanatory power of the approach lies. In what 
follows, the model is further elaborated by exploring that connection. 
3.4. REFLECTIVE COPING BEHAVIOUR AS RATIONAL PLANNING
Theories of economic action largely concern reflective conduct. This is not the least 
due to the dominant position of rational choice theory, where intentional acts are 
associated with an instrumentalist conception of rationality according to which eco-
nomic actors seek to maximise utility by pursuing self-interests (Smelser and Swed-
berg 2005: 4). As pointed out by Hedström (2005: 60), the growing impact of the 
approach in sociology during the latter half of the 20th century is inspired by advances 
in the neighbouring disciplines of economy and political science. Rational choice 
theory can be traced back to a psychological conception of ‘interests’, as it was advo-
cated by seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers such as La Rochefoucauld 
and David Hume, and classic economists like Adam Smith (Swedberg 2003: 2-3). As 
for microeconomics, this has led to a conception of rational goal-attainment that is 
based on individualistic views about the market actor (Smelser and Swedberg 2005: 
4). The emphasis on subjective rather than objective interests eventually produced one 
of the most influential analytical tools ever created, viz. the notion of ‘economic 
man’. Put boldly, this is typically an actor who pursues his self-interests in exchange 
situations by making rational choices more or less independently of other individuals.  
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Throughout the centuries, ‘economic man’ has undergone several revisions. Starting 
out in Humean-inspired utility theory as an actor whose preferences were subdued to 
passions, the concept eventually came to denote a character who, freed from the un-
predictability of emotions, is inclined to make pure, rational choices by maximising 
so-called utility functions. This implies that acts of choosing are seen as individual 
decisions based on perceived arrays of possible outcomes. It is further typically as-
sumed that each actor holds a more or less stable set of preferences that enables him 
to evaluate and consistently rank-order the alternative options from highest to lowest 
utility. Often, two additional assertions about the notion of preferences are made. One 
is that they are individual properties, enabling the chooser to act upon his self-
interests more or less without being constrained — or “disturbed” — by the likes and 
dislikes of others. Secondly, preferences are defined as objective qualities that lend 
themselves to measurement simply by observing the choices made.  
Choosing rationally, then, generally means to maximise utility by opting for the out-
come that, among any given set of obtainable alternatives, is the most beneficial 
(Hindess 1988; Elster 1989; Archer 2000a). In sociological extensions such as in Blau 
(1964) and Coleman (1990), rational actors appear as something like a mathematician 
who calculates utility in terms of payoffs — i.e. value minus costs — for each out-
come relative to the respective probabilities for attaining them (Hindess 1988; Collins 
1994). Also, the principle of utility maximisation is taken beyond the market and into 
many other parts of social life, such as marriage (Becker 1973, 1974, 1996), voting 
behaviour (Downs 1957) and trust (Coleman 1990). Additional applications include 
education and strategic behaviour by corporate actors (Collins 1994; Moe 1994).  
So to what extent is the rational choice approach helpful in explaining coping with 
severe debt problems? For a start, market actors are generally regarded as reflexive 
choosers who are responsible for their own economic dispositions. This may fit well 
into the picture of mainstream or highly successful economic careers, but once faced 
with less fortunate and deviant processes it becomes more problematic — especially 
when the deviance in question refers to clearly unwanted outcomes for the acting 
individual. According to what may seem a rhetoric argument — but still one that goes 
straight to the heart of the matter — nobody, or at least very few of us, deliberately 
seek misery and pain. Rational persons should therefore not be expected to make 
choices intended to bring debt problems upon themselves. In as much as that is the 
case, a means-goal model of economic action generally seems unfit to account for the 
causes of the phenomenon. 
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Still, there may be exceptions. For instance, the development of debt problems may 
be rooted in hidden agendas; i.e. that the utility value for the acting individual is not 
related to ordinary economic careers, but to something else. The most obvious case is 
immoral intent including all shades of dishonesty and criminal behaviour. According 
to the model, a person is likely to act upon such motives if the expected utility from 
doing it exceeds the utility of not doing it (Becker 1968) — depending on their per-
ceptions of risk for failure (Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga 2006). Whenever the 
risks materialise, severe debt problems may develop. Also, whenever the incentives to 
change attitudes under economic pressure are lacking, such persons may continue to 
act upon hidden agendas. If so, the emergence of debt problems as well as aggravat-
ing coping behaviour appears to evolve from rational sequences of choice.  
The argument readily extends beyond con-men and swindlers. According to some 
versions of the theory, ‘economic man’ is not a one-sided character, but an economic 
actor who interchangeably tends to focus on multiple goals and even seek obtaining 
several of them simultaneously (Blau 1964; Moe 1994: 116 - 118). Hence, rather than 
a clear-cut division between honest and dishonest actors there may be a mix of good 
and bad intent inherent in any sequence of rational choice. It follows that even pre-
dominantly candid persons may sometimes commit dubious acts and for that reason 
end up in financial difficulties. Whether a major explanation or not, it is nevertheless 
a possible one, and enough to justify a strong moral component in debt settlement 
legislation (cf. Moe 2003: 85-116) and public discourses on over-indebtedness and 
immorality (Poppe 2004a; 1999a; Tufte 2005; Gulbrandsen 1993, 1999, 2005; 
Monland 2003). 
Moreover, once severe debt problems have occurred the applicability of the rational 
choice approach may extend beyond cases of immoral conduct. Indeed, as default-
debtors necessarily have to deal with creditors and legal authorities as part of their 
coping behaviour, it cannot be precluded that a number of choices may follow a prin-
ciple of utility maximisation. Obvious candidates include rational prioritising between 
claims, strategic negotiations with the creditor side and steps to avoid stigmatising 
situations. The logic may also extend beyond economic considerations to include 
normative constraints — as for instance when default-debtors have to equilibrate 
conflicting social norms such as the duty to pay debts and the obligation to ensure the 
material and social welfare of one’s children. Following Elster (1989), another exam-
ple would be the need to secure a favourable social reputation by maximising codes of 
honour to compensate for the failure to comply with the repayment norm. Even 
though rational choice theory typically rests on the premise that market actors are 
egoistic and even atomistic, a sociological extension where social norms and even 
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altruistic motives enter the equation do not necessarily violate the goal-means theo-
rem as such; even altruists may strive to find the best possible action (Skog 2006: 95; 
Melberg 1993: 2). 
However, there are certain premises that, if violated, would undermine or render im-
possible any explanation based on the rational choice approach. In particular, these 
include the assumptions about the ability to consistently rank preferences and the 
need to be well informed in order to do so. As for the first, acting individuals are often 
found to have inconsistent preferences or to change their plans even though no new 
information is obtained. (Skog 2006: 88-89). As for the second, it is not easy to de-
cide the amount of information needed to be able to adequately rank-order prefer-
ences and choose rationally between available options. Therefore, claims on informa-
tion levels tend to vary across flavours of rational choice theory — from fully in-
formed in the classical variants to satisfactorily informed in Simon’s (1982) theory on 
‘satsificing’ which implies that the search for information stops once a good enough 
alternative is found according to the acting individual’s aspirations (see also Kahne-
man and Tverski 1979; Tverski and Kahneman 1981). The challenges involved are 
illustrated by the fact that preferences and outcomes typically depend on interaction 
with others (Hedstrøm 2005: 61), and by realising that these parameters are intrinsi-
cally related to information; whereas preferences and perceived outcomes are likely to 
influence the kind of data to be collected, acquiring new knowledge may change pre-
vious views and attitudes. Such complexities render the rational choice approach 
empirically cumbersome and perhaps even theoretically unrealistic (Hedstrøm 2005: 
60-66).  
Equally important to the forthcoming analysis, rational choice theory implies that a 
wide range of commonly performed actions fall outside the categorisation scheme. 
For instance, people may act by reference to other principles than those associated 
with ‘economic man’, such as communal loyalties, traditions and religious values 
(Weber [1922] 1978: 24-26, 63-68; Haralambos 1985: 280) — all of which may have 
economic implications. People may also act upon emotions and affects. This is not the 
least the case for defaulters as economic problems typically lead to provocative situa-
tions and considerable psychological pressure over time. In addition, people some-
times go beyond such — by definition: non-rational — conduct to behave irrationally, 
either by explicitly acting counter to their preferences or by pursuing unrealistic op-
tions. The latter typically follows from misinterpreting the contextual conditions — a 
type of conduct that seems important to the analysis of coping behaviour since de-
faulters at some point in time cross over from acting under normal conditions to 
standing up to contexts marked by severe lack of economic means. These objections 
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suggest that reflective action may be more than just rational planning and implemen-
tation as defined by rational choice theory. Also, as shall be further elaborated below, 
they indicate that spontaneous, pre-reflective behaviour may be important elements in 
coping behaviour. Even though goal attainment is obviously part of the defaulters’ 
conduct, there is no need to base the analysis on assumptions about rationality that 
only serve to restrict the study to a far too limited set of actions.  
A final point to be made is that in as much as reflective behaviour is motivated by a 
means-goal orientation a confined focus on rational choice may fall short of offering 
explanations on key aspects of such actions. In particular, the actors’ preferences are 
regarded as given; why they emerge and how they may change over time must there-
fore be explained by the use of other theories. In addition, certain parameters are 
treated as external factors. These include the goals themselves and any social meaning 
attached to the chosen sequences of action. Again, there is a need for other theories to 
explain why people act upon specified goals in specific ways (Melberg 1993: 1). As 
shall be argued below, many of these shortcomings are avoided by taking the context 
rather than individual action as the theoretical point of departure. It also allows for 
considering figure 3-1 model in full, and to examine the relationship between reflec-
tive and pre-reflective behaviour. 
3.5. PRE-REFLECTIVE ACTION; INSTITUTIONALISATION
Not only reflective, but also pre-reflective conduct is traceable in theories about eco-
nomic action. Durkheimian-inspired and phenomenological institutional theory both 
imply the exercise of habitualised conduct in economic life due to integrative, institu-
tionalised constraints and internalised norms and values. Yet another — and indeed 
related — approach is Habermas’ theory on communicative action, which suggests 
that economic dispositions may be routinely founded upon social considerations and 
consensus orientation in primary groups (Habermas 2004b [1981] ). A more specific 
theory of economic action is based on the concept of ‘standard packages’, which 
suggests that reflective market performances are intrinsically embedded in non-
market socialisation processes and hence on a large array of routines and customs in 
people’s economic practise  (Riesman and Roseborough 1966 [1955]; Parsons and 
Smelser [1956] 1984: 221-232). All of these approaches are highlighted throughout 
the chapter. 
Starting out with Durkheim, he is among the first sociologists to oppose individualism 
of the kind advocated by rational choice and utility theories. He claims that societies 
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cannot be reduced to the individual, and that individual actors cannot be understood 
as entities in themselves. Instead, he argues the existence — and precedence — of a 
separate social level of collective perceptions and moral values that both enable and 
constrain individual choice, actions and beliefs. According to Durkheim, social phe-
nomena — or ‘facts’ — are characterised by possessing inviting as well as enforcing 
powers that no individual can escape. ‘Social facts’ are also distinguished by being 
external and prior to any given person. They serve as providers of value systems and 
normative guidelines upon which acting individuals can base their actions (Durkheim 
1982; Østerberg 1983: 24-31).  
By definition, social institutions share every feature of ‘social facts’ (Beckert 2002; 
Gronow 2005). Hence, religious systems, legal orders, professional ethics, markets, 
credit devices and family and kinship structures are all examples of institutionalised 
domains whose typical function is to ensure societal integration and avoid moral de-
cay and anomie. As argued by Durkheim — and later elaborated by Parsons — social 
institutions work by norms and values that are internalised during socialisation and 
formalised learning processes. It follows that, as opposed to rational choice and utility 
theories, there is no need to presuppose a calculating rationality in social life; norms 
and values motivate certain actions to take place and explain the origin of individual 
preferences (Gronow 2005: 4; Parsons 1949).  
Whereas the Durheimian-inspired ‘normative’ position in sociological institutional 
theory emphasises regulation and commitment to internalised norms and values, the 
‘cognitive-cultural’ approach adopts a constructionist perspective (Scott 2001: 51-58). 
The paradigmatic assertion is that man produces his own social environment. The 
point of departure is that any repeated human action is liable to become habitualised; 
establishing routines for recurrent tasks allows for repeating them with a minimum 
efforts and learning. A social institution is established whenever such habits are recip-
rocally typified by types of actors. In order for this to happen there must be a continu-
ing social situation in which the routinised actions in question are repeatedly impor-
tant to the actors involved. Once set up, institutions control human conduct by estab-
lishing specific patterns that signify how things are to be done. They represent a par-
ticular social knowledge that is transmitted over time through socialisation and learn-
ing. As a consequence, social institutions appear as a historically legitimate objective 
reality that enable human conduct and channel it in certain directions rather than oth-
ers. As all important areas of social life become institutionalised, individual members 
of society experience the totality of social institutions as a more or less integrated 
whole — a reality that is prior to their own existence, yet constantly engaging them in 
processes of social construction (Berger and Luckman 1984: 65-85).  
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The ‘normative’ and the ‘cognitive-cultural’ approaches are often seen as comple-
mentary, involving a continuum from explicit rules to tacit cultural scripts (Gronow 
2005: 1; Scott 2001). Still, an important difference should be noticed: whereas the 
Durkheimian variant tends to leave the individual almost victimised by institutional 
constraints, the constructivist position implies a dialectic relationship between indi-
vidual actors and social institutions. But as Bhaskar (1998: 32-34) points out, both 
positions are unfortunate. As for the latter, it turns persons and societies into moments 
of the same process and, as a consequence, abolishes the distinction between the two. 
For even though individual action presupposes adequate knowledge, skills, habits and 
moral codes, the constraining forces involved do not determine the exact perform-
ance. This is not the least apparent in deviant behaviour. On the other hand, individual 
persons cannot be thought of as creators of their own contextual environment; since 
the conditions for human action always exist prior to individual action, people are 
instead reproducing — and sometimes deliberately transforming — the institutional 
reality (Bhaskar 1998: 27-37). It follows that system level developments — say the 
tailoring of credit products — cannot be reduced to individual choice just as little as 
changes in human conduct — say economic action — can solely be due to modifica-
tions in market arrangements. 
The idea that social institutions constrain human conduct is dynamically conceptual-
ised by the notion of ‘practises’. Following Schatzki (1996: 89), these are nexuses of 
doings and sayings that emerge from specific understandings about the instituted 
phenomenon in question — such as procedures, rules, instructions, beliefs and en-
gagements. In this sense, any institution is made up by a number of ‘practises’ — i.e. 
established patterns of expected conduct that in the case of the credit institution are 
closely connected with the workings of some of the most important organisations in 
society including legal bodies, banks, credit systems and a series of interrelated na-
tional and international markets for capital, property and commerce. But the reproduc-
tion of such nexuses also requires regular enactment by individuals during which a 
given pattern is “.. filled out by a multitude of single and often unique actions ..” and 
where the acting individual demonstrates to possess “.. certain routinised ways of 
understanding, knowing how and desiring” (Reckwitz 2002: 249-250).   
This element of performance in the notion of ‘practises’ suggests that normative con-
straints in everyday life not only come from large organisations but may also be 
linked to more informal features of social life. As far as credit-related actions are 
concerned, factors such as family traditions, class- and status-specific codes, peer 
group ethos and principles from related institutions may impact standing patterns of 
appropriate conduct. It follows that underlying any set of typified patterns there could 
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be considerable variation in the choice of “single and unique” reproductive actions. 
But even more importantly, it implies that there are always potentials for developing 
divergent institutional patterns. As shall be argued theoretically — and later demon-
strate empirically — this is a key point in understanding coping with debt problems as 
an intentional activity; under certain conditions, alternative practises may emerge 
alongside established, expected patterns of conduct. In as much as defaulters are con-
cerned, it implies that they act upon alternative bodies of shared social knowledge. 
As far as the model in figure 3-1 is concerned, institutionalisation places pre-
reflective action in the front seat for especially two reasons. Firstly, routinisation is 
established as a common — and perhaps the dominating — type of conduct. Entering 
repeating choice processes is not necessarily rational — neither from the individual’s 
or society’s point of view; quite the contrary, following the constructivist argument, it 
makes sense to reduce the number of choice situations through routinisiation. Also, 
from a normative point of view, integration, stability and predictability in social life 
are basically secured by delimiting human conduct through prescribed ways of con-
duct. Although the marketplace is a context in which calculating behaviour is legiti-
mate, most economic actions are probably habitualised and as such neither instances 
of explicit, individual decision-making nor unconscious and non-reflective acts 
(Warde 2005: 140; Gronow and Warde 2001). Furthermore, in as much as that is the 
case the implication is that market actors base much of their reflective conduct upon 
tacit social knowledge and internalised perceptions about appropriate economic ca-
reers. Given the fundamental nature of such knowledge, it should be expected to have 
considerable impact also in coping behaviour. 
Secondly, habitualised behaviour in everyday life presupposes the existence of al-
ready established institutional systems. In modern societies, these are often well be-
yond individual control; indeed, some of the most vital ones are globalised structures 
such as the production and supply of food and financial services. This introduces trust 
as a key element in economic action. To illustrate, it is far too cumbersome — if pos-
sible at all — to gather all the information necessary to be certain that all steps in the 
fabrication of a given food product meet high-quality safety standards (Kjærnes, 
Poppe, and Lavik 2005: 32-33; Seligman 1997). Similarly, it is impossible to know if 
the market will provide the stability needed to sustain a given set of financial obliga-
tions in near and distant future. The only solution to these problems is to do like eve-
ryone else and — more or less tacitly — trust the future performances of such sys-
tems. This kind of confidence is efficient for a number of reasons. Clearly, it reduces 
complexity and the need to make choices (Luhmann 1999). Also, it gives access to 
credit products and a wide range of socially acclaimed life chances that otherwise 
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would be out of reach. The importance of trust becomes even clearer once it is real-
ised that a shift to distrusting conditions would render existing routines useless and 
meaningless. As shall be empirically demonstrated later on, this is a key aspect of 
coping with debt problems.  
The institutional perspective generally suggests that reflective as well as pre-reflective 
actions necessarily are embedded in the social settings in which they are executed. 
The point to be made is that if the reasons why defaulters behave the ways they do are 
to be properly understood, the coping strategies must be traced back to the social 
environments in which they unfold. For, as pointed out by Warde (2005: 139), the 
many “single and unique actions” that combine to form a given practise “… will 
always be conditional upon the institutional arrangements characteristic of the time, 
space and social context ..” in which the actors find themselves. Indeed, as shall be 
argued below, coping with debt problems takes place at the intersection point between 
socially warranted expectations on the one hand, and market and state constraints on 
the other. 
3.6. GENERAL INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS FOR ECONOMIC ACTION
In sociology, dichotomies about society’s institutional order and its underlying gen-
erative processes date back to the 19th century. For instance, in the late 1880’ies Tön-
nies ([1887] 1957) introduced the distinction between ‘gemeinschaft’ and ‘gesell-
schaft’, designating the former concept to ties of the blood, primary group relation-
ships and small-scale social formations such as village communities, and the latter to 
business-like relationships and environments based on markets and money as a me-
dium of exchange and power. To each of these formations corresponds a certain ori-
entation in social interaction; viz. ‘natural will’ and ‘rational will’ respectively. The 
latter refers to planned, calculated behaviour in order to obtain specified goals. As 
opposed to this, ‘natural will’ refers to an inner human force based on the ‘.. principle 
of unity of life’ (Tonnies [1887] 1957: 103). The two types of social formations and 
their corresponding orientations typically co-exist and dominate different parts of the 
institutional order, as illustrated by the ‘gemeinschaft’-based family institution and the 
‘gesellschaft’-permeated markets for employment, goods and services. Also, the two 
realms of society are related to one another in that ‘gesellchaft’-formations presup-
pose — and hence cannot exist without —‘gemeinshaft’ institutions.  
Nearly a century later, Habermas ([1981] 2004a; [1981] 2004b) proposes a similar but 
more advanced type of dichotomy. Initially, modern societies are seen as made up by 
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three broad institutionalised domains; ‘markets’, ‘state’ and ‘civic society’. But at the 
end of the day the corners of the triangle in figure 3-2 above submit to a dual underly-
ing structure referred to as the ‘system world’ and the ‘life world’. With these con-
cepts, Habermas aims at making a synthesis of especially two major perspectives in 
sociology, viz. Mead’s ideas on socialisation (Mead 1934) and Durkheim‘s theory of 
the division of labour (Durkheim [1893] 1984; Østerberg 1983: 37-58). As for Mead, 
Habermas argues that although internalisation of the ‘generalised other’ is necessary 
to become a skilled social actor, the theory cannot explain how the act of taking the 
role of the other develops from symbolic interaction into what Mead calls a “social 
organism” that exist prior to the individual (Mead 1934: 233; Habermas [1981] 
2004b: 43-45). Durkheim, on the other hand, has the opposite problem; his evolution-
ary theory on social differentiation and transition from mechanical to organic solidar-
ity cannot explain the origins of the moral attitude that is necessary to enhance coop-
eration, solidarity and integration — apart from presupposing that it is an intrinsic 
part of any diffusion process (Habermas [1981] 2004b: 116-117).  
Habermas’ answer to these challenges is language; this is the medium by which indi-
vidual actors establish norms and get to understand semantic as well as social struc-
tures. But modern societies are also characterised by the crystallisation of a system 
level where integrative processes are quite different from those taking place at the 
micro level. Therefore, Habermas makes a distinction between ‘social’ and ‘systemic’
integration taking place in the ‘life world’ and the ‘system world’ respectively. These 
processes are also interrelated, the nature of which is indicated by the fact that the 
triangle in figure 3-2 is tilted: the development and continuation of a ‘system world’
Market
Civic
Society
State
SYSTEM WORLD
LIFE WORLD
Figure 3-2: The institutional domains of society 
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presuppose the existence of ‘life world’ relationships (Habermas [1981] 2004b: 113-
197).  
Habermas’ ideas about society’s institutional domains are helpful in identifying key 
influences in socio-economic contexts. An important implication is that economic 
action now appears as a matter of integration. This is quite appropriate; on the one 
hand, social participation in modern societies presupposes access to major economic 
arenas such as the markets for labour, housing and consumption, and hence a certain 
level of purchase power. On the other hand, chapter two clearly demonstrates that 
there is a huge potential for financial and social exclusion whenever severe debt prob-
lems occur. As shall be seen in subsequent chapters, much of the defaulters’ coping 
behaviour is in fact about resisting the prospects of being excluded from ordinary life. 
But beyond general statements about integration and exclusion, each of the three 
institutional domains provides specific opportunities and constraints for economic 
action — whether under normal conditions or in case of debt problem. Starting out 
with the ‘life world’, this is the domain for primary group relationships. ‘Civic soci-
ety’ may loosely be regarded as incorporating all non-state and non-market interaction 
networks made up by family members, neighbours, friends and work colleagues. As 
pointed out by Cooley ([1909] 1980: 165) nearly a century ego, primary groups are “.. 
fundamental in the forming of the social nature and ideals of the individual..“. Much 
in the same spirit, Habermas defines the ‘life world’ as an arena for social belonging 
and learning in which the acquisition of language — and through it: culture — is the 
key mechanism whereby the individual gradually increases his social competence and 
eventually becomes a full member of society (Wuthnow et al. 1984: 201). Moreover 
— akin to constructs such as Tönnis’ ‘natural will’ and Cooley’s ([1909] 1980: 165) 
‘common spirit’ — Habermas argues that the aim of primary group communication is 
to exchange ideas and views in order to establish a common understanding among the 
participants. Again, language appears important as it is the vehicle of a particular type 
of orientation — viz. the ‘communicative rationality’ — whereby mutual understand-
ing is sought within a consensus frame of reference. This is not to say that primary 
groups are free from tension and conflicts. But the ‘communicative rationality’ is a 
type of orientation that is not found in any of the other institutional domains. Also, 
according to Habermas it is the very foundation upon which personal identities, group 
solidarity and integration are developed and sustained ([1981] 2004b: 119-152; 
Habermas 1999: 70). Consensus-oriented communication is therefore the basic form 
of social life (Moe 1994: 236-237). 
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The overall concern of ‘civic society’ is to secure the welfare of any given primary 
group. As for the households, a vital part of it is to ensure favourable economic ca-
reers. On the one hand, this turns economic action into a social project that is based 
on the concerns, norms and values inherent in primary relationships. In as much as 
that is the case, even moments of calculative behaviour may, at the end of the day, 
appear as part of a socially coveted vision to enhance the welfare of the household. 
On the other hand, securing the welfare of a given primary group — say the family — 
means to protect the members from possible threats from the outside world. It follows 
that whenever a potential danger is recognised, the actions taken are likely to be based 
on the interests of the primary group. As shall be demonstrated empirically in subse-
quent chapters, this is an important feature of coping with enduring debt problems. 
Now turning to the ‘system world’, it emerges to solve deficiencies in the ‘life world’
domain. As Habermas ([1981] 2004b:168) points out, it is here “.. that we find those 
system problems that can be resolved only through evolutionary innovations, that is, 
only when a higher level of system differentiation is institutionalized”. Good exam-
ples include the need to improve production, stabilise supplies and ensure peace with 
neighbouring communities. In modern capitalist societies, this is solved by instituting 
the market and state domains as distributive arenas; markets for goods and services, 
and state bodies for public services, power and governance. From a ‘life world’ per-
spective, the market and state domains appear as locations where primary groups may 
secure their needs. From society’s point of view, the development of a wider institu-
tional order is a rationalisation of the integration processes since it aims at establish-
ing more refined and effective systems for interaction and problem solving (Moe 
1994: 238).  
However, as the ‘system world’ expands the ‘life world’ is stripped of certain qualities 
and functions. To illustrate, the emergence of markets establishes an arena where not 
only primary group members but also strangers are admitted. This, of course, expands 
the exchange networks and generally improves system sustainability. It also encour-
ages peace between potentially hostile groups. But at the same time, exchange prac-
tises slip out of the immediate control and is gradually exempted from the realm of 
consensus-oriented interaction. Instead, a quite different steering medium is intro-
duced: viz. the medium of exchange — i.e. money in modern societies. Another im-
portant illustration is the emergence of the state, which in a historical perspective can 
be seen as a response to the call for extended control systems as markets grow and 
exchange relations become more complex. But again, as power is detached from the 
primary groups it becomes disconnected from control by consensus-orientated inter-
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action. Instead, it is allocated to formal organisations and eventually subjected to 
generalised rules and bureaucratic routines.  
These polarities pose a risk to individual actors. As economic projects take form and 
get socially validated in a ‘life world’ context, people are expected to accomplish 
them by acting strategically in ‘system world’ settings. But in complex systems the 
‘life world’ becomes provincial (Habermas 2004b [1981] : 173). Beyond representing 
a certain range of possibilities, system agents are instead committed to act rationally 
upon a limited set of professional values, rules and regulations. As a consequence, the 
‘life world’ of individual customers necessarily ends up in the periphery of their focus 
and largely appears as irrelevant to professional organisations. This is a systemic 
feature with known potentials for creating disastrous effects; a much studied example 
is of course the historical development of the market institution itself, which at times 
has had devastating impacts on people’s living conditions and led to disintegration 
and social upheaval rather than stability and integration (see for instance Marx 1983: 
181-238; Polanyi [1944] 1957). The answer to such crises has been a redistribution of 
power and institutionalisation of sophisticated control systems in the state domain. 
But this does not change the nature of the ‘system world’ as such. Besides, also state 
bodies develop professional loyalties and a certain distance to ‘life world’ conditions. 
As a result, even in societies with a well-functioning institutional order and high lev-
els of integration, interaction on ‘system world’ arenas may create critical situations at 
the household level. Over-indebtedness is an example of this. 
In as much as this means that primary group needs are set aside, large and remote 
systems eventually turn against the individual actor to become veritable threats. From 
an integration point of view this is indeed unfortunate as the legitimacy and popular 
support of the market and state institutions depends on the extent to which the two 
domains actually contribute to the realisation of socially warranted projects. As for 
the market institution, modern economists like Sen and sociologists like Etzioni see 
no other solution than that the principle of utility maximisation must sometimes step 
aside for solidarity if markets are to preserve their legitimacy (Sejersted 1993: 21-24, 
41). In as much as such a principle is implemented, jeopardised groups such as de-
faulters may expect a certain amount of understanding, patience and generosity from 
the creditor side to take them through the crisis and preserve their ‘life world’ situa-
tions. Indeed, based on the description of the Norwegian institutional conditions in 
chapter 1.3 it can be argued that certain modifications have in fact been formalised in 
areas such as ethical business, banking, money collection practises and debt settle-
ments. But even though such arrangements provide economic actors with protection, 
the rights of the creditors remain unarguable. Hence, coping with debt problems still 
CHAPTER 3: THE SOCIAL ORIENTATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE          75
takes place within an institutional framework where, at the end of the day, ‘system 
world’ values are given supremacy over ‘life world’ needs.  
As for the state domain, the roles of public institutions are multifaceted. At the time 
when the market system expanded in the West, the state apparatus was weak and 
needed to reorganise in order to control the market forces and counteract their nega-
tive impacts on social integration. The institutionalisation of political power therefore 
partly aims at explicitly offering protection to the ‘life world’. As shown by Esping-
Andersen (1990: 26-29), the cultural basis for the emergence of welfare states leads to 
different approaches in protective steps. Countries like Norway are characterised by 
an extensive welfare policy to promote far-reaching equality and social programs to 
help families should they run into difficult life situations. It follows that the defaulters 
may not only expect legal protection, but also financial support and broad sympathy 
for the need to preserve their social situation. However, public institutions operate in a 
wide range of arenas including markets, taxation and public transfers, and may there-
fore end up as a creditor in any default-debtor’s portfolio of arrears. Due to the multi-
ple roles of modern states and the varying approaches in welfare policy, households 
with severe debt problems may find themselves in a multiple squeeze between organi-
sations in the state domain with different goals.  
Whenever the ‘system world’ threatens ‘life world’ achievements and fails to protect 
primary group relations, market organisations and state bodies appear as hostile, un-
trustworthy and even illegitimate by those affected. As shall be demonstrated empiri-
cally in subsequent chapters, this is a major shift in the contextual framework that 
fundamentally changes the nature of coping behaviour.  
3.7. SOCIAL ORIENTATION IN ECONOMIC CAREERS
In as much as that is the case, the theoretical implication is that coping with debt 
problems is institutionalised as a conflict between ‘system world’ demands and ‘life
world’ commitments. This means that once severe debt problems become a fact of 
life, the conditions for economic action change; as for orientation, there is still an 
economic and a social dimension to it, but the direction changes; as for intent, it re-
mains intentional but draws upon the knowledge and experience acquired under nor-
mal economic conditions. It follows that pre-reflective action continues to play an 
important role; coping behaviour is not only about planned steps to deal with financial 
difficulties, but also about routines and practises rooted in norms, values and skills 
acquired throughout life.  
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These characteristics have bearings upon the forthcoming analysis. In particular, it 
seems important to get a grip on the social foundation of the phenomenon. Also, it 
seems central to consider the connections between the normal and the debt problem 
situations. In doing that, a heuristic from classical sociology is introduced as a tool for 
understanding economic action; viz. the notion of ‘standard packages’.
3.7.1. ECONOMIC ACTION UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS; THE STANDARD 
PACKAGE HEURISTIC
The idea of ‘standard packages’ was originally developed during the mid-1950’ies 
(Parsons and Smelser [1956] 1984; Riesman and Roseborough [1955] 1966). In its 
most tangible form, the concept simply refers to a list of items that covers the house-
holds’ needs in a broad sense. As such, they go beyond physical subsistence, although 
they do include basic needs in terms of food, clothes, shelter and transport for all 
household members. Still, it is not as mere list of basics, but as a cultural media that 
‘standard packages’ retain significance. What distinguishes them from food baskets 
and related approaches is that they are based on a conception of the family as a cul-
turally embedded social unit. This means that the needs just mentioned must be of a 
certain standard that is in accordance with the current cultural value systems. Also, it 
implies that the list of items must allow for symbolic differentiation with respect to 
gender, age and generation roles. Since the standard packages are rooted in overall 
value systems, they may be regarded as cultural codes that are internalised during 
socialisation processes and adjusted throughout life. This makes them quite stable 
over time, and “.. relatively invariant in the face of moderate income changes” (Par-
sons and Smelser [1956] 1984: 222). 
Due to the asserted link between values and economic resources, the ‘standard pack-
age’ conception was from the very beginning related to social classes. In the original 
proposition, Riesman and Roseborough ([1955] 1966: 2) notice that the “.. set of 
goods and services including such household items as furniture, radios, television, 
refrigerator, and standard brands in food and clothing, shows a considerable uni-
formity throughout American society”. Based on this observation they argue the exis-
tence of a middle class package that a majority of the population orientates towards. 
As such, the standard becomes a mechanism for a more egalitarian society — materi-
alistically as well as value-wise. In a number of countries, these ideas have more or 
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less explicitly found their way into so-called standard budgets — i.e. concrete lists of 
items representing a national, ordinary standard for acceptable levels of living.12
Even though such budgets may gain popular support due to their typicality, there is 
obviously considerable variation around such national standards. This calls for a more 
differentiated class perspective. As Parsons and Smelser ([1956] 1984: 223) points 
out, class and status — or prestige — symbolisation is a major orientation in the eco-
nomic activity of any consumption unit. The composition of items needed to partici-
pate in social life may therefore differ systematically across social divisions. It fol-
lows that the variation around national packages could be seen as made up by class-
specific standards. The view is well in line with Habermas’ ([1981] 2004b: 169) ar-
gument that “.. classes develop their own milieus, lifeworlds, and value orientations 
specific to the various strata”. Furthermore, status variations within the classes may 
be thought of as systematically represented by a finer web of items and symbols nec-
essary to flag particular sub-cultural affiliations. As opposed to standard budgets, 
which are concrete lists of items, standard packages appear as as class-specific ‘life
world’ constraints. As such, the ‘package’ expression is a heuristic for a certain cul-
tural skill or orientation in economic interaction. Nobody can “see” their package. 
Still, it manifests itself in the social world by the fact that few people are indifferent to 
such things as the way they dress, the area they live in, the food they eat and the free 
time activities they engage in. As a consequence, they routinely spend their money 
accordingly.
According to a standard package perspective, economic action is intrinsically embed-
ded in a social frame of reference. Socially coveted economic careers begins in fact at 
birth when the individual is involuntarily assigned to a position in the social structure 
(Archer 2000a: 262). He thereby becomes part of a given household’s resource situa-
tion and subjected to socialisation processes whereby he internalises current package 
codes and eventually learn how they differ from alternative standards (Riesman and 
Roseborough [1955] 1966). He also gets familiar with how such codes are expres-
sions of wider value systems and how they translate into appropriate economic action. 
In this way, standard packages provide the basis for developing habitualised liabilities 
to use one’s economic resources in specific — and socially acceptable — ways. This 
turns package orientations into important mechanisms for social integration; besides 
                                                          
12 Standard budgets exist in many countries including Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Australia, 
Canada and a number of the US federal states. Such budgets cover a number of consumption 
areas such as food, clothes, leisure, transport, etc. They should therefore not be mixed up with 
food baskets and related approaches. 
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implying compliance with ongoing norms and values in one’s immediate social sur-
roundings, any manifestation of “.. the symbolic location of family units relative to 
each other ..” inevitably contribute to establish a social identity as well as affiliations 
with certain groups and networks (Parsons and Smelser [1956] 1984: 223). The oppo-
site is also worth noticing: those who do not comply with any known standard basi-
cally remain strangers in their social environments. 
If the one-person case is disregarded for the moment, it can be argued that it is only 
through the household that the construction of individual lifestyles and social identi-
ties are possible. This is partly due to the fact that some of the key objects needed to 
flag them are capital-intensive and therefore shared — even co-financed — with other 
family members. Good examples are homes and cars. Also, some items are collective 
by nature, such as energy and water supplies and a number of consumption goods like 
furniture, kitchen utensils and television. But above all, multi-person households are 
made up by individuals of different ages, gender and roles. Since not every member 
has income, the unit’s total resources must be divided between common purposes and 
individual needs. Although — as pointed out by Pahl (1995) — such processes may 
be a source of inequality and tension within the family, package orientations are nev-
ertheless based on a core of some kind of common understanding about each mem-
ber’s needs in order to sustain appropriate social identities. As for the one-person 
household, it does not alter the principal argument. But while they avoid internal 
disputes over scarce resources, they may be more exposed on the supply side since the 
construction of lifestyles and social identities must be based on a single money- and 
time budget. 
As a normative ‘life world’ constraint, standard packages have strong impacts on the 
way people manage assets and spend and invest money. They are conservative by 
nature in that they generally promote “business as usual” and facilitate the develop-
ment of routinised economic practises. Such patterns may simplify everyday living 
and reduce the need to go through complex processes of choosing. But they also re-
duce flexibility because they typically imply that major parts of any household’s 
budget become tied up in long-term contractual commitments to finance capital-
intensive, socially coveted items. The home is a good illustration; not only is it costly 
to buy or rent, but it must also be kept in good repair to sustain its market and social 
value. It follows that maintaining a social status is a constant challenge. As empha-
sised by Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame (1997: 64), “.. there is nothing mechanical 
about reproduction: it is a dynamic process”. This makes any lifestyle and social 
identity an achievement — something people have invested much time, energy and 
economic resources into. 
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But standard packages are also conservative in a more fundamental way. Since they 
are intrinsically linked to the resource situation of the household unit, and hence to 
specific class- and status positions, complying with a given standard is to use the 
resources in ways that safeguard appropriate social reputations. Of course, modest 
changes in status may be expected over the life span since one’s needs typically 
change with age and follow the overall economic and technological development. 
Still, package orientations generally hamper social mobility — in particular those 
implying a crossing over from one class situation to another. This is not the least 
demonstrated in a number of studies showing how difficult it is for adolescents from 
the lower classes to invest in higher education since it implies a break-up with cultural 
values and social belonging (Boudon 1991; Hansen 1995). Also, the risks involved 
are significant, as lower-class families typically find it difficult to support those who 
fail in upward mobility — economically as well as through professional networks 
(Keller and Zavalloni 1964). The quintessence of standard packages is therefore to 
preserve of status quo.  
3.7.2. SOCIAL RATIONALITY UNDER SEVERE DEBT PROBLEMS
Needless to say, since most of the items needed to enable lifestyles and signify social 
statuses have to be accessed on markets, any package orientation has a price tag that 
must be met. In that perspective, severe debt problems do not simply mean that bills 
cannot be paid; rather, it is a situation where lifestyles can no longer be sustained. As 
a consequence, one’s social identity is at risk. This sets the scene for how defaulters 
actually cope with the difficulties.  
As long as there is money enough to finance the households’ social projects, markets 
appear as attractive distributive arenas and suitable for obtaining adequate socio-
economic careers. But markets follow a different logic than do ‘life world’ institu-
tions. In particular, whereas relations in the former domain typically involve sellers, 
buyers and regulators, any person finds himself in a ‘life world’ situation with a range 
of additional — and indeed: basic — responsibilities. These include commitments to 
children, marriage partners, friends, work colleagues and the wider network of kin 
and social relationships. From the point of view of market agents, these responsibili-
ties are largely irrelevant. But for ‘life world’ actors the emergence of a debt problem 
does not change the presence of a totality of obligations. It does, however, change the 
ability to fulfil them all. Therefore, in any context where economy is a topic there is 
likely to be a struggle with respect to where to put one’s priorities and loyalty.  
Faced with a severe lack of means, it is important to underline that the repayment 
norm still is valid across all institutional domains. This fact challenges the defaulters 
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with a principal dilemma: should they submit themselves to the constraints from the 
‘system world’ or should they rather be loyal to their ‘life world’ commitments? Ob-
viously, even though coping behaviour may in principle be based on either one of the 
two loyalties they yield different sets of coping strategies. According to the former, 
the difficulties should predominantly be approached by playing the game by the rules 
of the market. However, in so far as standard packages are concerned, market partici-
pation is no longer affordable — by definition, so to speak. Of course, there may be 
certain advantageous market options available that may give the default-debtor some 
breathing space — especially in the early phases of the problem developments. But as 
the difficulties grow into impossible proportions, complying with market-based con-
straints will almost certainly lead to a loss of status and social affiliation; indeed, 
present lifestyles would actively have to be given up to reorient towards cheaper stan-
dard packages. The ‘life world’ situation as the defaulter knows it would, in other 
words, change dramatically. 
Alternatively, coping behaviour can be based on ‘life world’ loyalties. As just pointed 
out, package constraints promote ‘status quo’. It follows that whenever the house-
hold’s economic situation is destabilised, primary group relationships call for resisting 
the threat and securing the life styles and social identities in the ‘life world’. This is 
not necessarily the same as turning away from the problems; quite the contrary, any 
severe lack of money must be coped with one way or the other. But as the market 
institution now basically appears a threat to one’s material and social welfare, the 
equivalence to the ‘status quo’ ambition is to resist downward mobility; i.e. imple-
menting strategies to combat enforced adaptations to cheaper and more affordable 
packages.  
As shall be demonstrated empirically, defaulters seem to adopt a combination of the 
two approaches, but with a clear precedence for ‘life world’ commitments. Indeed, 
given the severity of the threats they should be expected to implement a wide range of 
strategies to handle the situation; resisting downward mobility is a challenge that must 
be met in a great number of different contexts and institutionalised settings. It is im-
portant to keep in mind that the primacy of ‘life world’ commitments does not turn 
economic orientations and rationalisations into useless parts of the repertoire of cop-
ing strategies. A comprehensive analysis of coping behaviour must therefore take 
both ‘system world’ and ‘life world’ loyalties into consideration. 
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3.8. SUMMARY
The research questions for the forthcoming analysis concern the way severe debt 
problems are coped with. This chapter set out by insisting that such explanations 
should also elucidate why default-debtors not always comply with the expectations 
directed towards them by market agents and legal authorities. In order to be able to 
address such challenges, a comprehensive theoretical apparatus has been developed to 
study coping behaviour in a broad perspective. It consists of three main elements. 
Firstly, economic action is defined as being intentional, oriented towards economic as 
well as a social objectives, and to include planned initiatives as well as institutional-
ised routines and habits upon which any explicit idea about goal-attainment is based. 
Secondly, economic action is thought of as embedded in social contexts. Drawing 
upon Habermas and a large sociological tradition, it is argued that decisive contextual 
conditions generally reflect ‘life world’ and ‘system world’ constraints and opportuni-
ties. Thirdly, economic action is seen as tied to a class- and status-specific codex 
referred to as ‘standard packages’. As such, it is rooted in overall value systems and 
may be regarded as based on skills that are acquired during socialisation processes 
and adjusted throughout life. Complying with a given standard is important because it 
provides the individual actor with social status, identity and belonging. 
Debt problems imply — by definition — that the current standard package is unaf-
fordable. This puts the defaulters in a squeeze between ‘system world’ demands from 
creditors and legal authorities on the one hand, and the rather basic ‘life world’ re-
sponsibilities towards family, friends and the wider social network on the other. The 
way such situations are handled can be based on loyalties to parties in either one of 
the institutional domains. However, the two orientations is likely to result in different 
sets of coping strategies. Complying with market-based constraints will almost cer-
tainly lead to a loss of status, identity and social belonging as the economic standard 
has to be given up. Alternatively, acting upon ‘life world’ loyalties would mean to 
lean on package constraints which promote ‘status quo’. The implication is to resist 
downward mobility and counteract enforced adaptations to cheaper and more afford-
able packages. At any one point in time, the two loyalties may lead to a mix of strate-
gies that the default-debtors find suitable. Nevertheless, the theoretical discussion 
suggests that coping behaviour is largely founded upon ‘life world’ commitments. 
In conclusion, the proposed analytical apparatus defines coping behaviour as embed-
ded in a conflict between ‘system world’ commitments and ‘life world’ demands. The 
general implication is that any such conduct must be explained by relating the de-
faulters’ actions and intentions to the conflicting responsibilities. In particular, the 
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inclusion of ‘life world’ demands offer insights into orientations in coping behaviour 
that may throw light on why people act counter to what creditors and authorities ex-
pect them to do. 
4.   METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 3 outlined the theoretical positions and concepts needed to address the re-
search questions developed in chapter 2. Now turn has come to the methodological 
implications that they raise. The point of departure is an underlying model where 
coping behaviour is seen as conditioned by the institutional environment in which it 
unfolds. However, as the forthcoming study is based on twenty qualitative interviews 
with persons who are stuck in the debt quagmire, it is recognised that the number of 
possible analytical strategies supporting such a model is legion. The aim of this chap-
ter is to provide a bridge between the model and the methodological choices that have 
been made, and to argue the rationale between the chosen research design and the 
forthcoming data analysis.  
The chapter starts out by assessing alternative methodological approaches to the re-
search questions. Next, the sampling procedure and the main characteristics of the 
final sample are documented. The chapter then proceeds to account for the data col-
lection methods and the ideas behind the interview guide. In the final sections of the 
chapter, some critical features of the research design are examined, including validity, 
reliability and the possibilities for taking the empirical findings beyond the group of 
informants. 
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4.2. CHOOSING A DESIGN
As pointed out before, debt problems develop over time into complex life situations. 
Methodologically, two important implications follow; firstly, the problem situation 
changes qualitatively as it builds up, and secondly, the way it is actually dealt with in 
terms of perceived and adopted coping strategies changes correspondingly. This 
means that in order to appropriately account for the phenomenon, a research design is 
needed that covers the process from its initial stages and well into the debt quagmire.   
Figure 4-1 on the opposite page pinpoints the challenge. The rows represent two dif-
ferent strategies to secure information along the time dimension. One is to systemati-
cally include respondents across the whole range of economic difficulties.The other 
implies to only gather information from hard-core default-debtors who actually find 
themselves caught in the debt quagmire. The columns make a distinction between two 
broad approaches to empirical research; viz. quantitative and qualitative methodolo-
gies respectively. Taken together, this defines four alternative sampling options (a), 
(b), (c) and (d), each with a set of different analytical implications.  
Starting out in the quantitative column, square (a) typically refers to surveys that are 
representative for some population. Although attractive for many purposes, the ap-
proach is encumbered with major shortcomings when applied to the research ques-
tions at hand. For a start, representativeness is a problem; it is difficult to define a 
population of default-debtors at any required level of precision that could form the 
basis for a randomised sampling routine. An alternative is simply to base the analysis 
on a general sample that is representative for Norwegian households or population of 
persons over eighteen years. Considering the option, in 2000 and 2001 when the study 
was designed an estimated 30% of all grown-up individuals did not pay their bills on 
time (Gulbrandsen 1999a) whereas some 8-10% of the households continually lacked 
money for bill paying at the last reminder (Poppe 2001). A representative sample 
would therefore give enough informants with lighter and even medium levels of eco-
nomic difficulties. But the hard core default-debtors would be in demand; by January 
2001 only 12.536 persons had obtained a debt settlement since the Act was introduced 
in 1993.13 Even though this indicator is likely to underestimate the number of debt 
quagmire casualties, it would still be a stroke of luck to get even one of them in a 
national-representative sample of, say, 1000 or 2000 observations. The problem 
would also persist at a slightly modified level if the study was instead based on some 
sort of a stratified sample where the proportion of default-debtors was overrepre-
                                                          
13 Cf. figure 1-1 and (Tufte 2005: 59).  
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sented. The square (a) approach would in other words create an inappropriate empiri-
cal basis as information on coping among those whose economic problems are most 
severe would not be available. 
The (b) square suggests that, rather than sampling default-debtors across the whole 
range of economic difficulties, the focus could instead be put exclusively on heavily 
over-indebted informants. Such a population could for instance be defined in terms of 
debt settlement applicants. This would solve the problem under (a) where this type of 
respondents would be in want. On the other hand, there would be a lack of informants 
with lighter and medium level economic difficulties. This is not necessarily a critical 
feature; since hard-core default-debtors have seen most shades of the debt problem 
phenomenon they can also tell about how they coped with their economy before it got 
totally out of hand. But it is an obstacle that the quality and content of the court data-
bases are limited and a challenge to anyone who needs representativeness as a sam-
pling feature. Another problem is that turning the empirical interest into a question of 
debt settlements may turn out to be too narrow. Indeed, ending up in these files may 
be regarded as a coping strategy in itself. As a consequence, there would be no data 
about the situations and motives of those who decide against that option.  
Furthermore, the squares (a) and (b) have in common that they imply some quantita-
tive methodology. However, quantitative measurement instruments such as a ques-
tionnaire may turn out to fall short of serving the analytical purposes. In particular, as 
already documented in chapter two there is limited pre-knowledge about default-
debtors’ coping behaviour. This makes it difficult to create a set of questions that 
meets the actual need for information. Besides, rather than interrelationships between 
operationalised variables the research interest basically concerns insights into proc-
Figure 4-1: Alternative Designs.
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esses as they unfold in social contexts over time — a challenge that is normally better 
handled by a qualitative approach (Silverman 2005). Along with the above mentioned 
sampling problems, it was decided against the (a) and (b) options altogether.  
This brings the attention to the second column in figure 4-1. As far as sampling 
strategies are concerned, the difference between (c) and (d) corresponds to that be-
tween (a) and (b); whereas (c) implies to include respondents across the whole range 
of economic difficulties the (d) option narrows down the sample to hard-core default-
debtors only. In as much as qualitative approaches are not focussed on representative-
ness in the quantitative sense of the term, both types of samples are possible. Still, the 
(c) option is more challenging as it typically implies a higher number of informants. 
Besides, the early phases of processes leading up to severe over-indebtedness may be 
hard to identify. As the forthcoming empirical analysis will show, default-debtors-to-
be read the danger signals rather poorly. Indeed, most economic problems are tempo-
rary and hence parts of contexts that are not necessarily relevant for the study. The (d) 
option avoids these obstacles as a sample of hard-core default-debtors provides in-
formation from persons who clearly have been through the whole process from the 
very beginning and well into the debt quagmire. 
As the aim is to generate insights about a type of process which is only partially ac-
counted for by previous research, a qualitative methodology seems to fit the research 
questions better than do quantitative approaches (Vabø 1994: 55). Moreover, in order 
to obtain such knowledge, it follows from the discussion in chapter 3 that the contex-
tual features constraining the default-debtors’ coping behaviour must be spelled out. 
Such information is probably best secured through a holistic approach where the con-
textual logic, arrangements and rules are revealed through the perceptions of “insid-
ers” (Miles and Huberman 1994: 6). This is also a study that, in the wording of Miles 
and Huberman (1994: 7), aims at explicating how default-debtors “.. understand, 
account for, take action and otherwise manage their day-to-day situations”. In as 
much as that kind of data is obtained, it is also possible to achieve systematic knowl-
edge about coping behaviour as a social phenomenon.  
At the end of the day, any analytical design is established by pragmatic choices ac-
cording to the research questions and the underlying theoretical model (Silverman 
2005: 5-15). Based on the above considerations, the (d) alternative in figure 4-1 is 
chosen. As shall be demonstrated throughout the remaining parts of the chapter the 
decision is far from trivial; quite on the contrary, the option has several critical fea-
tures. But before its advantages and disadvantages are examined more in detail, the 
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sampling procedure, the methods used and the actual sample that came out of these 
decisions are accounted for.  
4.3. THE SAMPLING PROCEDURE
The ambition to cover the process from its initial stages and into the debt quagmire by 
adopting the (d) alternative must now find its practical solutions. What is established 
so far is a commitment to sample hard-core default debtors who have been through 
the whole process and therefore can inform about how they coped with the situation 
as it aggravated. But to actually obtain the sample two kinds of decisions have to be 
made; firstly, what sampling principle to implement, and secondly, what routines to 
follow in order to compose a group of informants that satisfies the requirements im-
plied by that principle. 
A place to begin is to draw a basic distinction between ‘representational’ and ‘con-
venience’ samples (Weiss 1995: 21-33). The latter implies that just about any person 
may serve as an informant. Such a principle can be useful in many situations, espe-
cially as part of explorative designs where the phenomenon under investigation is 
little known or the population affected by it is difficult to delimit. As already noticed, 
there is limited pre-knowledge about default-debtors’ coping behaviour. But this does 
not mean that the debt problem phenomenon as such is unknown; quite the contrary, 
chapter 2 accounted for a wealth of systematic insights obtained by widespread re-
search in the field. This means that convenience sampling and some of the major 
problems associated with it can be avoided — in particular those related to taking the 
findings beyond the sample itself.  
Representational samples are “.. made up of people who .. adequately represent the 
experiences of a larger group” (Weiss 1995: 21). A number of approaches may lead 
to such samples, including procedures based on mathematical probabilities. As al-
ready noticed, this is not an option. The challenge is nevertheless related to the asser-
tion that different types of financial problems and life situations may lead to differ-
ences in coping behaviour. In as much as that is the case, the research questions can-
not be properly addressed unless attainable ways are found to recruit informants that 
as a group cover a reasonable variety of the different routes into severe over-
indebtedness. For this purpose, the ‘maximising for range’ principle is implemented. 
As for the current study, it generally implies to include representatives of the main 
known causes of debt problems in the sample. But as the phenomenon develops over 
time and any outcome of intertwined incidents is conditional for future events, this is 
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more about making sure that known, characteristic types of processes are covered by 
the sample, rather than defining the sampling range in terms of a  strict conception of 
the ’cause of origin’.
Moreover, ‘maximising for range’ is a principle that is advantageous in order to en-
sure the inclusion of theoretically important processes and infrequent, a-typical cases. 
As such, it is also a useful approach to support conclusions by deliberately contrasting 
the ‘typical’ and the ‘confirming’ with the ‘deviant’ and the ‘disconfirming’ (Miles 
and Huberman 1994: 28). A quasi-experimental design is far from being considered. 
Still, the study shall draw on both of these properties; in particular, to address the 
research questions high-status default-debtors shall be over-sampled. Also, an effort 
shall be made to include cases that may support the individualistic view that debt 
problems are caused by immoral behaviour and a lack of rational thought. 
In order to secure the necessary range of choice of informants, a routine was devel-
oped to samples cases from four sources. The most obvious of these is the Enforce-
ment Officer’s Register where all applicants of debt settlements are found. But as 
indicated above, this can be regarded as a coping strategy in itself that needs to be 
complemented by informants who are not living under such regimes even though they 
are qualified to do so. Hence, three additional data sources were addressed to widen 
the recruitment basis; viz. the Debt Victim Alliance’s membership archive,14 Kredinor 
(a money collection company),15 and a private network. In all cases, the sampling 
routine was geographically restricted to Oslo and the surrounding counties.16
Based on many of the studies reported in chapter 2, the means of recruitment was a 
questionnaire asking about some of the major causes, effects and anticipated coping 
strategies. It also invited the respondent to write about his or her toughest experience 
as a default-debtor. The informants were then asked if they could be called by phone 
to make appointments for in-depth interviews.17 In February 2001, the recruitment 
questionnaire was distributed by post to 300 applicants of debt settlements in Oslo, 
100 members of the Debt Victim Alliance and 300 default-debtors enrolled in the 
money collecting company’s files. In this way, a total of 700 questionnaires were 
distributed. As it turned out, 102 forms were completed and returned. Among these, 
                                                          
14 Gjeldsofferaksjonen (GOA). 
15 At the time of the data collection, Kredinor was named Kreditorforeningen. 
16 We started out with the Enforcement Officer’s list for Oslo County. Next, we sampled informants from 
Akershus County using the Debt Victim Alliance’s membership archive. Finally, we approached default-
debtors’ in two additional counties around the Oslo Fjord (Østfold and Vestfold) through the money collec-
tion company. The idea behind the procedure was to avoid contacting the same persons more than once.  
17 The questionnaire is included in appendix A. 
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19 default-debtors were carefully picked for further interviewing. In addition — and 
prior to the distribution of the questionnaire — a pilot interview was carried out in 
December 2000 with an informant belonging to a personal network. It was later de-
cided to include it in the final sample as it shred light over some relevant aspects of 
the debt problem situation that were not covered by the 102 returned questionnaires. 
Hence, the total number of informants to form the empirical basis for the study adds 
up to twenty.  
The procedure is summed up in table 4.1 above. As can be seen, the response rate 
varies across the recruitment sources. So does the participation willingness rate — i.e. 
the proportion of returned questionnaires that gave permission to call back for further 
interviewing. The lowest scores on both of these statistics are found among the Kred-
inor default-debtors; whereas a modest 4% of the 300 default-debtors from this list 
returned the questionnaire, only four of these nine respondents volunteered for in-
depth interviews. Moreover, as they were contacted by phone, one was unavailable 
and two changed their minds and turned down the offer to participate. Hence, only 
one default-debtor from the Kredinor database made it through to the final sample. 
There are at least two complementary explanations for this. One is rooted in the na-
ture of the database; even though the routine selectively addressed people who had 
Table 4.1 The Initial Enquète. General Response. Absolute Numbers and Percentages. 
I: Enforcement Officers’ Register     II: Debt Victim Alliance’s Membership 
Archive III: Kredinor’ List of Default-Debtors    IV: Private Network 
I II III IV Total 
Questionnaires:
Distributed 
Returned
Response Rate
300 
66 
22% 
100 
23 
23% 
300 
13 
4% 
-
-
-
700 
102 
15% 
Interview Participation:
No, do not call me  
Yes, you may call me 
Participation Willingness Rate a)
29 
37 
56% 
2
21 
91% 
9
4
31% 
-
-
-
40 
62 
61% 
Further Interviewing:
Selected 11 7 1 1 20 
a) Percentage of returned questionnaires where permission to call for further interviewing was given. 
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defaulted on their electricity bills, most of them are probably not as severely hit by 
economic problems as those targeted by the two other sources. In as much as that is 
the case, many of the recipients may have found the questionnaire irrelevant to their 
situation. Also, those who are actually on their way to more aggravated financial 
situations, but not quite there yet, are typically those who are most reluctant to step 
forward. The second explanation is methodological; to save in on sampling costs, the 
questionnaire was distributed together with a claim to pay the electricity bill. Such 
claims are sometimes taken as a provocation — in particular in those cases where one 
feels there are good reasons for the default situation. This may have affected the atti-
tude towards the recruitment questionnaire.18
As for the two other recruitment sources — the Enforcement Officer’s register and the 
Debt Victim Alliance’s membership files — they both yield next-to identical response 
rates, but differ with respect to participation willingness rates; whereas about every 
second of the contacted debt settlement applicants agree to in-depth interviews, nine 
out of ten Debt Victim Alliance members do the same. The difference may refer to 
the fact that the latter source is made up of people who actively seek support from a 
special interest organisation and hence tend to see their situation in a politicised per-
spective. As opposed to this, debt settlement applicants include resourceful as well as 
run-down individuals with little or no energy to talk to researchers. The point to be 
made is that the decision to step forward is not random, but due to specific self-
selection mechanisms. This is further discussed in section 4.5 below.  
The 62 returned forms that gave permission to call back for further interviewing were 
carefully scanned to compose a theoretically sustainable sample for the study. Al-
though a simple construct, the questionnaire makes it possible to selectively include a 
wide range of problem situations. Table 4.2 on the opposite page sums up the key 
characteristics of the sample. As emphasised above, the primary recruitment ambition 
is to include as many of the major problem-generating mechanisms as possible. The 
result is reported in the lower part of the table. Hence, large system level processes 
such as unemployment, small business bankruptcies and tax arrears are covered by the 
sample. The same goes for certain household- and individual-level developments 
including marital problems and physical and psychological health — all of which are 
known for their devastating economic capabilities. Also, the sample contains in-
                                                          
18 The sampling procedure leaves traces of both mechanisms. Firstly, the nine returned questionnaires 
generally reflect severe rather than temporary financial difficulties; one respondent was even in prison for 
having turned to violence at the social security office. Secondly, some recipients were obviously provoked, 
as three of them put the unpaid claim into the included, franked envelope and sent it off to us — without the 
questionnaire!  
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stances of gambling and various shades of over-consumption — mechanisms that 
typically appear as moral issues in public debates over the emergence of debt prob-
lems as a social phenomenon and responsibility. Finally, the twenty cases cover proc-
esses marked by various types of substantial economic and social deprivation, and by 
problem-accelerating events such as creditor harassment and humiliating experiences 
at the social security office, in banks and in interpersonal relationships.  
Given the complexity of such processes, there is not one case for each attribute; 
rather, every case has elements of several of them. Hence, the sample was composed 
by looking at combinations of relevant characteristics and selected informants that, 
taken as a group, covered the widest possible range of aspects. This secures data 
about most of the attributes as they unfold under different contextual conditions. At 
the same time, there is every reason to underline that the sample does not cover every 
aspect — not to say: every combination of aspects — of the debt problem phenome-
non; after all, much depends on the sampling procedure itself and the self-selection 
processes it triggers. To illustrate, none of the returned questionnaires was instances 
of a much debated causal mechanism; viz. when parents stand surety for their chil-
Table 4.2: Maximising for Range: The Data Set. General Attributes as Stated by the Informants 
in the Initial Enquète. Absolute Numbers. N = 20.
Attribute In Sample Attribute In Sample 
Occupation when the Trouble Started:
Lower Status Occupations 
Higher Status Occupations 
Small Firm Managers
6
4
10 
Structural Environment:
Problems Originated Before 1993 
Problems originated After 1993 
12 
8
Debt Settlement Position:
Not Applied  
Applied, not yet decided  
Granted 
Refused
2
3
10 
5
Background Variables:
Women 
Men
Youngest 
Oldest 
6
14 
25 yrs 
64 yrs 
Types of processes:
Unemployment, Small Business Bankruptcy, Loss of Homes, Tax Arrears, Marital Problems, Health Problems, Over-
Consumption,  Gambling, Economic Deprivation, Social Degradation, Creditor Harassment, Humiliating experiences 
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dren’s loans. Still, the research presented in chapter two leaves little doubt that the 
sample covers major aspects of the debt problem situation.  
In addition, several secondary selection criterions were implemented to ensure neces-
sary variation in the sample. For a start, the fact that the increased impact of market 
dependence may drag even well-off households into the quagmire, steps were taken to 
make sure that higher-status occupations such as lawyers, teachers and medium-level 
functionaries were represented in the sample. Also, it was especially desirable to 
include managers of small firms because business failures are important routes into 
debt problems. Since none of these aspects have been given much attention in Nor-
wegian research, it was decided to deliberately “over-sample” these categories. 
Hence, as table 4.2 shows, there are six cases of lower-status occupations, four cases 
of higher-status professions and ten small-firm managers in the sample. The occupa-
tional status was assessed on the basis of labour market positions at the time when the 
financial difficulties started. 
Next, it was considered important to cover causal processes under different structural 
conditions. It was therefore sampled cases where the problems originated under the 
economic crisis in the late 1980’ies and early 1990’ies as well as during the subse-
quent economic upturn. As shown in table 4.2, there is a next-to equal representation 
of the two: twelve vs. eight cases respectively. Yet another selection criterion was to 
ensure the presence of default-debtors who do not cope with the situation through a 
debt settlement. As the table shows, ten of the informants live under debt settlements, 
three more have applied but not yet pulled through, additional five have had their 
applications turned down while the remaining two have not applied. Finally, variation 
along traditional background variables was desirable; hence, there are six women and 
fourteen men in the sample, varying between 25 and 64 years of age. 
In as much as debt settlement applicants from Oslo in 1999 may serve as a point of 
reference, a recent study reports that their average age is 44 years and that 29% of 
them are women. The proportion of higher-status occupations is 23%. This is lower 
than in the sample if small firm managers are included in the category. On the other 
hand, according to the study business bankruptcy was among the main causal factors 
in 43% of the applications that year. It should also be noted that the financial difficul-
ties originated before 1993 in 42% of the cases (Poppe and Tufte 2005: 21-27). 
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4.4. THE DATA COLLECTION METHOD
As already explained in the previous section, the twenty selected informants were 
further exposed to qualitative interviewing, which is the primary method by which 
data for the analysis are secured. Of course, no research technique is flawless, and 
some of the most the critical aspects are highlighted in the next section. For the pre-
sent, the focus is on the attractive features that make the personal research interview a 
useful tool for with respect to the research questions of the study.  
As accounted for in the previous chapter, the institutional approach to studying debt 
problems rests on, firstly, a distinction between three institutionalised domains — viz. 
the ‘market’, ‘state’ and ‘life world’ — and secondly, the primacy of the latter. In-
deed, it has been argued that the way such difficulties are coped with basically refers 
to ‘life world’ constraints and orientations. As a consequence, the empirical ambition 
becomes a matter of obtaining descriptions of the default-debtors’ everyday lives and 
coping behaviour in order to interpret the social meanings, motives and orientations 
behind the ways debt problems are dealt with over time. Potentially, a number of 
qualitative methods are viable — including various shades of observation, personal 
interviews, group interviews, and naturally occurring data such as debt settlement 
applications, health records and social security files. In addition, any combination of 
methods could potentially meet the analytical needs. Hence, in planning for the study 
several options had to be considered.  
As for the choice of personal interviews as the primary data collection method, certain 
concerns for the subject-matter at hand have been decisive. For a start, even though 
several techniques may produce relevant insights into the informant’s daily lives, 
some of them are obviously less suitable than others. For instance, naturally occurring 
data may contain information of high precision, but the personal accounts and across-
the-table assessments are largely missing as such sources consist of written material 
only. The same kind of argument can be made for group interviews, but with the signs 
reversed; here, the stories and the opinions are obtained, but as they are powered by 
group dynamics they give few facts about the individual participants’ life worlds. 
Also, group interviews may be problematic to stage for a different reason as well; viz. 
the social stigma and personal traumas that characterise most over-indebtedness situa-
tions. This turns any technique where the default-debtors are exposed to wider social 
contexts difficult to use — including many observational designs. Taken together, the 
need for discretion and sensitivity in encounters with this kind of informants makes 
the personal interview more likely to succeed than most other methods.  
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This does not preclude that a combination of two or more techniques would provide a 
better analytical foundation than relying solely on personal interviews. But as in most 
research projects, time and other scarce resources imposed limitations upon the plan-
ning of the study. However, beyond pragmatism there is every reason to point out that 
any combination of methods must stand up to the requirements of the research ques-
tions. To illustrate, default-debtor interviews could be combined with naturally occur-
ring data from the courts and social security offices, or be backed up by additional 
interviews with creditors and executive officers who are directly involved in the 
cases. In this way, more precise and validated information would probably be ob-
tained, which could also be closer to some notion of the “objective truth”. Still, it 
would hardly add direct value to the analyses as the insights into coping behaviour 
basically is a question of how the default-debtors understand their own situation and 
evaluate the options available to them. A similar argument can be made about the idea 
of re-interviewing them after, say, six months. Such a design would probably lead to 
certain corrections and reinterpretations of the data, but the price is high as any such 
adjustment would necessarily be influenced by the default-debtors’ qualified anticipa-
tions about the researcher’s intentions, perspectives and attitudes at the second en-
counter. In as much as that is the case, a new set of complications is introduced to the 
analyses.
As opposed to this, the one-time, stand-alone interview has some attractive advan-
tages. For a start, it allows to initiate a routine where the informants may simply con-
vey their version of what happened without too many constraining ideas about what 
kind of information is wanted. Also, it is a method that yields first-hand descriptions 
of complicated social processes including the web of interrelationships between spe-
cific events, life situations and ‘significant others’. In addition, the method allows for 
switching between topics as well as coming back to issues according to the internal 
logic of the conversation. The informant may even change his descriptions and atti-
tudes should the interaction provide him with new insights about the situation he is in. 
These are all features that suit the research questions well.  
However, Kvale (2006 [1997]: 74-78) underlines that in order to obtain such flexibil-
ity several aspects of the interview must be balanced against one another. One is de-
scription vs. interpretation. Although the informants are encouraged to explain their 
intentions, motives and reasons for coping the way they do, the research questions are 
descriptive by nature; they demand nuanced accounts on the debt problem phenome-
non rather than elaborated interpretations and reinterpretations of statements and 
positions. Also, a too strong emphasis on interpretations may easily derail the conver-
sation by triggering high levels of accusation, anger and frustration over the creditor 
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side. It was therefore decided to primarily encourage description — which in practise 
means to ask neutral questions about what happened and how it happened, and largely 
leave the whys for the respondent to bring up. Another — and related — aspect is the 
balance between affect and affect-neutrality. This is undoubtedly a delicate issue as 
the interview should be frank and personal without triggering traumas that the inter-
viewer is not trained to handle. Good examples are suicide attempts and sexual abuse 
— issues that the interviewer in fact were confronted with during the twenty conver-
sations. The solution is to avoid digging actively into personal issues that are not 
directly relevant to the coping behaviour as such, and instead leave them as they are 
—as contextual pieces of information that may serve as starting points for mapping 
out the consequences they might have had for the development of debt problems. 
Yet another aspect concerns the structure of the interview. In principle, it can vary 
from following a strict plan of successive topics and pre-formulated questions to 
open-ended schemes with just a few themes, no line of succession and no pre-defined 
questions. A high degree of structuring may be necessary if a large number of respon-
dents are to be addressed by multiple interviewers. But as Johannessen et. al (Johan-
nessen, Kristoffersen, and Tufte 2004: 142) point out, in such cases a quantitative 
approach may sometimes serve the analytical purposes just as well. As for the un-
structured interview, it is especially useful in explorative projects where there is lim-
ited pre-knowledge about the phenomenon under scrutiny. But as shown in chapter 
two, this is not the case for our study. Quite the contrary, the extensive knowledge 
about the causes and effects of debt problems allows to introduce at least some struc-
ture into the interview situation as coping activities basically reflect reactions to spe-
cific causal events or efforts to correct the consequences or avoid possible calamities 
in the future.  
Kvale (2006 [1997]: 72) defines the semi-structured interview as a plan that covers a 
number of themes including a pre-defined list of tentative questions and check points 
that ensures that the analytical needs are covered. At the same time, such schemes 
enhance flexibility by permitting ad-hoc changes and a reshuffling of the order of the 
topics and questions. In this way, it is possible to tailor the interaction to meet the 
communicative needs of each individual respondent. Also, these features contribute to 
create an atmosphere of confidence, empathy and mutual understanding — a neces-
sity in order to get information about sensitive phenomena. Besides, flexibility is 
definitely required to cover complex processes; very few informants are able to give 
chronological accounts that contain all relevant aspects as they develop over time. 
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Table 4.3 above contains a condensed version of the interview guide, where the suc-
cession of topics indicates what is believed to be the ideal line of conversation. The 
ambition is to record relevant aspects of the respondents’ ‘life worlds’ as it has devel-
oped from the childhood years up to the current over-indebtedness situation. In line 
with the theory outlined in chapter three, the idea behind it is to empirically account 
for the assertion that the debt problems and the way they are coped with are best ex-
plained in terms of the ‘life world’ contexts from which they evolve. In as much as 
economic careers are constrained by status-specific goals, norms and values, a com-
prehensive understanding of any route into the debt quagmire must include informa-
tion about the default-debtor’s family background and life situation prior to the devel-
opment of financial difficulties. Hence, the first topic is simply the respondent’s 
growing-up conditions; his parents’ socio-economic status and life projects, the fam-
ily situation, his educational career and the moulding of ambitions and perceived life 
chances. The next topic continues the story, as it focuses on the life situation prior to 
the start of the debt problems — including the economic achievements, work career, 
social situation and ambitions for the future. Together, the two topics set the ‘life
world’ stage for the upcoming problematic times. 
The next two themes specifically concern the debt problem situation as it develops 
and become established as a true quagmire. The idea is to get the informants to tell 
about it as freely as possible without too much interference from the interviewer. In 
particular, comprehensive descriptions are wanted rather than detached accounts on 
the usage of specific coping strategies since the latter would require a predefined, 
Table 4.3: Condensed Interview Guide. a)
Topics Points 
Growing-up Conditions Parents’ work and aspiration, housing, education 
Pre-Problem Conditions Achievements, work, marital status, aspirations, conceptions of the ‘good life’,
The Debt Problem Situation What happened, how did it happen, causes, effects, reactions, solutions, creditor 
relationships, significant others, everyday life 
Stigmatisation Family, friends. colleagues 
The Future Possible solutions, current ambitions 
a) The full guide is reported in Appendix B. 
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exhaustive list of strategies to ask about. Such a list does not exist. Indeed, even if 
there was it would probably lead to a-contextual descriptions. From a more principal 
point of view it can be argued that a focus on individual strategies rather than the full 
story should be avoided because it presupposes that the default-debtors are choosing 
rationally between alternative options — or at least are highly conscious about the 
way they handle the problems. Even if it holds true for major parts of the coping be-
haviour, there is still a risk of losing important aspects of it since human action is 
largely routinised and hence unfolds as automated responses to social constraints.  
It was therefore decided to identify the obvious as well as more subtle ways of coping 
as they appear in broad descriptions of the courses of events. As a consequence, the 
role of the interviewer is primarily to ask open-ended questions about what happened 
and how it happened, and to follow up the links between specific causes, effects and 
coping strategies as they appear during the conversation. Also, the interviewer must 
constantly pay attention to the ways in which everyday life changes along with shift-
ing economic conditions. For that reason stigmatisation is launched as a separate 
topic; here the point of departure is a general question about who among ‘significant 
others’ should and should not know about the debt problems, and to whom — if any 
— they have turned for help during the crisis. 
The final topic in the interview is the future. Again, a general approach is applied by 
simply raising the question: what next? The underlying theme is the fact that the debt 
problem situation has changed the respondent’s socio-economic position — including 
the availability of resources to eventually get out of the quagmire. Also, there is likely 
to be an informative contrast to explore between the conceptions about ‘the good life’
before the troubles set in and the ambitions and dreams pursued in the current situa-
tion. This should provide additional information about the social constraints that 
guide economic action under different financial conditions. Also, there are lessons to 
be learned from the conclusions that are drawn from the debt quagmire experiences 
and the bearings that such conditions have on the individual as well as society as a 
whole.  
At the start of the interview the respondents were told about the project and how the 
data was going to be used. An interest for the full story was flagged and coping be-
haviour was mentioned as an intrinsic part of any account on debt problem careers. Of 
course, full anonymity was promised. The interviews were taped; although it probably 
came as a small surprise to some of them, all of the respondents gave permission to 
turn on the tape recorder. About half of the conversations took place in the inter-
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viewer’s office, whereas the other half was carried out in the informants’ homes. One 
interview was taped at a coffee shop and another was done over the telephone. 
With a few exceptions, the interviews more or less followed the guide. The two intro-
ductory themes — the childhood and pre-problem situation — had an unexpected 
bonus function as they not only came as a pleasant surprise to the respondents, but 
also turned out to have a calming effect; all of a sudden they found themselves talking 
about the best parts of their lives and could present themselves as ordinary people 
with applicable skills, resources, dreams, ambitions and socially as well as economi-
cally acclaimed achievements. So instead of sitting down at the table as failures and 
financial disasters, they now appeared as whole persons with an interesting life story 
to tell. It also created an atmosphere of confidence and even introduced elements of 
humour into the interaction. As the interviewer quickly became aware of the effect, it 
was consciously used it as a reassuring technique if the respondent started out on his 
own by describing an urgent problem or major frustration. In such cases, the inter-
viewer listened to the account and recognised the importance of the information, then 
launched the introductory topics and later returned to the issues raised by the respon-
dent at the start of the conversation. 
The next two topics — debt problems and stigmatisation — are of course the key 
themes of the interview and those taking up the better part of the about one and a half 
hours the conversation lasted. At the same time, the issues of concern are indeed sen-
sitive and from the respondent’s side marked by considerable levels of frustration, 
guilt, lost dreams and chaos. In rare cases, a more or less chronological account was 
given. But typically, the story swayed back and forth across time as well as aspects. 
As already stated, the interviewer recognised the value of letting the informant tell 
what happened without too much interference from the interviewer. Still, as the de-
tailed interview guide in appendix B shows, a number of important issues were an-
ticipated and listed to ensure they were all covered throughout the session.  
As for the final topic — the future — it was probably the easiest of them all, even 
though most informants no doubt had difficult times ahead. Still, at this stage of the 
conversation they typically volunteered to speak freely about their dreams and future 
aspirations. They also seemed confident in drawing general conclusions about the 
way they currently handle the situation, as they already had provided a nuanced pic-
ture of the courses of events that put the coping behaviour in perspective. Talking 
about the future simply made their stories complete. Many of the informants even 
provided confidential information when the tape recorder was switched off.  
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4.5. CRITICAL FEATURES OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN
As Weiss (1995: 168) points out, case studies about individuals make us “.. aware of 
the respondents’ experience within the context of their lives: this is what it is like to 
be this person in this situation.” Having said that, there is every reason to underline 
that the interviews are not just accounts of what happened but subjective descriptions 
of rather dramatic courses of events. This is probably how it must be if the research 
questions are to be at all addressed empirically. But this does not mean that the col-
lected data are unproblematic or reflecting the “truth”. The remainder of the chapter 
looks at some critical, interpretational issues that the methodology of the study raises, 
including biased data, validity, generalisability and reliability. 
4.5.1. WHAT DO WE HAVE DATA ABOUT?
Although the twenty interviews undoubtedly contain detailed information about the 
respondents’ routes into the debt quagmire and how they have coped with the situa-
tion over time, the accounts are biased in especially two ways; firstly because they are 
retrospective narratives, and secondly because they are one-sided presentations of the 
self and one’s personal interests. Both biases follow directly from the way the study is 
designed, and as such they have an inherent impact on any analyses performed on the 
data.    
Starting out with retrospection, the implication is that the respondents have presented 
selective interpretations of historic courses of events rather than objective descrip-
tions. In as much as that is the case, the accounts are more or less flavoured by a hu-
man desire to make sense of one’s existence in terms of comprehensive, consistent 
and positive presentations of the self. As part of the process, particularly compromis-
ing elements are typically repressed and eventually displaced or simply forgotten as 
time goes by. Retrospection may, just as intended by the design, give insights into 
lengthy processes. But the picture drawn by the informants is skewed. 
Adding to this, the data are also likely to be biased due to the element of self-selection 
in the sampling procedure. As shown in table 4-1, a little less than two thirds of those 
who returned the recruitment questionnaire gave permission to be approached for an 
interview. As opposed to those who did not authorise further contact, they share the 
attribute of willingness to talk about the situation. For some reason, they have all 
seized the opportunity to be heard — perhaps because they have lost the argument 
with the creditors and other parties in the case, or because they feel that very few lend 
them an ear since they got lost in the debt quagmire. Beyond a general readiness to 
talk to a researcher, twelve of the twenty informants explicitly volunteered to promote 
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or pursue specific interests. For instance, whereas some simply needed to talk through 
their cases for therapeutic reasons, others wanted to share their experiences in order to 
help people in similar situations. One of the informants was rather desperate for help, 
whereas two others needed information and simple pieces of advice. Still others de-
fined their appearance as a political mission as they either wanted to express their 
views on governmental regulations or speak for particular professions such as entre-
preneurs or small firm managers. 
Taken together, retrospection and one-sided presentations of the self and one’s per-
sonal interests delimit what can be done with the data. But to put it in the right per-
spective, it must be acknowledged that the research interview is based on everyday 
conversations and hence shares important features with it. In particular, information is 
communicated retrospectively in most social encounters. Also, people are typically 
trying to keep up a positive social image and present their life projects in a favourable 
light. Besides, in living out these ends multiple meanings is attached to what is being 
said. Biases of these kinds are, in other words, normal features of everyday life. The 
fact that they also impact the character of the interviews should therefore not be a 
source of great worry; after all, the information is recognisable and interpretable pre-
cisely because it resembles what is given in other social contexts.  
On the other hand, the research interview distinguishes itself from everyday encoun-
ters by being an asymmetric conversation that goes beyond mere exchange of infor-
mation by aiming at generating systematic knowledge (Kvale 2006 [1997]: 21). At the 
highest level of precision, this involves establishing possible links between causes and 
effects — in our case between coping strategies and the social factors that may trigger 
them. Given the biases in the data, this is difficult; as Silverman (2005: 8) points out, 
in as much as the informants document their past by highlighting some features and 
downplaying others, the identification of causal mechanisms becomes blurred and 
incomplete. Within some analytical positions such as hermeneutics and discourse 
analysis the very process of constructing narratives is made the target issue for data 
interpretation. But the ambition — and hence the character of the interview guide — 
is primarily phenomenological. Therefore, Silverman’s (2005: 48) advice is taken to 
regard the interviews as descriptive responses to being exposed to a specific social 
problem rather than data on processes of social construction.  
Still, causality can be approached. As argued by Weiss (1995: 179-181), descriptions 
of given processes — in our case: the development of debt problems — necessarily 
gives some insights into how the informants’ situation came to be; after all, most 
people identify at least parts of the dynamics that have produced the events. Such 
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knowledge can be pursued and expanded from one interview to another, and add up to 
qualified assertions about what mechanisms are likely to have had an impact on the 
way the informants cope with the difficulties. This is also due to the information ob-
tained across interviews; for whereas the individual respondent may be partly or 
largely unaware of given operative causal factors, influential contextual parameters 
may attract the attention of the analyst who works on not just one but a number of 
cases. Besides, while some informants may fall short of comprehending the situation, 
others are likely to be more thoughtful or sensible to triggering factors that may apply 
to similar cases as well. Having said that, the limitations involved should also be 
explicitly acknowledged; as it is not known to what extent the actual courses of events 
have been smartened up by the interviewee, any assertion about causation cannot be 
exhaustive. Indeed, the very existence of over-emphasised, downplayed, forgotten and 
unrecognised generative forces turns any statement about causal mechanisms into 
propositions rather than conclusive facts. 
4.5.2. VALIDITY ISSUES
The credibility of such proposition, like any other type of data interpretation, hinges 
on the validity of the findings. An important aspect of it is of course whether or not 
the informants tell the truth. Needless to say, there is no reason to sit down at inter-
views expecting the informants to be potential liars; quite the contrary, it should be 
generally expected that they tell the truth. But as Weiss (1995: 147-150) points out, 
this does not mean that they tell ‘the whole truth’, nor ‘the precise truth’. There are 
many reasons for that — much due to the biases discussed above. In addition, most 
people develop memory gaps as time goes by — a fact that especially has an impact 
in studies like ours that aims at covering large time spans. Also, the answers depend 
on the questions asked and the way the interviewer understand and respond to what he 
is told. Indeed, just as people seldom make up stories during an interview, they are 
typically not likely to add unasked-for information on their own initiative. Besides, 
most questions can be answered from different perspectives and vary by the type of 
relationship established during the interview — each of which may rightfully claim to 
express truth content.  
A way to come around at least some of these problems could be to use multiple data 
sources or re-interview the informants at a later point in time. But as already argued, 
such steps have not been taken. Another possibility would be to actively check out 
concrete pieces of information from the interviews to evaluate the truth content and 
assess the general credibility of the respondents. But no detective work of any kind 
has been done, either. Some of the interviewees have on their own initiative, however, 
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supported their accounts by providing official documents and debt settlement applica-
tions. 
In a study like this one, a critical issue is uncomfortable truths. As noted in a study on 
money collection in Norway, being unable to pay bills is unpleasant to the extent that 
default-debtors may suppress many relevant experiences, events, feelings and reac-
tions (Vabø 1994: 62). Just as important, no informant can be expected to endanger 
themselves by confessing criminal acts or jeopardise their social or professional posi-
tions by revealing information that can be used against them at a later point in time 
(Weiss 1995: 149). Here, the design of the study is believed to modify such threats on 
validity. In particular, the sample is made up by people who have volunteered to pro-
vide information about a rather compromising life situation. Even though none of 
them have been part of a research project before, it is not the first time that they talk 
about their problems; indeed, all of them have long experience in arguing their cases 
with creditors, money collectors, family members, friends, social workers and repre-
sentatives of the court system — all high tension instances of interaction. The threat 
on validity is further modified by the possibility that the research questions concern 
aspects of the debt problem situation that there may be fewer reasons for holding back 
information about. Put boldly, any need to be thrifty about data on illegal economic 
dispositions does not necessarily generate a similar thriftiness with respect to coping 
behaviour — which can be rather trivial in comparison. In addition, these are all per-
sons who have already suffered considerable material and social losses; in fact, in 
most of the cases there is little left to lose — including integrity and honour.  
The impact of uncomfortable truths can also be modified by creating a trusting and 
accommodating climate during the interview. To a large extent, this is a matter of 
making the informant feel comfortable and giving him the understanding of being a 
valued and respected conversation partner. The fact that sensitive information is ob-
tained both on tape and off record is a good sign in that respect. Another useful strat-
egy is to focus on concrete events rather than on general attitudes, views and feelings. 
This makes it easier for the informant to provide the adequate information as it helps 
remembering and reduces the tendency to make modifications. Event-oriented data 
are also easier to interpret (Weiss 1995: 150). Besides, difficult issues have been 
systematically approached from different angles and perspectives throughout the 
interview in order to get as nuanced opinions on the matter as possible; a good exam-
ple is the extent to which one tries to run away from the problems — a multi-faceted 
way of coping that can be difficult to admit for some.  
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Finally, two additional strategies have been implemented to strengthen the validity of 
the study. One is to use deviant cases to support the main findings. Following 
Silverman (2005: 215-219), in qualitative analyses all cases in the sample should be 
accounted for. As a consequence, any deviances must be inspected for explanations 
on why they do not fit the mainstream patterns. Such knowledge supports the main 
results by delimiting the extent to which they are valid. As shall be demonstrated, the 
strategy has proved valuable in establishing an overall stage-by-stage description of 
the default-debtors’ coping behaviour. The second strategy is external validation. In 
our case, this has been about giving lectures on coping to a number of different spe-
cialist audiences, including enforcement officers, money collectors, creditors, law-
yers, bureaucrats, social workers and students. As the activity has been going on for 
some years and parallel to the analysis of the data, the feedback from these audiences 
has been a corrective and inspired additional investigations and sometimes even a 
change of perspectives. The analysis to be presented in the coming chapters hopefully 
meets the criterion that different professions recognise the descriptions and see the 
results as a supplement to their own treatment of debt problems. 
4.5.3. ANALYTICAL GENERALISATION; WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE MADE?
Just as there are biases with respect to the subject matter as well as the truth content of 
the data, there are also limitations on what conclusions that can be drawn from the 
material. The obvious point of departure is the sample itself, composed as it is 
through a fussy recruitment procedure with obvious elements of self-selection. Al-
though all studies based on such samples are initially confined to the limited number 
of cases at hand, it is normally unsatisfactory to draw conclusions only about them. 
The question is therefore if — and in what sense — the sample permits to take the 
results beyond the group of twenty informants. 
Following Kvale (2006 [1997]: 160-162), there are three basic types of generalisa-
tions. Firstly, the naturalistic; this is the everyday kind of generalising activity that, 
based on experience with specific persons and situations, puts people in a position to 
routinely predict new events or form opinions about what may happen in similar 
situations or interactions with the same kind of people. Research, of course, aims at 
going beyond the typically tacit and informal knowledge that is called upon here. 
Secondly, there is statistical generalisation. This is a highly formalised activity based 
on randomisation and probability theory; whereas the former refers to sampling pro-
cedures where the likelihood of being selected is random or at least known, the latter 
concerns a set of techniques and tests that makes it possible to assess the probability 
that the observed results are produced by chance rather than systematically. Random 
104          INTO THE DEBT QUAGMIRE
samples are representative for some population according to a set of specified criteria, 
and the findings may therefore be generalised to the population as a whole. It is 
tempting to regard the twenty informants as representative for default-debtors in the 
Oslo region. But clearly, they are not. The sampling procedure does not even lead to a 
representative sample of those who responded to the recruitment questionnaire. 
Hence, the results from the study cannot be generalised to any population in the statis-
tical sense of the word. 
There is one more type of generalisation left: the analytical. According to Kvale 
(2006 [1997]: 161-162), this is a justified assertion about the extent to which the find-
ings from a study may serve as guidance about related situations or contexts. Such 
generalisations are based on an analysis of the differences between the contexts in 
question, and is as such a formalised — rather than a naturalistic — prediction. The 
data shall not be analysed for predictive purposes. Rather, the relevance of this type of 
generalisation lies in the applied logic, where specified evidence and explicit argu-
ments allow researchers as well readers to assess the validity of the conclusions 
drawn. The same path is followed here, based on the main characteristic of the sam-
ple; viz. that it has been composed in order to account for a theoretically defined 
range of debt problem situations. For this enables analytical generalisation of a spe-
cific kind; in the wording of Bryman (2000 [1988]: 90), “.. to theoretical propositions 
rather than to populations or universes”.
Any such generalisation is a statement about the typicality of observed coping behav-
iour: how likely is it that the experiences of one or more of the informants are typical 
for the broad class of phenomena to which the theory refers? For a start, such state-
ments can be based on the informants’ own claim of being typical of anybody in a 
similar situation. Although people may in fact have a justified claim based on knowl-
edge, experience and structural position, this is perhaps the weakest support for theo-
retical propositions; as Weiss (1995: 27) argues, the informants’ claim for typicality 
must at least be explicitly assessed as to whether or not they are likely to possess the  
necessary overview.  
Much in line with Bryman’s (2000 [1988]) position, a better foundation for generali-
sation is obtained by taking contextual constraints as the point of departure. Again, 
the design of the study provides the corner-stone as maximising for range systemati-
cally leads to the inclusion of many of the theoretically important shades of debt prob-
lems into the sample. The potential for making generalisations is the following: in as 
much as it can be substantiated that specific dynamics and constraints from theoreti-
cally relevant social processes may account for the informants’ coping behaviour, 
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similar patterns can be expected from any other person subjected to the same dynam-
ics and constraints (Weiss 1995: 27). A particular characteristic of the sample is that it 
does not necessarily contain multiple informants for each type of debt problem or 
problem-generating process. But as long as generalisability is a question of theoretical 
propositions, a low number of observations — even down to the single case study — 
is not an obstacle in itself; generalisations are still justified insofar as the experiences, 
actions and motives of individual informants can be theoretically sustained as typical 
for people living under given conditions (Weiss 1995: 32). Moreover, as Bryman 
(2000 [1988]: 91) observes, such assertions are valuable for science as a cumulative 
endeavour; subsequent research may re-examine them in similar or even radically 
different milieus, thereby assessing their validity. 
A third way of supporting analytical generalisations is of course by reference to cor-
roborating studies (Weiss 1995: 28-29). This shall be done by drawing on findings 
and propositions from a number of empirical and theoretical works in as diversified 
fields as unemployment studies, class- and status analyses, institutional research and 
sociological investigations on deviance and trust. 
4.5.4. RELIABILITY ISSUES
Reliability has to do with how accurate and trustworthy the data are — including the 
collection the material and the subsequent treatment of it (Johannessen, Kristoffersen, 
and Tufte 2004: 227). As Miles and Huberman (1994: 38) underline, this largely 
hinges on the skills of the individual researcher, as it is “.. essentially a person — 
more or less fallibly — [who] is observing, interviewing and recording ..”. The same 
goes for coding, interpretation and reporting. The discussion has already touched 
upon many issues of importance to the reliability of the study such as the choice of 
data type, the interview guide and the interviewing process. Reliability is here primar-
ily a question of good routines and transparency.  
It should be added that most tasks have been done by one person. Even though addi-
tional personnel may help improving the reliability of the data collection process, the 
one-man job has some advantages as well. One of them is related to the fact that the 
semi-structured interview is characterised by a certain degree of flexibility thereby 
allowing for the dynamics of the interaction to impact the direction and content of the 
conversation. The use of one interviewer secures some uniformity across interviews 
with respect to such aspects as the phrasing of questions, probing, reactions to sensi-
tive information and possible elements of leading questions.  
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As for the more technical aspects of the data collection and processing procedures, all 
interviews were taped and then transcribed by an experienced, professional secretary 
who was known by the research milieu from a number of similar assignments. Again, 
all interviews were transcribed by only one person, following strict routines whereby 
all pauses, overlaps, sighs, repetitions, etc. were included. Comparisons between 
taped and transcribed information hardly show any deviations. Also, instances of poor 
sound quality were notified in the transcripts, encouraging a check of the tapes. The 
subsequent coding of the material has also been done by only one person, and was 
based on the transcripts as well as the original tapes. No computer program was used 
for the task. Along with the development of the analysis, the data has been coded and 
recoded several times following theoretical advances, discussions and advice from 
many sources including supervisors and colleagues working on similar topics.  
Like most studies based on qualitative interviews, the forthcoming analysis is sup-
ported by extensive use of quotations. Since this way of documenting results and 
conclusions implies to select and highlight small pieces of information from a vast 
amount of text, it is fair and proper to make explicit the criteria for making such selec-
tions. In general, the excerpt that strongest emphasises the point to be documented 
should be chosen. But following Weiss (1995: 191-192), the principle must be sup-
plemented by additional guidelines. For a start, the selected text should be representa-
tive in the sense that it “.. forcefully presents what is widely shared..” among the 
informants. Also, whenever there are different or conflicting opinions among them, 
these views should be cited as well. Thirdly, any excerpt should forward an argument. 
One quotation per argument is sufficient; to demonstrate that several respondents 
express the same opinions is tedious and does not bring the line of reasoning forward. 
However, breadth shall be indicated throughout the analysis by alternating between 
informants whenever there is a real choice of illustrative quotations. 
In line with many other writers, Vabø (1994:63-64) practises similar guidelines by 
quoting informants who most accurately express meaning contents that are held by 
more than one respondent. In doing that, she also notices the weakness of the ap-
proach; viz. that since it is hard to tell how widespread the cited opinions are, it is 
easy to give too much attention to marginal points of view. This is a problem in the 
current study as well, in particular because a wide range of debt problem situations 
have been sampled for which there is sometimes only one representative in the sam-
ple. It follows that even the most general rule — that quotations should cover views 
held by multiple informants — is hard to live up to. In such cases, once again the 
design of the study has to be relied on; i.e. the theoretical relevance of the points be-
ing made. That means that it shall not only be quoted views held by multiple infor-
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES          107 
mants, but also given precedence to those arguments that seems particularly relevant 
from a theoretical point of view — even though they are expressed by only one per-
son.
Kvale (2006 [1997]: 188) mentions two additional rules that should be followed in 
order to secure high levels of reliability. One is that any quotation should be inter-
preted; the reader should not be left with multiple meanings of a given excerpt with-
out knowing which of them are assigned weight by the researcher. The other is the 
principle of contextualisation, which means that the reader should know what part of 
the conversation the excerpts are taken from and also the questions that triggered the 
responses. In practise, this is a matter of balance between being explicit about the data 
and avoiding being over-particular every time a quotation is launched.  
Beyond contextualisation, the ways in which quotations are reported have two more 
aspects of great importance to the study; viz. reproduction and translation. As for the 
former, two basic strategies exist. On the one hand, there is the ‘low-inference’ or 
‘preservationist’ approach according to which the informant is quoted as accurately as 
possible ‘in verbatim’, including hesitancies, repetitions and the often circuitous ways 
of telling the story (Silverman 2005; Weiss 1995-193). The main argument for such a 
quotation style is to pass across as much of the original meaning content as possible, 
and be true to the informants’ presentation of the self. On the other hand, there is the 
‘standardised’ strategy where the quotation remains true to the words and meanings 
of the informant, but where editing is accepted to make the message more accessible 
to the reader. A major argument in favour of the approach is that a too faithful repro-
duction distracts and annoys the reader (Weiss 1995-193; Kvale 2006 [1997]: 189). 
But standardisation is always a matter of degrees. The two strategies may therefore be 
regarded as poles on a continuum where the typical reproduction of quotations lies 
somewhere in-between.  
As for the current analysis, a standardised quotation style is adopted. It means that the 
informants’ views are passed across as compact statements, largely stripped of dis-
turbing figures of speech. It implies a licence to eliminate words, sentences and para-
graphs in order to bring together views on the same subject-matter that is spread 
across the interview (Weiss 1995-193; Kvale 2006 [1997]: 189). The strategy is ac-
companied by a formalised notation structure that informs the reader whenever the 
excerpts are taken from different sections of the transcript. Of course, the quotations 
shall remain true to the words and meanings of the original statements. Still, the ar-
gument against standardisation is that styles of speech and dialect-specific expres-
sions are important sources of information. But in a predominantly descriptive analy-
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sis like the one to be carried out here, the loss is acceptable compared to what is 
gained in efficiency, readability and clarity.  
Besides, the study is reported in English whereas the interviews are recorded in Nor-
wegian. This, of course, not only involves a reproduction of what is being said, but 
also a translation of it. As a consequence, some degree of standardisation appears 
unavoidable since translating necessarily implies a step away from the original word-
ing. It could be argued that the fact that the excerpts have to be translated into a dif-
ferent language represents a source of reduced reliability. However, on the positive 
side it contributes to hiding the identity of the respondents — even to the interviewees 
themselves; it is sometimes hard for an informant to face how his actions, opinions 
and attitudes contribute to the dynamics of unfortunate social processes. 
Finally, a professional translator could have been used to minimise the risk for pass-
ing across different meaning contents. However, it was decided not to do so as the 
challenge was found to be satisfactorily handled without. In appendix C the result is 
documented; it offers a side-by-side comparison of a quotation composed by elements 
from different parts of an interview in the original, ‘preservationist’ form and in the 
translated English standardised version respectively — the latter as it appears in one 
of the empirical chapters. 
4.5.5. A SHORT NOTE ON THE FORMALISED NOTATION STRUCTURE
As indicated above, all quotations are given according to a formalised notation struc-
ture. For a start, all excerpts are given in italics and in separate paragraphs. As already 
explained, the recruitment questionnaire was returned by 102 default-debtors, each of 
which was numbered from 1 to 102 as they arrived through the mail. When the twenty 
informants were selected for the sample, they retained their number. Whenever an 
informant is cited, an identification label is given in a bracket; for instance, a quota-
tion from informant number 28 is denoted by [28]. Also, when a given quotation 
contains excerpts from several sections of the transcript, it is denoted by [..].  
4.6. SUMMARY
This chapter has clarified the methodological implications and argues that a qualita-
tive methodology fits the research questions well. A major reason is that coping be-
haviour is largely unploughed ground. As the ambition is to know how default-
debtors understand, account for and act upon their difficulties, and how institutional 
conditions influence such behaviour, such knowledge is probably best secured by 
approaching the “insiders”. The study is therefore designed to be based on semi-
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structured qualitative interviews with twenty informants from the debt quagmire. The 
interview guide contains five major topics: growing-up conditions, pre-problem con-
ditions, the debt problem situation, stigmatisation and the future. As it turned out, the 
two first topics had a calming effect and contributed to a trusting atmosphere during 
the interviews as they allowed the informants to present themselves as ordinary and 
resourceful persons — and not as failures. 
The sampling procedure was carried out in two steps. In the first, 700 default-debtors 
in the Oslo region were approached through the mail by a recruitment questionnaire 
whereby key information about their debt history and life situation was collected. In 
the second, 19 of the 102 persons who returned the questionnaire were selected for the 
final sample. In addition, a pilot interview was included, bringing the total number of 
informants to twenty. The procedure was based on the principle of ‘sampling for 
range’ according to which a wide variety of debt problem situations were systemati-
cally selected.
The result is a theoretically planned, representational sample that secures variation 
with respect to causal processes, social status, and structural conditions under which 
financial problems evolve. Although representational, the sample is not a probability 
sample. Hence, statistical generalisations are impossible. But the ‘sampling for range’
procedure enables instead analytical generalisations aiming at forwarding theoretical 
propositions rather than statements about populations or universes. The principle 
involved is that, in as much as it can be substantiated that specific dynamics and con-
straints from theoretically relevant social processes may account for the informants’ 
coping behaviour, similar actions can be expected from any other person subjected to 
the same dynamics and constraints.  
There are many influences that may jeopardise analytical generalisations and conclu-
sions. A number of issues have therefore been considered, such as the nature of the 
data, retrospection, one-sidedness and the tendency to present the self in a favourable 
light. Several precautionary steps have been taken to minimise the impact of these 
threats. Above all, efforts were made to establish a relaxed and trusting atmosphere 
during the interviews, approach difficult issues from different angles and adopt an 
event-oriented interviewing style rather than focussing on attitudes and feelings. Still, 
theoretical propositions and conclusions shall be made with great care. 
With this, the empirical analysis may begin. 
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5. COPING BEHAVIOUR OVER TIME
5.1. INTRODUCTION
Even though it is possible to incur insurmountable debt problems more or less over-
night, severe financial difficulties typically build up over time. Moreover, once ac-
quired, it normally takes years to get out of the quagmire unless by a stroke of excep-
tional luck. As for coping behaviour, it not only evolves over time but is also likely to 
change its characteristics in the course of events. As pointed out in chapter 1.3.2, 
money collection routines increasingly put the default-debtors in difficult situations. 
This alone forces them to react and consider new ways of coping with the difficulties. 
In addition, ‘life world’ demands become progressively problematic to comply with 
as the economic foundation for achieved lifestyles withers. Sooner or later, coping 
behaviour necessarily includes involuntary changes in standard package orientations.  
In the first of three empirical chapters, the first of the research questions developed in 
chapter 2.6 is addressed:  
How do default debtors cope with debt problems over time? 
The chapter sets out by assessing the main pattern by which the informants cope with 
their debt problems. In particular, the data indicate that there are three major stages in 
such processes. Next, the characteristics of each phase are considered in more detail. 
Here, the data suggest that at each stage coping behaviour follows an economic ra-
tionality as well as being constrained by a social orientation. Finally, the cases that 
violate the three-stage pattern are highlighted. 
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5.2. THE OVERALL PATTERN IN COPING BEHAVIOUR
The contextual conditions necessarily change as the debt problems aggravate. Coping 
behaviour should therefore be expected to change over time. A key activity like credi-
tor negotiations illustrates the point; even though such talks are recurrent events 
throughout the whole of the debt problem career, the stakes at risk, the range of possi-
ble outcomes and the prospects of obtaining acceptable results all change as the defi-
cits accumulate. Indeed, as shall be demonstrated throughout the chapter, the severity 
of the debt situation largely influences the default-debtors’ choice of strategies as well 
as the social meanings attached to them.  
A critical factor is that the relationships between the parties involved shift as the debt 
problems escalate. Throughout the process, they experience each others’ actions and 
reactions, and evaluate one-another’s involvement. As a result, untried strategies may 
appear as both pressing and reasonable whereas others may loose their value alto-
gether. A formal illustration is of course the way one’s creditor relationships change 
as the system of stepwise execution of increasingly punitive sanctions is imple-
mented. But also typical ‘life world’ connections may undergo marked changes, as for 
instance when friends and relatives initially reach out a helping hand in a number of 
ways, but later become more reserved and selective in their support. There may be 
many reasons for that to happen. From the contributors’ point of view, the need for 
economic support quickly grows beyond anybody’s capacity. For that reason alone, 
friends and relatives may have to delimit and target their contributions to special 
purposes such as food or outfit for the children. From the default-debtors’ perspective, 
gifts passed through ‘life world’ channels are typically felt as something that should 
be reciprocated — which of course becomes increasingly difficult as time goes by. 
Many default-debtors may therefore suffer from continuously being at the receiving 
end of relief efforts from significant others, and gradually self-exclude themselves 
from participation in a growing number of networks and social arenas.  
Another major aspect of such processes is social learning; all parties act upon knowl-
edge acquired in previous encounters. As for the default-debtors, they learn the impli-
cations of a new role as they become exposed to legal procedures and new social 
constrains. They also progressively learn the extent to which society’s security net 
may — or may not — protect them from unwanted scenarios of many kinds. These 
experiences constitute a body of social learning that continuously enhance new frames 
of reference for adapting to the current situation. However, such knowledge is not 
picked up in predictable sequences like learning a curriculum at school. Instead, it is 
acquired through sudden blasts against one’s social situation. This partly follows from 
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the fact that debt recovery procedures escalate stepwise and that different claims may 
trigger different punitive routines and have different consequences. Also, default-
debtors have to actually realise the full extent of their situation before they can act. As 
the data will show, this takes place in terms of irregular, shocking eye-openers. As a 
result, coping behaviour is likely to develop in leaps rather than steadily over time. 
The interviews give rise to the identification of three distinct stages in the default-
debtors’ coping behaviour. With two exceptions, all informants refer to a particular 
event or time-limited series of incidents that made them fully aware of the fact that 
they were in serious economic trouble. Correspondingly, they also associate certain 
episodes or circumstances with a sudden understanding of being in a situation where 
they permanently are unable to handle their debts. The period in-between the two 
points in time is defined as ‘stage two’. This is a turbulent chapter in the default-
debtors’ lives where a wide range of financial, social, physical and psychological 
hardships occur; yet it is basically a period where they actively defend their lifestyles. 
Previous to these troublesome times is an initial ‘stage one’ where the main focus is 
not on defending, but preserving ‘status quo’ in spite of the charges against one’s 
economic stability. Finally, there is a ‘stage three’ where not only a new social iden-
tity as a default-debtor is taken onboard, but where dignity and self-respect is re-
established through adaptations to new lifestyles and alternative moral standards. 
The idea of stages in the development of problematic life situations is not new. The 
classic study of unemployment in the Austrian village of Marienthal during the early 
1930’ies is an outstanding example. It found that the process of adaptation to long-
term unemployment sets off by an immediate shock reaction, and is followed by a 
slight recovery and optimism, only to be replaced by frustration, resignation and apa-
thy as the life conditions aggravate and the prospects of getting a job withers away 
(Jahoda and Lazarsfeld 2002 [1933] ; Jahoda 1982: 22-23). A similar pattern was 
found among Italian unemployed, and a more fine-meshed sequence was identified 
among 57 Polish jobless, involving fear and distress, numbness and apathy, adapta-
tion and job seeking, loss of hope and apathy again (Jahoda 1982: 22-23; Zadawski 
and Lazarsfeld 1935). In the wake of these classic works, post-war unemployment 
research largely supports the notion of phases (Lunde and Borgeraas 1986). Based on 
a number of studies, Borgeraas (1984: 45-46) proposes a three-stage adaptation proc-
ess. First, there is an ‘initial stage’ that is marked by shock as well as modest opti-
mism. Next comes a ‘middle stage’ characterised by extended job seeking, but also by 
certain hardships such as depressions, marital problems and a loss of time structure in 
everyday life. The ‘final stage’, however, is less troublesome as one learns to accept 
the situation and take on the role as unemployed. 
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In as much as debt problems coincide with labour market marginalisation processes, 
coping behaviour should be expected to display similar patterns. The same is the case 
in as much as dealing with over-indebtedness shares common features with adapta-
tions to aggravating life situations in general. But severe debt problems also constitute 
a phenomenon in its own right with characteristics. In particular, debt recovery proce-
dures and non-compliance with the repayment norm are among the distinguishing 
features that are likely to impact any sequential patterns in coping behaviour. It fol-
lows that the way debt problems are dealt with over time may be similar to, but not 
identical with, the patterns suggested by unemployment research.  
Each of the three stages is investigated below. As shall be demonstrated throughout 
the analysis, the many ways in which debt problems are coped with can be traced 
back to rational economic considerations as well as social orientations. A few cases 
do not comply with the pattern. They are inspected towards the end of the chapter. 
5.3. STAGE ONE: PRESERVING STATUS QUO
Unlike unemployment, which strikes unmistakeably by a single event, debt problems 
typically evolve over time through complex processes of ambiguous incidents. It is 
like a tsunami; the real danger is often not realised until it is all over the place — 
upon which the default-debtor enters into what was just called ‘stage two’. But retro-
spectively, the informants interpret ‘stage one’ events as real hazards that should have 
been handled differently than they did at the time. As one of them puts it: 
“Had I known what I know today I had of course done something about 
it much earlier.” [63] 
Another informant, who had bought herself into a building project that turned out to 
be far more expensive than estimated in the prospectus, says: 
“Some sold their flats before I did, while there still was a chance. But I 
held on to it because I really believed everything would be sorted out in 
the end.” [73]  
This does not mean that people stay passive. Of course, the dark clouds on the horizon 
are noticed by those involved and in turn somehow acted upon — only insufficiently 
as it seem in retrospect: 
“My wife and I talked about it from time to time. Our economy was 
strained. But we talked too little about it .. And then I took on some 
more work .. And we just continued to live like we always had done.” 
[45] 
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The statement is typical for ‘stage one’. The situation normally prevails years on end. 
It is on the whole often difficult to tell how the mess actually began. According to one 
of the informants: 
“The problems started towards the end of the 1980’ies, and we strug-
gled for quite some time .. I think we may have barely scraped through 
for almost a decade or so .. We just hoped to survive the storm” [41] 
Obviously, there are good reasons for this to be the typical. For a start, one should not 
overreact; put to extremes, people rarely sell their homes only because there are a few 
unpaid bills in the drawer. Also, as indicated by the informant, most people actually 
manage to keep the head above the water for a while as some bills are paid and others 
pile up. This is largely a learned skill that is partly acquired through interacting with 
the creditors over time, partly gained by experiencing the social and legal implications 
of the process, and partly mastered by exercising flexibility and discipline with re-
spect to one’s own needs and ambitions. Also, during ‘stage one’ the possibilities 
continue to overshadow the limitations. But above all, the consequences of reacting 
disproportionately are indeed discouraging; while the self-employed risk loosing their 
businesses and hence the very source of income, others may find themselves without 
a home.  
5.3.1. STAGE ONE RATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTION
A restrained way to act is by sticking to the options rooted in economic rationality. 
But the informants do not seem to have implemented a wide range of such steps. This 
does not necessarily imply that they do not act rationally throughout ‘stage one’ of the 
process. Rather, it means that they behave according to well-established practices and 
routines — ways of managing one’s economy that have worked in the past and there-
fore are believed to work in the future as well. Like most of us, default-debtors simply 
continue to holding on to habits and ambitions, keeping on trusting the wider eco-
nomic, legal and social systems of which they are a part, and interpreting current 
events in familiar frames of reference. Taking into account that there are many more 
people who manage to get out of minor economic problems than there are people who 
end up in severe difficulties, “business as usual” is generally not a bad strategy from a 
rational economic point of view — even at ‘stage one’.
Still, about half of the interviews contain information about rationally rooted steps 
specifically taken to counteract perceived economic threats. One of the most obvious 
things to do is of course to try to increase one’s income. Eight of the informants report 
to have done that; two found better paid jobs whereas the others started to work over-
time or took on additional jobs — sometimes as undeclared work. As arrears build up, 
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one may even be tempted to take a calculated risk. For instance, a convenience store 
manager suffered from shoplifting for which he was held personally responsible. His 
debts to the mother organisation increased each month. He was then offered to take 
over another shop: 
“I was concerned about the shoplifting problem in the new shop. But 
the shrinkage was no bigger than I already faced. I had a good reputa-
tion in the organisation, and the corporate management told me that 
the new shop had great potentials for increased sales and hence sub-
stantially higher monthly salaries. I was talked into it.” [65] 
As it turned out, the move was a mistake. But even the more common strategies of 
working overtime or taking on extra jobs may be short-lived; increased work loads 
usually proves too hard over time as it tends to affect one’s health as well as the social 
life including family relationships. Says a lone mother who, on top of her ordinary 
job, worked at the local post office every Saturday: 
“As long as I worked at the post office I managed somehow. But I 
gradually got worn out because I did not get the rest I needed. And I 
had to catch up with everything during Sundays. You know, I had a 
young daughter who was left to herself every Saturday morning. I sim-
ply couldn’t go on like that.” [73] 
The experience is shared by a self-employed accountant who took on extra assign-
ments to keep pace with the growing debt expenditures: 
“I nearly killed myself to get enough money to pay mortgages.. I fell ill 
from time to time, and then I had to catch up with everything when I re-
covered. It was such a vicious circle .. I even came behind with my own 
accounts, and finally I was made bankrupt by the tax authorities.” [45] 
Self-employed managers often face specific challenges that demands special coping 
strategies. For instance, the just mentioned convenience store manager engaged in 
improving the surveillance systems in his own shop as well as developing a broad 
security policy at the corporate management level. Another was in a trade that was 
particularly vulnerable to the economic crisis at the end of the 1980’ies, and — as the 
only one in or sample — managed to liquidated his firm over a six month period, just 
in time to avoid a bankruptcy and most likely a substantial financial loss beyond the 
company’s equity. In spite of this he still ended up in debt problems due to disagree-
ments with the authorities over taxation. 
In addition to try and increase the incomes, steps can be taken to reduce consumption 
expenditures and debt loads. Both of these approaches, however, seem to be more 
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prominent in later stages of the process. As for the former, most of the informants 
have probably saved on their food budgets but not to the extent that they found it 
worthwhile mentioning it as a strategy as such. As for the latter, reducing debt loads 
typically calls for resource-demanding actions such as using savings or asking  par-
ents or parents-in-law for gifts or advancement of inheritance. These are quite dra-
matic steps that are incompatible with a “business as usual” philosophy. Refinancing 
is a less pretentious alternative, but none of our informants report to have done that — 
perhaps because they found it unnecessary, impossible or unattractive due to high 
interest rates at the time when their difficulties began to unfold. Still, one of the in-
formants did sell off possessions to the benefit of his creditors, hoping to avoid having 
his financial situation coming out of control. 
5.3.2. STAGE ONE SOCIAL ORIENTATION
While the traces of economic, rational coping strategies are modest, the imprints of 
measures embedded in social orientations are quite distinct. These are actions that are 
implemented to preserve social positions and identities. The strategies may be con-
ceptualised by the help of two adjacent, yet different analogies. One is what can be 
called the ‘ostrich approach’; it is a well known fact that when ostriches are scared, 
they stick the head in the sand and hope that the danger is gone by the time they look 
back up again. The other analogy is the ‘card is played logic’; whenever a card is 
played there is no point of return, and each player must stand up to the consequences 
and make their next moves accordingly. During ‘stage one’ much the socially moti-
vated coping behaviour seems to be tailored along these lines. 
Starting out with the ‘ostrich approach’, the following is a good illustration: 
“My wife comes from a poor country. I always took a pleasure in buy-
ing her things like expensive clothes. We also spent money on travel-
ling. We had some extravagance in our lives .. Her family is poor, so 
over the years we have tried to help them out economically .. When our 
economy got strained we behaved as if we had enough money. There 
was less shopping and a little less support to my wife’s family. But I 
knew we spent too much .. Our friends were surprised when I went 
bankrupt.” [45]  
The ‘ostrich approach’ is about continuing ones social lives as always, implicitly 
hoping that the consequences will be manageable until the economic problems even-
tually vanish. In practise it implies to reduce the invisible parts of one’s consumption, 
at the same time as maintaining the social profile with respect to friends and relatives. 
As expressed by the informant, there was less “extravagance” in terms of clothes and 
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travels, but they continued the lifestyle at a somewhat reduced level. They also carried 
on with entertaining their friends at home with food and drinks as before. Although 
they on several occasions tried to tell them that their economy was strained, the bank-
ruptcy came as a surprise to everyone. Social relationships imply commitments that 
persist through times of economic scarcity. This is not the least illustrated by the fact 
that the informant continues to send money abroad to the wife’s family; concerns for 
— in this case — mothers-in-law and brothers-in-law take precedence over obliga-
tions to the creditors. The point to be made is general: as shall be seen throughout the 
chapter, and further explored in chapter 7, social relationships tend to weigh more 
than commitments to financial institutions. Whenever that is translated into action in a 
‘stage one’ context, the result is always increased pressure on the economy; one starts 
to dig one’s own grave, so to speak.  
Other examples of the mechanism include taking on additional credit for consumption 
or bill paying in order to hold the fort. Value items is also an issue; one informant 
makes a point about how he advised some friends who were about to develop debt 
problems to sell off assets to avoid being dragged into the downward spiral he found 
himself in; a strategy he himself had — regretfully — not implemented. But selling 
off valuables normally is far too drastic at ‘stage one’. In fact, the ‘ostrich approach’
prescribes precisely the opposite: stay calm, and the problems will be sorted out. This 
is more than underlined by a self-employed who takes the strategy to the extremes: 
“Well, I just hoped I would eventually come across something smart to 
do and get away with it .. I thought some of my debt eventually would 
be out-dated and eradicated.” [28] 
The ‘card is played logic’ is much about the same — i.e. preserving social positions 
and identities. Still, it distinguishes itself by particularly applying to capital-intensive 
items and projects rather than consumption and daily expenditures. As a consequence, 
the strategies falling into the category are more fateful and more felt like an active 
choice rather than a continuation of an established pattern. At ‘stage one’ the ‘card is 
played logic’ is first of all implemented by the self-employed to secure their busi-
nesses, but it may also apply to protect private property. It could be argued that these 
strategies have elements of economic rationality since they involve protection of 
capital. But the point is that they are not defendable from an economic point of view 
and that the actors implicitly are aware that the steps taken are likely to worsen rather 
than improving the financial situation.  
A typical example is to borrow more money to defend one’s investments. One of the 
informants tells that the joint expenses of the apartment block she lived in started to 
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accelerate. In spite of seeing her neighbours selling their flats she followed a ‘card is 
played logic’:
“What happened was that the rent started to really increase, and I had 
to take on an extra loan. Which of course I had to pay back along with 
the rent that continued to rise. In the end my wages couldn’t sustain the 
expenditures.” [73] 
Small-firm managers may take on more credit to keep their businesses going: 
“I soon realised I didn’t actually have enough capital to run my busi-
ness. So I took on additional credit in 1986, at the time when the banks 
queued up to lend money to everyone .. I was bowled over from the very 
start. I lacked experience with this capital stuff. And then came this 
desperation for more credit at all costs.” [28] 
It is interesting to notice the strong social motivation involved in choosing this way of 
coping. The informant just quoted had established the business against his father’s 
wishes. Also, the father was a workaholic who took great pride in being a successful 
breadwinner. Therefore, there were strong family constraints against admitting failure 
in time to avoid the debt problems to develop. 
Another informant expanded the business at a time when the market was declining: 
“It was a fateful investment. The company had halting finances, but we 
expanded into a new geographical area .. We hesitated to lay off our 
employees. Their wages represented enormous expenditures for us. But 
we felt it was too bad to impose suffering onto people who trusted us 
and the business we ran.” [41] 
Again, the strong social motivation is evident. Together with her husband the infor-
mant had established a production facility in small, countryside community. 
Throughout the interview she displays a philanthropic, almost paternalistic commit-
ment to the employees. The factory was based on a flat organising structure, and the 
couple took pride in providing the workers with a more urban and wider cultural per-
spective on life; they even took them on paid trips abroad. The fact that they stand by 
their social commitments in times of financial adversity and expand the business 
rather than down-scaling it takes them into severe debt problems in a matter of years. 
5.3.3. STAGE ONE: BRIEF SUMMARY
At ‘stage one’, the main focus is on preserving ‘status quo’ in spite of the charges 
made against the household’s economic stability. The typical approach to coping with 
growing debt problems is not to overreact, but to stay calm as some bills are paid and 
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others pile up. This does not necessarily imply that the default-debtors fail to act sen-
sible in economic terms. Rather, it means that they behave according to well-
established practices and routines — ways of managing the economy that have 
worked in the past and therefore are believed to work in the future as well. In addi-
tion, many of the informants try to increase their incomes by getting a new job, work-
ing overtime or finding an extra job. Besides, some of the steps taken are distinctively 
embedded in social orientations. These include a continuation of consumption pat-
terns that they know they cannot afford (the ‘ostrich approach’) and to back up in-
vestments by taking on more debts (the ‘card is played approach’). As a result, the 
debt problems continue to build up rather than being adequately attended to.  
5.4. STAGE TWO: DEFENDING LIFESTYLES
’Stage two’ of the debt problem process is perhaps the one that comes closest to any 
of the stages described in unemployment research. This is a period of great turbulence 
when chaos, despair, resignation and depressions occur, and when families fall apart. 
This is also the time when people fall ill to the point that they are unable to work and 
when creditors are temporarily unable to get in touch with their default-debtors. But 
first of all, this is the time for combat, when almost any possible solution is checked 
out in order to fence off the threats to the financial and social situation. It follows that 
these are the months when the range of events and variety in coping strategies peak. 
A major difference between ‘stage one’ and ‘stage two’ is that the severe economic 
problems are explicitly acknowledged by the default-debtors. When it happens the 
difficulties have already been a part of their lives for some time. But as shown above 
the expectant ‘stage one’ attitude has effectively filtered the potential hazards through 
well-known frames of reference. Also, it takes time for the money collection proce-
dures to develop into a full force assault. Besides, the prospects of loosing everything 
are so fearsome that one simply refuses to stand up to it unless there is really no es-
cape. Therefore, it typically takes a breathtaking single event or series of incidents to 
open the eyes to the hard facts of life. To illustrate, a high-educated and well-
connected woman who ran into difficulties in a complicated house building process, 
was advised by her lawyer friends to take the entrepreneur to court. Surrounded by 
friendly experts she did not realise it was already a lost case: 
“The real estate agent who sold me the house told me when he quit his 
job in the agency: “You know, I really have to tell you that you’re about 
to lose everything.” I didn’t understand what he meant, not even my 
husband saw it coming. Nobody did until I lost the trial.” [1]  
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Another informant, who had struggled with the economy since the divorce, was sur-
prised by finding out that she was no longer creditworthy: 
“I went to the bank and asked for an overdraft agreement. I needed 
some flexibility. But they told me no, and I didn’t understand why. Not 
long before I had bought a television set on tick, and that was no prob-
lem. But the bank said I was blacklisted because I had defaulted on a 
loan.” [75] 
Nearly all of the interviews contain descriptions of eye-opening events; several of the 
self-employed receive an out-of-the-blue deathblow from the tax authorities, others 
are bowled over by a mess of financial obligations and fatal family events, still others 
come to facing the realities as they gradually become marginalised on the labour 
market and eventually get a claim they cannot pay. Common to them all is that these 
moments of truth trigger a crusade to save what they have accomplished so far in life. 
5.4.1. STAGE TWO RATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTION
Rational economic action at ‘stage two’ is typically directed towards increasing the 
incomes, reducing debt expenses, lowering daily costs and negotiating with the credi-
tor side. As for the former, increasing the incomes continues to be important; during 
‘stage two’ more than half of the informants report to have taken specific steps down 
this road. For instance, a woman who got psychological problems in the wake of her 
divorce eventually managed to complete her education and get a job. Three of the 
bankrupt self-employed have attractive qualifications and therefore found work as 
consultants in their old trade. Additional two former small firm managers became 
subordinate wage-earners. As one of them explains: 
“My special qualification is processed fish products. There aren’t many 
who can do that nowadays. Not in shops, anyway. I had my own com-
pany for years, and I learned the trade from bottom-up .. After the 
bankruptcy I took a job in a supermarket.” [8] 
Other strategies naturally include taking on extra jobs and working overtime. Unde-
clared assignments are common. One informant also made some extra money by 
letting out his apartment while he shared a flat with three other people. Two others 
combated marginalisation by taking supplementary education. Those who do not 
implement steps to increase their incomes are typically suffering from physical sick-
ness or psychological disorder. 
Another strategy — and now: more urgent than ever — is to reduce the debt load. As 
already pointed out, these types of strategies are not widespread during ‘stage one’
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because they imply a dramatic reorientation in the use of family resources. But now, 
thorough-going measures seem unavoidable. Naturally, not all have access to means 
whereby a given debt load can be reduced. Still, at ‘stage two’ seven informants re-
port to have taken steps of this type. The weightiest strategy is of course to sell the 
home; five interviewees voluntarily did so in time to avoid a forced sale. But the ap-
proach may also involve selling other types of property. Says one: 
“We had a Mercedes and a nice boat and a flat in Oslo and everything, 
so I chose to sell everything I had as we already lived in a rented 
apartment in another town. We settled our debts to the best of or finan-
cial capability. The remaining claims are what constitute the core of my 
debt problems today.” [80] 
Refinancing the debt portfolio is another possibility. Clearly, this does not reduce the 
amount of debt in itself, but it temporarily or permanently brings down the costs of 
having it. None of the wage-earners report to have pursued the strategy; perhaps their 
situation had already aggravated beyond the point of interest from a creditors’ per-
spective, or maybe the interest rates were too high at the time to provide a significant 
relief. But to the self-employed refinancing may be more of an option up to a certain 
point as two of them report to have seized the possibility during ‘stage two’. They 
also had savings and paid off some debts s part of the operation. One of them even cut 
down his debt expenditures by selling his house and then buying a cheaper one, hop-
ing it would be enough to avoid a total financial collapse. 
Sometimes rather dramatic decisions are made to try to come to grips with the situa-
tion. This is not the least illustrated by the manager of the convenience store who at 
the end of ‘stage two’ simply quitted his job. Since his success in combating shoplift-
ing was limited, he could no longer face the accumulating losses for which he was 
made personally responsible. As a result, he would be without a manager’s incomes, 
but at least put an end to the accelerating debts. The decision probably came too late, 
but as shall be shown, he had his reasons. 
As the debt problems aggravate, saving in on running expenses becomes increasingly 
important. During ‘stage two’ this is the aim of a number of coping strategies, involv-
ing half of our informants. Besides actually drawing up a budget — perhaps for the 
first time in life — restricting consumption habits is probably among the easiest 
things to do since this is the part of the budget of which one has complete control. But 
still, it is a challenging option. For a start, there is a substantial element of necessity 
inhabited in personal consumption. But beyond that, restrictions on consumption 
affect their lifestyles directly. This is a paradox since the whole point in behaving 
CHAPTER 5: COPING BEHAVIOUR OVER TIME          123 
economically rational is to return to ‘status quo’, not to introduce a permanent trans-
formation. Nevertheless, six informants report to have restricted their consumption in 
several ways. If possible, the steps taken are restricted to the — for outsiders — “in-
visible” parts of life. For some this is easy, as for a cook:  
“I try to keep the food budget very low. I eat at work before I start in 
the morning, and I eat before I go home. I pay very little for that. And I 
work all the time so I don’t have leisure time expenditures any more”. 
[32]  
Another informant tells he profited from the fact that he lived in the countryside dur-
ing ‘stage two’:
“Well, we had access to cheap meat through my wife’s family. Berries 
were right outside our doorstep. Cheap fish was no problem, either. 
Our diet was quite good.” [28]  
For others, however, saving in on daily expenditures may be more problematic. Says 
a woman in her late 30’ies: 
“It is difficult to make ends meet. Whenever something happens, I have 
to save in on food and clothes and cinemas. And the car. People say I 
don’t use the car. I do restrict the usage because it costs a lot. Every 
inch costs money. I always have to choose between basic needs, and it 
is hard to never have some leeway.” [91]  
As for reducing debt expenditures, direct talks and negotiations with the creditors are 
among the most used strategies. About half of the informants report to have engaged 
in such activities during ‘stage two’. The discussions are often complicated and may 
involve all kinds of creditors, including financial houses, banks, state institutions and 
private lenders. The talks may also raise the need for lawyers and other mediators. 
But as the debt problems aggravate and the parties get to knowing each other, the 
relationships typically become strained. A self-employed involved in a very complex 
debt situation provides a good illustration of a frantic climate: 
“I tried to turn up in person .. and I tried to call the tax authorities. I 
called and I called and I was there in person and I told them they have 
got it all wrong. And I called my lawyer, but he wanted money so I told 
him I was broke. What can you do? At the same time, the bank and the 
social security office collaborated and we had a meeting and I lost my 
house and I had to move out.” [32] 
Previous research indicate that encounters between creditors and default-debtors with 
serious debt problems tend to be marked by misunderstandings, unrealistic expecta-
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tions and lack of flexibility (Poppe and Borgeraas 1992). Such features are also trace-
able in the interviews made for this study. As a defaulter reports: 
“I tried for a long time to get the bank to accept a deal that I could 
handle, but it was out of the question. Out of the question. I wrote to 
them, I called them to discuss my case; instead, they came at my door 
step saying I owed them money. Pure terror, you know.” [8] 
Still, some have obviously had a more relaxed relationship with their creditors. A 
former self-employed illustrates that personal qualities, connections and transparency 
are decisive. Being a much organised person and on friendly terms with many of his 
creditors, he explains: 
“I think my creditors felt they had direct access to me and all the in-
formation they need. So I had no negative experiences with them. I kept 
them informed in detail, and they were content with that. [80] 
Those who do not report to have been in contact with the creditors during ‘stage two’
are either psychologically worn out or do not find themselves in a position to obtain 
any relief by talking with their counterparts. Whereas the former case implies that 
they are periodically out of reach of their creditors, the latter means that negotiations 
are not seen as a relevant coping strategy. Rather, the types of communication that 
take place are likely to be letters and more or less unpleasant telephone calls. 
5.4.2. STAGE TWO SOCIAL ORIENTATION
If the social orientation in coping behaviour is evident during ‘stage one’, it is even 
stronger at ‘stage two’. For a start, well-known strategies such as the ‘ostrich’ and 
‘card is played’ approaches are continued. This means that even though the severity 
of the financial situation is recognised, it is still not acted upon in all situations; in 
fact, some aspects of the social identity may still be unthinkable to change. A good 
illustration is provided by a woman who, when the house was lost, did the following: 
“I rented a very nice flat in the same area that was equally exclusive .. 
It was convenient since my daughter’s school was nearby. But it was 
expensive.” [1] 
The convenience motive is obviously ulterior since her daughter had just started upper 
secondary school and therefore had no real need or formal reasons to belong to a 
certain geographical area; in fact, students often come from different parts of town.  
The social motivation for renting an expensive flat was rather a matter of continuing a 
social image; she simply did not want to move into other and cheaper parts of town. 
The desire was so strong that she asked her ex-husband to pay the deposit for the flat 
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as she could not afford it herself. Also, since the rent was high she asked her daughter 
to take up a student loan — which is unusual at this educational level: 
“Even though her father helped us financially it was not enough to con-
tinue the standard we were used to. So I asked her to take up a student 
loan .. It was my intention that she put the money in the bank so that she 
would have some capital in the future to buy her own home. But we fre-
quently ended up lacking money, and we had to use some of it.” [1] 
Although this is the only case where student loans appear as a coping strategy, the 
informant is far from being the only one who takes on additional credit during ‘stage 
two’; whereas probably all of them are dependant on borrowing smaller amounts of 
money from friends and relatives, four cases report to have accessed new credit in 
financial institutions. Much of it is obviously used to cover day-to-day expenses. But 
at least three of them continue to invest in the firm and private property. Also, it is 
important to remember that the self-employed have backed up their businesses with 
private mortgages. Under such conditions, it is easy to become frantic. Says one: 
“It’s like, you know, you end up using your private credit card to cover 
the tax bill. It’s kind of desperate; you take on debts and accept 25-50% 
interest rates.” [28] 
During ‘stage two’, socially embedded coping patterns are taken beyond the ‘ostrich’
and ‘card is played’ approaches into new directions as the default-debtors have to 
face really disturbing events that put their lives upside-down. Even though all of them 
are mentally and emotionally affected, the consequences are particularly hard in cases 
of psychological instability. Two informants simply run away from the difficulties. 
After months of struggling with accelerating debt expenditures one of them realises 
that she can no longer sustain her home ownership. And without a home she feels she 
cannot take care of her daughter. This becomes a turning point: 
“I had to send my daughter away. I made a deal with my ex-husband .. 
You see, I was mentally ill. Instead of going to the doctor to get a medi-
cal certificate I was stupid enough to simply quit my job. I planned to 
commit suicide. So I gave the keys to the flat to the real estate agent, 
took the little money I had and ran away on a one-way trip to France .. 
Luckily, I didn’t succeed in taking my own life, and eventually I came 
back to my sister’s place.” [73] 
A more common reaction to the pressure is to stay clear of social stigmatisation. Dur-
ing ‘stage two’, about half of the informants take explicit steps to avoid being con-
fronted with their financial problems and conceal the truth to others. These are the 
types of strategies that are among the most frequently commented in the public dis-
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course. The perhaps most common thing to do is to stop reading mail. But this kind of 
protection has consequences. Says one informant: 
“It took a while until I could read my mail again. I threw the letters 
from lawyers and money collection companies in the waste basket. But 
it turned out to be quite expensive. The claims increased to unbeliev-
able levels, and there were a number of incidents with the court of con-
ciliation.” [8] 
At this point in the process nearly any consequence — severe or not — is subordi-
nated to the fear for being stigmatised. Public appearances are of course even more 
frightening than letters — which after all can be read in solitude. This is the major 
reason why many of the informants do not turn up in court to face the problems.  
Another implication of avoiding written information is that the claims typically end 
up at the employers’ desk who must execute wage deductions as ordered by the en-
forcement officer. This is far from optimal to people who want to steer clear of stig-
matising situations: 
“Whenever that happens you are of course confronted with your finan-
cial problems at work. They have to tell you that they have imposed de-
ductions on your salary even though I’ve had that information in writ-
ing through the mail. But I don’t open my mail anyway. No, it’s not 
pleasant. I don’t like to talk about it.” [63] 
Some creditors are not confined to just demand wage deductions through formal 
channels; they also actively try to contact the default-debtors while they are at work. 
In such cases, the stigmatising scene threatens to expand and involve more people. 
This may in turn lead to a series of far-reaching reactions. Tells a former self-
employed who became a wage-earner after the bankruptcy: 
“The creditors called me at work. I told them sorry, I don’t take such 
calls during working hours. At the time I was placed in landscaped of-
fice, and I couldn’t talk about financial problems there. So I decided to 
change jobs. I did, and they couldn’t get hold of me for a while. But in 
the end I couldn’t concentrate on my work no longer, and the employer 
gave me the choice between quitting the job or get sacked. I quit. I be-
came unemployed at the worst possible time.”[94] 
Such courses of events and reactions illustrate how money collection routines may 
lead to unpredictable and severe consequences, and take coping behaviour beyond 
any imagined debt recovery scheme based on economic rationality. The interviews 
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are in fact full of such stories. Says another self-employed who was made personally 
responsible for his partner’s actions: 
“I was recommended by a lawyer to report my partner to the police for 
embezzlement, but I couldn’t stand up to it. I was psychologically run-
down. I just wanted to get away from it all .. Burn all bridges and run 
away” [8] 
In a matter of weeks he had sold the house and left the town for good. Yet another 
informant grabbed a few belongings from his home a Sunday afternoon and set off for 
one and a half years of bohemian life, leading a poor man’s life at changing addresses 
out of reach of creditors and family members. A fourth small-firm manager acknowl-
edged his bankruptcy by selling whatever was left in his shop, putting a fair share of 
the money in his own pocket and leaving the area for good to start a new life in Oslo 
as unemployed. A fifth default-debtor travels even further: 
“I ran away from everything. I took off to India for two years and had a 
good time. My marriage and business were gone. So I needed to get 
away for some time.” [63] 
The repertoire of strategies intended to avoid being stigmatised also includes steering 
clear of the social security office where emergency aid as well as free of charge eco-
nomic counselling is generally available. Most of the informants are persons who are 
employed at the time they enter ‘stage two’, and some of them may still have prop-
erty. Therefore, walking into such offices represents a true barrier; it is simply humili-
ating. But sometimes it is the only way out. The following is a typical statement:  
“I applied for assistance once and got it once. It was the worst of ex-
periences, and I shall never do it again .. I felt so small. I’m a proud 
person; I used to stand on my own feet.” [5] 
Although the strategies to avoid stigmatisation are widely used at ‘stage two’, about a 
quarter of the sample does not seem to take such steps. This is not the same as flag-
ging the financial problems to everyone. But some of them do not find stigmatisation 
to be their biggest concern; they may have friends that are equally bad off, or operate 
in social environments where financial difficulties is not stigmatic, or may simply 
have stopped worrying about other people’s opinions. As one of them puts it: 
“The bankruptcy was in the newspaper for everyone to see. My father 
knew it long before that because I asked him for money every now and 
then .. I have never done much to hide my problems. On the contrary, I 
have often called up my customers and asked them for advance pay-
ments.” [45] 
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As shall be shown in the next chapter, letting ‘life world’ relationships in on one’s 
financial difficulties is often hard and in fact something that not everybody do — 
neither at ‘stage two’ nor later. Still, asking family and friends for help is often a 
necessary coping strategy at ‘stage two’. Sometimes, the support is substantial, as in 
one case where the informant was able to reduce his debts after he got the advance-
ment of inheritance he asked for. But as a rule, the economic assistance from friends 
and relatives is modest. It probably has to do with the fact that those who actually 
have affluent and supportive networks tend to fence off serious debt problems at a 
much earlier stage in the process. As for the informants who reached ‘stage two’, the 
typical helping hand from members of ‘life world’ networks seems to be small 
amounts of money, private loans of modest magnitude and gifts like clothes and food 
to keep the default-debtor going from one day to the next. As one of them tells: 
 “My parents have helped me a lot. They have borrowed me money and 
paid vacations. They even gave me one of their cars as a gift. I have a 
doctor's certificate confirming that I must have a car.” [75] 
Equally important, in close relationships money also go in the opposite direction; i.e. 
from the default-debtors to friends and relatives. This is a point that shall be further 
contextualised in chapter 7. For now, let it suffice to say that these are coping strate-
gies that are motivated by strong moral commitments. In rare cases, the receiving end 
may in fact be the local bank. But more typically, this is about personal loans from 
friends and relatives. Such debit items may be small or large sums of money, depend-
ing on the network. Says a former self-employed who is reluctant to talk about it 
because the repayment was done behind everybody’s back shortly before the business 
went bankrupt: 
“We borrowed one million from a friend to solve a huge problem. To 
put out the fire if you know what I mean? He knew about our problems 
and we prioritised to pay him back. He was the only one who was re-
paid in full.” [41] 
The moral commitment is at least as strong when family members are involved. The 
convenience store manager, for instance, hung on to his job for too long. Each month 
the deficit increased and accumulated way beyond his capacity to pay back. He hesi-
tated to quit because he would then most likely get a less paid job — which of course 
would make his situation even worse. But there was another reason as well: 
“As a commissioner I operated on a bank guarantee, which again was 
guaranteed by my mother. So I thought: I have to pay the debt, or else it 
will be covered by the bank guarantee. And then the bank will turn to 
my mother who may have to sell her flat. It was a nightmare.” [65] 
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As ‘stage two’ comes to a close and the default-debtors are taken into ‘stage three’,
moral commitments become an even more pronounced motive in coping behaviour. 
5.4.3. STAGE TWO: BRIEF SUMMARY
At ‘stage two’, the severity of the situation is explicitly acknowledged after a series of 
breathtaking events. From then on the default-debtors put up a defence that is partly 
embedded in economic rationality and partly founded in social orientations. As for the 
first, the steps taken range from increasing the incomes by finding new jobs, extra 
jobs or working overtime, to reducing the debt loads through savings, refinancing and 
sales of homes, cars, etc. There are also talks and negotiations with the creditor side. 
Besides, all informants actively try to reduce consumption and other expenditures. As 
for the social orientation, there is a continuation of the ‘ostrich’ and ‘card is played’
approaches. Furthermore, there is extended use of support from family and friends, 
and efforts to protect family funding and repay debts to ‘life world’ relations. In addi-
tion, ‘stage two’ is strongly marked by behaviour aiming at avoiding stigmatisation by 
not opening the mail, not turning up in court, quitting jobs, running away from the 
problems and avoiding social security services like emergency aid and economic 
counselling. As a result, the financial difficulties continue to aggravate.  
5.5. STAGE THREE: REORIENTING TOWARDS NEW IDENTITIES
Even though ‘stage two’ is a period where a wide array of coping strategies are im-
plemented, all of these efforts end in financial disaster; in fact, the problems aggravate 
instead of being solved. Just like the passage from ‘stage one’ to ‘stage two’, the 
transition into ‘stage three’ is typically acknowledged by the default-debtors after an 
eye-opening event or series of incidents. If possible, these ‘rites de passages’ are even 
more dramatic and traumatic than the ones that took place earlier in the process; this 
is when it is realised that the battle is lost, and with it the social project and everything 
that has been accomplished so far in their socio-economic careers. The ‘life world’, as 
the default-debtors used to know it, is reduced to rubble. 
A few illustrations should account for the stakes involved. The convenience store 
manager just cited, for instance, finally found himself in a complete calamity: 
“I had debts everywhere. I was lagging behind with the mortgages as 
well as my professional debts. I tried my best to avoid it, but in the end 
the bank took the flat and carried out a forced sale. It was so humiliat-
ing, especially since I was the leader of the owners’ committee. Every-
body had access to all details .. Then the tax authorities began bank-
ruptcy proceedings because I couldn’t manage my professional debts. 
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Although I still had some time left in my job as a commissioner, I had to 
leave my job the very same day .. About the time it happened I had an 
accident and was hospitalised and had to go through a number of op-
erations. As you can see, I‘m currently one hundred percent unfit for 
employment.” [65] 
The only strike of luck he had is that the deficit in the shop eventually turned out to be 
modest enough to avoid having his mother’s flat on the market. But a restaurant 
owner was not anywhere near this kind of luck: 
“My father and aunt had both guaranteed for my business debts, as I 
had done myself with my private property. When I was made bankrupt 
my father had to sell the house and move to a retirement home. It was 
tragic. He didn’t speak to me for years. My aunt had to sell her house 
and move to a retirement home, too. My own house went on a forced 
sale. Everything was lost. My marriage broke, and my wife and child 
moved to another town.” [32] 
As for himself, he spent the coming years as a wage-earner in several restaurants and 
catering companies. For one year he lived in a caravan. A third informant nearly 
ended up the same way:  
“We had a small house, a kind of a small farm. It was subjected to a 
forced sale. I moved into an empty house nearby, but my wife took the 
children and moved out of town. She couldn’t stand the thought of go-
ing on living in the same neighbourhood, it was too humiliating .. As for 
myself, I tried to come and go unnoticed. Living in the empty house was 
a kind of an undercover situation .. In the mornings and evenings I re-
turned to our farm house to feed the cat and my daughter’s horse. I sat 
down with the animals and cried”. [94] 
In the darkest of moments, the informant finally had some luck. As it turned out, his 
neighbour managed to buy the house. As a consequence, the family could move back 
in again, but this time as tenants. 
Not all of the informants have equally dramatic transitions into ‘stage three’. For 
instance, in one case psychological treatment becomes the starting point. Four others 
put and end to ‘stage two’ by getting a job. Yet another becomes a student. But com-
mon to all of them is that these events become markers of a new era; from this point 
onwards they all realise that they have lost the lives they had and that they now must 
reorient to build a new social identity.  
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5.5.1. THE PRINCIPAL ROUTES OF STAGE THREE
As the informants transcend into ‘stage three’, three general features of the situation 
seem important. Firstly, they have struggled with financial problems for years on end, 
and been more or less “washed” through the system to become experts of their own 
cases. Secondly, the unmanageable debt is still there, and it does not go away. 
Thirdly, there is a certain sense of permanency about the new position; for unlike the 
status as unemployed, which is by definition temporary, ‘stage three’ is an open-
ended situation that has the potential to last for the rest of the life.  
Being forced to cope under such prospects, the institutional setting offers three princi-
pal routes to go by. The first is to redefine the situation and take on a different, more 
dignified social status. This is a typical solution for many of the marginalised unem-
ployed, who eventually leave the work force on grounds of failed health to receive 
disability benefits rather than social welfare. None of the informants in the sample 
have gone down this road. But if they had, it would perhaps have made it easier to 
explain the economic situation to others, but it would not be a complete transition 
since nobody can leave unpaid debts like an unemployed may leave the work force. 
The default-debtor label would simply not go away.  
The second route is to acknowledge the situation, park the debt load and leave it as it 
is. This is in fact the initial starting point for everyone who reaches ‘stage three’; the 
economic situation is hopeless but life must go on. The following view is typical: 
“I simply parked the debt. It’s a question of survival. I can’t pay it 
anyway, even if I tried.” [5] 
The route implies that the default-debtors do not service the loan agreements any 
more, although some of them may give in to pressure and pay some to the creditors at 
irregular intervals. Instead, they seek protection under the legislative system described 
in chapter 1.3.2. From a default-debtor point of view, the advantage is that the rules of 
the game are known to them and that that they are entitled to keep a certain amount of 
their incomes. On the negative side are the constant charges that are routinely made 
against their economy and the risk to have too much money withdrawn from their 
bank accounts. A much more serious implication of parking large debt loads is that 
their volumes accelerate; wage deductions are in any case too low to prevent that 
from happening. During ‘stage three’, and for as long as the debt is parked, the finan-
cial situation continues to aggravate to hitherto unseen proportions. It becomes unreal: 
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“I don’t panic no more. It’s nothing but numbers. Out of this world. I 
can’t pay any more than they take off my wages, so I give a shit .. It’s 
hopeless, anyway.” [45] 
Yet another implication is that under such circumstances it is practically impossible to 
own property or any other assets of substantial value. As shall be demonstrated in the 
next chapter, non-ownership may be real or fictional in the sense that values may be 
accumulated in somebody else’s name. The situation is experienced as more or less 
painful. Some simply accepts it as a part of their new lives. As a wage-earner puts it: 
“I knew that the creditors couldn’t harm me much, but I also realised I 
couldn’t own anything. Seen that way, as long as I didn’t own anything 
I felt safe.” [90] 
Others obviously find it harder. A former self-employed, now a high-income wage-
earner, does not dare to accumulate assets even in the name of his new partner: 
“I don’t dare to own anything. That’s the real disadvantage by being a 
default-debtor: you’ve got a record, you know, and you can’t own a car 
or a home. I could of course have taken a chance, but I don’t because it 
would break my self-reliance if I built up assets only to loose it — 
again. So my partner owns the car and we rent a flat.” [5] 
The third route to follow during ‘stage three’ is a debt settlement. As pointed out in 
chapter 1.3.2, this is in fact the only way in which accelerating debts, persistent credi-
tors and exclusion from building up assets can be put an end to once and for all. How-
ever, there is every reason to underline that it takes time to reach the point where the 
Debt Settlement Act actually becomes an option. As drawn attention to in chapter 
1.3.2, debt settlements are intended as a way out of extreme over-indebtedness. Also, 
it takes a ‘stage three’ transition to realise the severity of the situation, accept the 
identity as a default-debtor and decide to contact the authorities for help. Hence, none 
of our informants have coped with debt problems for less than five years, and at the 
time of the interview only half of them had obtained a debt settlement. Still, as shall 
be documented in this as well as subsequent chapters, the solution is not embraced by 
all default-debtors as it is subjected to strategic and moral considerations. 
The three principal routes of ‘stage three’ — redefinition, parking of debts and debt 
settlement — make up the institutional framework into which the default-debtors have 
to fit their coping behaviour. Again, rational economic action as well as social orien-
tations can be identified. But beyond that, ‘stage three’ appears to be a quite different 
world compared to the two former phases. 
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5.5.2. THE SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF RATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTION
The new ‘stage three’ situation is marked by a distinct change in coping patterns; 
some strategies loose their relevance and disappear while new ones are added to the 
repertoire. In particular, with one exception none of the informants have belongings to 
sell to the benefit of the creditors, only one is able to refinance the debt portfolio, and 
nobody but one still has savings to be used for debt reductions. And needless to say, 
none of the self-employed have any longer a firm to wind up. On the other hand, 
labour market related activities continue to be important, as indicated by the fact that 
as many as half of the informants report to have changed jobs or worked extensively 
overtime since they passed into ‘stage three’ — some of which is undeclared work. 
However, the fundamental change in coping behaviour follows from the realisation 
that there is no longer any point in serving the interests of the creditors as everything 
is already lost and the default-debtors are left with debt loads that can never be repaid. 
As a consequence, their market appearances are directed towards building up new
identities; the motive for acting on markets simply changes, and the social embedded-
ness of rational economic action becomes more distinct than ever. Also, the coping 
patterns slide further away from what is expected from the creditor side. 
Outwardly, many of the things the default-debtors seem to be by the book. For in-
stance, those who have not already cut their budgets to the bone one must do it now. 
Obviously, some of them even go through periods with too little money for food. In 
many cases, the reliance on day-to-day support from family members and friends 
becomes increasingly important. Moreover, the default-debtors systematically try to 
save in on daily expenses in a number of ways, varying from making a budget, to 
minimising one’s social activities, to sharing a flat and hence the housing expenses 
with a friend. But these are all efforts that are no longer intended to free money for 
the creditors. Instead, the default-debtors try to protect their new social projects by 
drawing directly on their ‘stage two’ experiences. To illustrate, some of them have 
painfully learnt that it may be risky to have money in the bank. Says a woman: 
“The bank had done a mistake and allowed a money collection com-
pany to take too much off my account. I hardly had enough left for food. 
I went to the bank and cried. At first they were just rude and refused to 
correct the mistake. I made them contact the enforcement officer. I fi-
nally got some of the money back.” [64] 
As pointed out in chapter 1.3.2, the mechanism behind such mistakes may be the lack 
of coordination between the various enforcement officers. Overdrafts may therefore 
take place from time to time, and it is often up to the default-debtor to correct it:  
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“It is a full time job to manage those claims, you know. It is not simple 
.. You start getting these letters in your mailbox, and then the wage de-
ductions are implemented. Then you have to document your expenses 
and argue to be left with enough to survive. I have kept on doing this 
for fifteen years.” [63] 
Several of the informants have similar experiences. The result is a slide towards cash 
economy. A former self-employed has embarked on an envelope system: 
“Based on my net monthly salary I prioritise the house rent and the 
telephone and energy bills. After having paid this, I take out what we 
need for food in cash. I divide the cash in envelopes and mark them 
week one, week two, three and four. Then I’m sure there’s money for 
food whatever happens. I don’t want to have this kind of money in the 
bank because I run the risk of having somebody taking them. I have al-
ready seen that happen, you know.” [94] 
The same kind of logic operates in relation to wages. As already pointed out, many of 
the informants try to find better paid jobs or to work overtime. If they cannot have the 
extra money undeclared, it is of course registered as regular, increased income, some 
of which is likely to end up with the creditors. This is the point of departure for the 
implementation of various smokescreen strategies. One of the informants takes it to 
the extremes as he works as a consultant through his own company, but canalises 
most of the firm’s incomes to an account that formally belongs to a relative who has 
emigrated and is no longer liable to pay tax. Needless to say, such trickery presup-
poses detailed knowledge about laws, regulations and bureaucratic routines — and the 
nerve to actually go through with it. A more common way is to participate in net-
works where services are exchanged or paid for under the table. One of the informants 
explains:   
“Veteran cars? Oh, yes, I have a few of those. I fix them, drive a bit 
around, swap some, sell some, and buy some. I know the trade, so I 
make a profit .. I don’t have much money, but I can do things, trade 
services .. I got a motorbike and a car through exchange .. There was a 
lawyer who needed a new motor in his car so I provided him with one. 
And in return, he did some paperwork for me, sorted out my debts and 
helped me on to a debt settlement. We are both happy.” [63] 
Also the regular incomes are protected whenever possible. The informant goes on:  
“My former employer offered me a pay rise. What the hell, I don’t want 
it!! Then I have to calculate everything again, subsistence levels and 
then the tax authorities and a whole lot of shit. Buy me something in-
CHAPTER 5: COPING BEHAVIOUR OVER TIME          135 
stead, like a travel or something, under the table. But leave my wages 
alone.” [63] 
Two other informants speculate in the fact that each time they change jobs it takes 
some months until the money collection routines catch up with them and wage deduc-
tions are once again in place. Meanwhile they get some breathing space.  
As for all the debts that are still there, seven of the informants report that they have 
tried to negotiate it once and for all — three of them through a lawyer. Two have in 
fact obtained positive results and one of them have even managed to avoid accumulat-
ing interests. But the typical outcome is negative: 
“I really feel I have offered a compromise to the benefit of all parties, 
but they refused. Then I tried a debt settlement, but again they refused. 
So, well, I don’t want to make any more fuss about it. I’ve done what’s 
in my power .. No more waste of time.” [23] 
More significant than the result is the attitude that he expresses; if the creditors refuse 
to cooperate it is their own problem. He intends to go on with his new life either way. 
The view is shared by many of the informants. A manager in a large company does 
not want a debt settlement because he finds it humiliating to a man in his position. 
Instead, he wants a negotiated solution. He plans revenge if it fails: 
“I have offered a deal. All but the largest of my creditors have accepted 
.. The alternative is a forced debt settlement .. I don’t want it, but I will 
consider it if future negotiations break down. But in that case I’ll 
change jobs. No point in having such a stressful job and not getting 
anything back. I’m serious.. They’ll get much less that way.”  [5] 
In case of severe debt problems it is of course economically rational to apply for a 
debt settlement. During ‘stage three’ seventeen of the twenty informants have tried to 
negotiate one. When the interviews took place, only ten of them actually lived under 
such a regime. The remaining ten either had an application in progress, or had had 
their propositions turned down, or was against the idea of a debt settlement altogether.  
5.5.3. STAGE THREE SOCIAL ORIENTATION
At ‘stage three’ some socially embedded strategies obviously loose their significance. 
Among these are of course the ‘ostrich’ and ‘card is played’ approaches; it makes no 
longer sense to hide away from the problems or to frantically hang on to social identi-
ties that are unsustainable and in fact given up. Also, efforts to avoid stigmatisation 
diminish in strength; the damage is already done. But as shall be shown in the next 
chapter, there are still some areas where many of the default-debtors want to conceal 
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their debt problems. In as much as that is the case, there is a continuation of some 
familiar ‘stage two’ strategies. The following quotation is illustrative: 
“When I find bills in my mailbox I couldn’t care less, you know. I sort 
out the important bills and pay them with a smile. As for the rest of 
them, I must confess, I recognise the envelopes and leave them un-
opened. I throw them in the dustbin. I know that I loose information that 
way, but I simply can’t take it. Such letters just take me down.” [94] 
Another way of handling it is to make a distinction between open and closed arenas. 
The strategy is illustrated by a woman who often finds herself short of money: 
“I borrow from friends. It’s hell — so humiliating. But it’s the only 
way. I don’t go to relatives, only friends. You know, people start gossip-
ing. And I’ve got my pride, and my close friends know about my finan-
cial problems so it’s easier to ask them.” [1] 
A related strategy is to avoid opening up new arenas where one necessarily become 
exposed to the default-debtor label. This is enacted by two informants who spent 
much of ‘stage three’ without applying for a debt settlement. As one of them puts it: 
“It took many years until I applied. In the beginning, my creditors were 
not coordinated. I got work and after a year one of them established a 
modest wage deduction. I could live with that. But then the tax authori-
ties wanted twenty percent of my wages and money disappeared from 
my bank account. So I finally had to face it.” [28] 
At ‘stage three’ social orientations are also marked by a pronounced need to observe 
certain moral commitments towards oneself and one’s close family. Indeed, surviving 
as a default-debtor presupposes to take care of one’s own well-being. One of the in-
formants does this by trying to uphold a certain dignity and affiliation with bygone 
days by eating out: 
“Yes, I do allow myself to have dinner at a restaurant and spend some 
money in that way. It’s something to look forward to, you know. Each 
month when I get my salary I do it.” [1] 
Another goes abroad once a year, thereby killing two birds with one stone: 
“My daughter studies abroad, so once a year I prioritise to go visiting 
her. I put aside a certain amount of money each month. Like that I get 
exactly what I need for the travel and stay.” [63] 
Concern for the children is a recurrent issue in the interviews. At ‘stage three’ the 
default-debtors must accept fundamental changes in their life situations including the 
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loss of property, new neighbourhoods, scarcity of money and perhaps broken mar-
riages. Such events clearly affect the children and causes pain: 
“I get such a guilty conscience when I think of the children because 
they always ask: why do we have it this way when everybody else has it 
that way .. It’s tough, really.” [32] 
It becomes urgent to try and protect the children from the consequences as much as 
possible. Says one informant: 
“There are children around, and that’s where the problems start as far 
as I’m concerned. That’s the only thing I really care about. I’ve tried 
my best to prioritise the use of money to minimise the effects my debt 
problems have on the family.” [80] 
This can be done in several ways. One is of course to pay for the children’s need for 
clothes, outfit and leisure time activities with money that should have been used to the 
benefit of the creditors. Another is to utilise one’s personal network to ensure that 
they have more or less the same facilities and life chances as other children in their 
social environment. The same informant goes on: 
“My children suffer with me. They see I come nowhere. But materialis-
tically they have not suffered much, really .. We have had access to cer-
tain facilities such as a family cottage, so they have not had the feeling 
of total deprivation. Children are not so interested in who owns what, 
the important thing is access.” [80] 
A related issue is the children’s economic future; ‘stage three’ default-debtors have 
not only lost everything, but they are still heavily over-indebted. Hence, they have 
few possibilities to save up for their children’s future to support such needs as a 
driver’s licence, higher education or first home purchases. Moreover, some of them 
have prospects to inherit money or property — values that easily can fall into the 
hands of their creditors. In such cases there is a compelling need to do something: 
“I’ve had a lawyer to look into it. Eventually, I will inherit my father 
and I’ll try to prevent those values from being confiscated. Since I have 
an heir, a son, I think it is important to make sure he gets it.” [45] 
Another informant has apparently already found a working solution: 
“My family is a little worried. But if you have a good lawyer everything 
is possible. I simply decided I don’t need that money. So no problem. 
My children get it.” [63] 
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5.5.4. STAGE THREE: BRIEF SUMMARY
The principal ‘stage three’ route is to park the debt — i.e. simply leaving it as it is. 
The result is devastating in as much as the debt situation is concerned; the credit vol-
umes accelerate and the creditors continue to make charges against the default-
debtors’ economy. Coping behaviour is generally based on the fact that everything is 
lost. The recognition is triggered by rather dramatic and traumatic events, after which 
the focus shifts from defending a previous lifestyle to building up a new identity. 
Although the informants continue to act according to an economic rationality, it now 
becomes very clear that it serves a distinct social purpose. Indeed, coping strategies 
are no longer performed to the benefit of the creditors. Instead, the informants are 
occupied with fighting for their right to keep enough means for subsistence, imple-
menting a cash economy to make sure the creditors cannot get to their money, and 
putting up various smokescreen activities like changing jobs to avoid money collec-
tion for a while, establishing ways of having undeclared incomes, and participating in 
informal supply networks to enrich the material standard as well as their social lives. 
Also, they engage in extrajudicial negotiations with the creditors as well as taking 
steps to obtain a debt settlement. As for the non-market behaviour, avoiding stigmati-
sation by not opening mail and avoiding uncomfortable social arenas is still promi-
nent. Besides, the informants make a point of taking care of themselves and the chil-
dren by spending money on their social lives rather than on creditor claims.  
5.6. EXCEPTIONS FROM THE MAINSTREAM INTERPRETATIONS
The three-stage debt problem process described in this chapter is a general pattern 
from which there could be important exceptions. The twenty informants considered in 
the analysis are of course too few to account for the full range of coping behaviour. 
Still, the data suggest the existence of two types of deviances from the general pat-
tern: a two-stage process and a ‘stage three only’ situation. 
As for the first of these, it does of course not refer to cases that have not yet reached 
‘stage three’; all of the informants in the sample have developed advanced debt prob-
lems. Rather, the two-stage type refers to processes marked by an absence of ‘stage 
one’. These are instances where the debt problems strike out of the blue and create a 
severe crisis more or less overnight. Such shocking experiences take the default-
debtor directly to ‘stage two’. One of the cases is caused by a sudden collapse in spe-
cific trades. To illustrate, in the late 1980’ies one of the informants had established 
himself in the boat building industry: 
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“The market just cracked. I sold the first three boats faster than I could 
build them, but then it was full stop. It all happened very quickly. First 
the famous stock market crash in New York followed by the Norwegian 
downfall a week or so later, then no sales .. That was it. I spent the next 
two years trying to delimit the damage, and then I just threw in the 
towel.” [80] 
Obviously, there is no ‘stage one’ in which the problems accumulate; instead, there is 
a blast and the informant knows right away that he is in serious trouble. A similar 
experience is shared by another of the interviewees, only that it is triggered by a dif-
ferent type of event: alleged fraud. A year before he had bought himself into a firm 
that he eventually took over when his partner became a pensioner. Even though he 
had gone through the accounts, some months later he got a surprise-letter from the tax 
authorities: 
“I was cheated. It turned out that my partner had not paid VAT for 
quite some time. Instead, he had spent the money. When the bill came I 
tried to find a way out of it, but it soon became clear that it was impos-
sible.” [8] 
Needless to say, the bad news took him straight to ‘stage two’ and the struggle to try 
to save the firm and defend his lifestyle.  
The second type of deviance from the mainstream pattern involves processes with no 
detectable stages. It does not necessarily mean that there was no initial phase where 
the debt load accumulated. But it implies that any such accumulation is not very sig-
nificant as the informants do not make a point of it. Indeed, there is no identification 
of events that mark neither a realisation of being in real trouble nor a recognition of 
having lost everything to become somebody who do not pay bills. Instead, these are 
accounts marked by distinguished default-debtor identities right from the start.  
The two interviews falling into this category represent, however, quite different social 
types. One of them is a young family man with periodically unstable income due to 
low education and a marginalised position on the labour market. He seems to have 
been somewhat short of money ever since he left school and started to work at a youth 
club. Still, it seems like the household has had a reasonable amount of capital to de-
fend advances in the housing market. But he is not a clever planner; for instance, 
when his wife started a business it came as a surprise that they lost the cash benefit for 
parents who stay at home with children under three years of age. Adding to this, there 
are no economic buffers. Instead, he has been liable to over-consumption by the help 
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of credit cards, ending up using them even for mortgages and instalments on a car 
loan:  
“Yes, the credit cards. Yes. I used them to pull through some problems 
because things had gone a little wrong. I had control, you know. But 
then I got some unexpected bills. The hot water tank collapsed, there 
was a roof leakage .. And I used the cards when I was broke. It’s easy. 
You have money even when you’re broke .. I didn’t party the money 
away, and I didn’t spend them on vacations. But we needed things for 
the house. A sofa, some paint .. And a lot of small purchases, buying 
things we wanted but couldn’t really afford ,. Sometimes I feel like a 
non-paying passenger.” [86]  
A characteristic feature of his economic dispositions is that they are thoroughly em-
bedded in a youthful and perhaps immature attitude that everything will be all right in 
the end; hence, in spite of the non-paying passenger feeling he does not seem to worry 
too much about the situation. From time to time he pulls himself together to regain 
control over the economy, but soon he is at it again taking up more consumption debts 
and falling behind with bills. It is simply a way of life — a routinised way of running 
the family’s economy that could be rooted in his upbringing:  
“Actually, I have always been against credit cards. I was raised to 
avoid them .. My mother had several cards when I was little, and she 
says she regrets it so much. Not that she had payment problems. But she 
ended up paying instalments on credit card debts instead of saving up 
some money to establish a more affluent economic situation.” [86]  
The other informant whose story lacks the notion of stages is more extreme. Growing 
up with an aunt he never finished school but earned a living taking on odd jobs from 
an early age onwards. Unlike the previous case, he never owned a flat or kept a steady 
job over longer periods. Instead, his life was marked by partying, gambling and light 
drug abuse for nearly twenty years. Although he insists on always having intended to 
keep loan agreements, he soon developed a talent for accumulating huge amounts of 
consumer debts from a number of banks and financial organisations. The following 
story is typical: 
“It was surprisingly easy during the mid-eighties. I remember once I 
went to a bank to borrow a larger sum of money. I had an appointment 
with the manager. While I was sitting there, a father whose son had 
borrowed money in the bank called. The son couldn’t pay the instal-
ments. The bank manager told the father to talk to his son to make him 
pay. Afterwards, he turned to me, saying: can you understand people 
who borrow money without being able to pay them back? I remember I 
thought it was terrible. I got the loan and used it for gambling.” [99] 
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Besides financing his excessive lifestyle with gambling and consumer credit, he also 
specialised in getting money from cash dispensers. He distinguished between “kind” 
and “unkind” machines: 
“Some ten years ago the cash dispenser technology was not so devel-
oped, and the machines were not always updated. There were some that 
I called “the kind ones”. At particular times during the day you could 
get money out of them even though your bank account was over-
drafted. One night I took a friend to one of them to show him how easy 
it was. I cashed a considerable sum of money. The next morning I went 
to the bank and put it back into the account. To avoid being charged 
with fraud.” [99] 
Although he carefully observed certain borderlines, he developed a lifestyle that even-
tually demanded a secret telephone number. And just as he made a distinction be-
tween “kind” and “unkind” cash dispensers, he also learned to distinguish between 
“good” and “bad” creditors. As he explains: 
“Once I worked off record for a small company. The manager was sup-
posed to pay me by giving me a free weekend car. So he hired a car in 
my name, but never paid the bill. The rental company sent three torpe-
does to get me. But in my neighbourhood there are two other persons 
with the same name as mine. The torpedoes picked the wrong guy, 
probably because I had a secret telephone number and the one they 
picked didn’t. They threatened to kill him and the police got involved .. 
I learned to carefully choose my creditors. Avoid borrowing money 
from smaller firms. I stick to banks.” [99] 
Basing his lifestyle for so many years on gambling and unwarranted consumer debts 
the identity as a default-debtor was more or less there from the very beginning. As 
such, he carefully managed his social reputation; very few persons were told the full 
truth about his economy. Also, he did not want his neighbours to know: 
“Where I live the kids sometimes go through the garbage in the court-
yard. And then they find letters. Creditor claims. I soon realised I 
couldn’t just throw my letters in the dustbin. So I gambled on some 
horses, won some money and bought myself a shredder. I ran my letters 
through it for two years.” [99] 
This is a type of default-debtor who balances between legal and criminal behaviour — 
and even beyond. The informant knows it very well: 
“I’m not sitting here pretending I’m victimised by debts imposed on me 
by some external cause. I’m not the kind of default-debtor who lost the 
home because the interest rates went sky-high. There are many default-
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debtors who deserve a lot more sympathy than I do, to put it that way. I 
have behaved irresponsibly.” [99] 
At the time of the interview he had nonetheless just started on a five year debt settle-
ment. This is just the way it should be; as pointed out in chapter 1.3.2, the intention of 
the Act is to offer a solution even to those who have behaved irresponsibly in the past.  
5.7. SUMMARY
This chapter has shown that coping with severe debt problems evolve through three 
distinct stages where the default-debtors act according to an economic rationality as 
well as a social orientation. During ‘stage one’, when the difficulties start to accumu-
late, the ethos is to stay calm and carry on life as usual — perhaps with some minor 
adjustments. At ‘stage two’, however, this is no longer possible as the problems have 
grown out of hand. Now, the ethos changes into one of defending the socio-economic 
achievements in order to return to ‘status quo’. The coping activity is high, as is the 
suffering and the tendency to hide and avoid stigmatising situations. However, in the 
end the loss has to be faced; behind them is a life in ruins and before them lies a life 
marked by uncertainty and insurmountable debts. This marks the transition into ‘stage 
three’ where the identity as a default-debtor is taken on and a new orientation in eco-
nomic life is taken onboard; a cheaper lifestyle must now be built up and defended. 
While the difference between ‘stage one’ and ‘stage two’ is that the economic situa-
tion becomes explicitly recognised as a threat, the transition into ‘stage three’ is in 
fact even more dramatic as it marks a fundamental change in attitudes and goals. 
From now on, the informants no longer see a point in serving the interests of the 
creditors. As they have lost everything and need to start all over again, the old debt 
commitments stand in their way. People who were once considered creditworthy and 
trustworthy now develop coping patterns that run counter to common interpretations 
of the repayment norm. 
The data also give rise to identifying two types of deviations from the three-stage 
pattern. One is an absence of ‘stage one’. But as this only means that the informants 
have been thrown into the debt quagmire overnight, a two-stage process should be 
considered a variation rather than a violation of the main pattern. The second excep-
tion, however, is fundamentally different as ‘stage two’ is lacking as well. This should 
be seen as a special type of coping behaviour, since such informants — implicitly or 
explicitly — seem to disregard the creditors from the very beginning. 
6. THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL DIVISION 
6.1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, three distinct stages in coping behaviour were identified. But 
even though such patterns are shared by most of the informants, the ways they handle 
the debt situation vary considerably. From an individualistic point of view, it could be 
argued that it is because individuals have different personalities. But in sociological 
terms, personal biographies and identities evolve in institutionalised settings (Bertaux 
and Delcroix 2000; Archer 2000a). This, of course, also includes economic careers.  
The point of departure is the following observation from one of the informants: 
“I know people living under debt settlements, with nice jobs, being best 
friends with the boss and everything. They surf through the five years, 
you know, they don’t even notice that they have a debt settlement. They 
have a car through the company, and instead of ordinary wage in-
creases they’ll probably get a solid bonus when the five years are over 
and done with .. The welfare obviously depends on the state of affairs at 
the time of the establishment of the debt settlement.” [80]  
The underlying assumption here is, of course, that differences in access to socio-
economic resources systematically generate variations in living conditions among 
defaulters. If the informant is right, there is hardly any need to delimit the statement 
only to people who live under debt settlements as it would also apply to everyone else 
who struggle with escalating debt loads. As for the dynamics underlying such pat-
terns, it generally makes sense to interpret access to socio-economic resources as 
representing specific opportunities enabling defaulters to cope in ways that people 
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without such access cannot. Moreover, since serious debt problems arise in different 
layers of society, it follows that different status situations are at stake and that differ-
ent resources would be called upon to defend them. As a consequence, debt problem 
careers may vary substantially depending on the defaulters’ access to resources in a 
wide sense. 
By focussing on the informants’ routes into social downfalls, this chapter addresses 
the second of the research questions forwarded in section 2.6: 
What — if any — is the impact of social division on coping behaviour? 
The analysis is organised as follows. Firstly, a resource-oriented classification scheme 
is introduced. Next, based on this scheme the transition from ‘stage one’ to ‘stage 
three’ is described along three status dimensions; viz. the ‘job situation’, the ‘housing 
situation’ and the wider ‘social situation’. Finally, based on these descriptions the 
final section of the chapter discusses the relationship between resources and coping 
behaviour. 
6.2. CLASSIFYING SOCIAL DOWNFALLS
By introduction, sociological perspectives on social division cover a variety of strati-
fication systems whereby certain assets, resources and valued goods are allocated 
among the population according to certain norms and rules. The distributed items in 
question are typically economic, political, cultural, social or honorific in kind. They 
also include access to civil rights and individual qualification such as knowledge, 
skills and formal education (Grusky 1994: 3-4). The importance of such processes lies 
not the least in the tendency for these ‘capitals’ to accumulate in unequal combina-
tions and quantities among the population, thereby instituting a range of social divi-
sions that, in turn, impact overall living conditions, life chances and hence everyday 
interaction practises.  
As for economic action, the basic sociological concepts are of course social ‘class’
and ‘status’. Whether taking the Marxist stand — that classes are embedded in the 
system of production and reflect a fundamental opposition between owners and non-
owners of production means (Østerberg 1995: 16-17) — or follow the Weberian ap-
proach — that classes emerge from inequalities of chances on markets (Weber [1922] 
1978: 927) — the concept of ‘class’ generally refers to systematic differences in the 
accessibility of a wide range of resources. These inequalities primarily follow from 
the fact that some positions in the work hierarchy are associated with higher rewards 
than others, and that individuals who are marginalised in the occupational system 
CHAPTER 6: THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL DIVISION          145 
typically get much less than others. As a mechanism for resource allocation, class 
affiliation is therefore the very entrance ticket into standard package pursuits. In as 
much as that is the case, it is reasonable to tentatively speak of several ideal-typical 
standards for categories of people sharing the same life chances on markets — such as 
a middle class package (Riesman and Roseborough 1966 [1955]), a labour class vari-
ant and even a code for groups exposed to permanent economic deprivation.19
However, if class distinctions were solely about differences in economic well-being, 
variations across class divisions in areas such as educational preferences and con-
sumption patterns would largely be explainable in terms of rational economic consid-
erations (Bihagen 2001). It is important to realise that classes themselves are not 
communities. Instead, they typically provide the basis for ‘status group’ formation. 
These are social entities whose members have in common distinguishing qualities like 
values, norms, tastes and consumption habits, and share ideas about such aspects of 
life as decency, honour, aspirations, and lifestyles (Hansen 1995: 15; Weber [1922] 
1978). Indeed, as pointed out in chapter three, this is where package orientations are 
communicated and transferred as a learned skill. Following Elstad (1992), it should 
therefore be emphasised that any given income situation designate people to different 
socio-economic contexts that not only represent sets of material living conditions, but 
also inevitably engage people in wider social processes. As a consequence, class 
situations emerge as also incorporating arrays of cultural, social and symbolic capitals 
— referred to as within-class status differences (Weber [1922] 1978) or the socio-
cultural dimension of class (Bourdieu 1994, 1985; Bihagen 2001; Hansen 1995).  
Hence, in order to analyse the impact of social division on the way economic prob-
lems are coped with, there is a need for a classification scheme that takes into consid-
eration a wide range of resources — i.e. economic as well as the socio-cultural impli-
cations of occupying different positions in the stratification system. It falls well be-
yond the frames for the study to design a conceptual apparatus specifically for this 
analysis. Instead, a classification scheme is used that was developed particularly for 
Norway by Hansen (1995).  Put simply, it is largely based on Weber ([1922] 1978) 
and modern extensions of his theories on ‘class’ and ‘status groups’— especially 
Parkin’s (1979) notion of class-specific ‘closure’ of access to coveted resources,
Bourdieu’s (1994; 1985) conception of economic, cultural, social and symbolic ‘capi-
tals’, and both writers’ emphasis on individual level action as crucial to sustain and 
improve class positions over time. An important element in constructing the classifi-
                                                          
19 The approach has been applied in developing a budget-equivalent for households exposed to 
people at risk for poverty in Norway. Cf. (Borgeraas and Øybø 2003). 
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cation scheme is that the resource situation is a variable as any set of ‘capitals’ may 
vary in volume and composition across class divisions. For instance, whereas manag-
ers and executives typically score high on economic capital and lower on cultural 
capitals, it is normally the other way around for high-level teachers, artists and aca-
demics in many professions. The resulting scheme is shown in table 6.1 above where 
‘occupational class’ is not only a matter of job titles but also incorporates important 
socio-cultural aspects of the whole range of professions. When applied to statistical 
material it has proved useful in identifying class-specific patterns with respect to 
choice of education, choice of marriage partners and the relationship between class of 
origin and earnings later in life (Hansen 1995). 
As for our data set, the twenty respondents give detailed information about the per-
son’s own as well as the parents’ occupational careers. In addition, they offer descrip-
tions about educational background, social networks and the nature of the jobs that 
other key family members hold or have held — all of which is helpful in a case-by-
case assessment of positions in the stratification system. Based on this, a classification 
of cases can be done in two steps. In the first, each profession recorded in the inter-
views is allocated to the appropriate occupational class. The outcome is reported in 
the third column of table 6.1. In the second step each informant is classified according 
Table 6.1: A Typology of Occupational Classes in Norway.a)
Level Occupational Class Professions in the Data Set 
Higher
Classes
Managers, Executives Lawyers, High Level Teachers, 
Directors, Entrepreneurs 
Professionals, Higher Level Teachers, etc. 
Engineers, Administrators 
Middle
Class
Medium Level Employers in the Private Sector Small Shop Owners, Restaurant 
Owners, Firm Owners, Economic 
Counsellors Medium Level Employers in the Public Sector 
Small Firm Managers, Shop Keepers 
Working 
Class
Lower Level Employees, Service Lower Bank Employees, Factory 
Workers, Accountants, Taxi Driv-
ers, Office Clerks, Hospital Work-
ers, Fishermen, Sailors 
Farmers etc. 
Skilled Workers 
Unskilled Workers 
a) From Hansen (1995: 96, 90-97). 
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to his or her class of origin and the initial occupational class at ‘stage one’ — i.e. as 
the debt problems start to accumulate. When these pieces of information are com-
bined, the respondents may be grouped as shown in table 6.2 on the next page.  
Since the position in the occupational system are fundamental to package pursuits, the 
grouping of the material in table 6.2 shall be used throughout the chapter to assess any 
changes brought about by enduring debt problems. The upper part of the table is made 
up by the six informants who, just like their parents, occupy working class positions 
at ‘stage one’. The five cases allocated to the lowest section of the table, on the other 
hand, are people whose initial background is working class, but who have obtained 
middle class positions at the time when their financial problems start. They are, in 
other words, the climbers in our data set. As opposed to both of these situations, the 
informants found in the middle sections of the table are characterised by an absence 
of working class affiliations; instead, they are middle or upper class people with mid-
dle or upper class backgrounds. Even though there are differences in package orienta-
tions and hence lifestyles, these nine cases are for simplicity discussed under the same 
heading as the most resourceful among the twenty informants. 
Using the labels from table 6.1, the next three columns in table 6.2 give the more fine-
grained occupational positions for each of the informants during their debt problem 
careers. There are, however some exceptions, the reason being that the transitions 
taking place in the default-debtors’ lives not only are dramatic, but also sometimes 
exclude them from the work force. One of them is case 75 who is a housewife at 
‘stage one’. Following common procedures in traditional class analysis, she is as-
signed to the working class based on her husband’s position in the occupational sys-
tem. This is not necessarily a good solution. But given the rich information about 
other aspects of her social and cultural identity, it is safe to do so here. Other excep-
tions include the unemployed and the sick. In principle, any permanent marginalisa-
tion or exclusion from the occupational system should be considered as cases of 
downward mobility. However, since practically none of the informants have been 
marginalised or excluded to the extent of absolute permanency at the time of the in-
terview, they are in the following considered to be marginalised, but still holding the 
same occupational class as they did before they became unemployed, recipients of 
disability benefits or subjected to rehabilitation programmes. There is one exception, 
though, where the combination of receiving disability benefit and developing a life-
style as a professional long-term social client seems to be a permanent. Case 64 is 
therefore treated as a shift of class positions into what is loosely labelled the under-
class.
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Table 6.2: Mobility in the Occupational System.
C
A
S
E
Initial Class1 Position in the Occupational System at Various Stages Mobility3
Parents IP2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 1-3
90 W W Unskilled worker Low  Lev. employee Low  Lev. employee 
99 W W Odd Jobs Odd Jobs Unskilled worker 
86 W W Unskilled worker Unskilled worker Unskilled worker 
73 W W Low  Lev. employee Low  Lev. employee Rehabilitation
75 W W Housewife/ Student Low  Lev. employee Rehabilitation
64 W W Unskilled worker Disability Benefit Disability benefit C-
5 M M Small firm manager Low  Lev. employee Manager C+
80 M M Small firm manager Small firm manager Reduced work load 
65 M M Small firm manager Small firm manager Disability benefit 
1 H H Professional Professional/ student Professional 
48 H H Professional Unemployed Professional 
23 H M Small firm manager Small firm manager Small firm manager 
41 H M Small firm manager Student Med.  Lev employee 
63 H M Small firm manager Skilled worker Skilled worker C-
91 H M Med.  Lev employee Disability benefit Rehabilitation
94 W M Small firm manager Professional Manager C+
45 W M Small firm manager Unemployed Low  Lev. employee C-
32 W M Small firm manager Small firm manager Skilled worker C-
28 W M Small firm manager Unemployed Unskilled worker C-
8 W M Small firm manager Low  Lev. employee Rehabilitation C-
1 Class codes: W = working class; M = middle class; H = higher classes. Based on Nordli Hansen (1995).  
2 Interviewed person’s position at stage 1. 
3 Interviewed person’s mobility from stage 1 to 3: C = change of classes, up (+), down (-). Blanks indicate 
that no permanent crossing of class boundaries has taken place. 
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The last column of table 6.2 assesses the degree of social mobility from ‘stage one’ to 
‘stage three’ of the debt problem career. In all twenty cases, the differences between 
the two points in time indicate that substantial changes in status have taken place. 
However, not all transitions are cases of downward mobility; some of the informants 
manage to hang on to the initial status or even improve it. Also, the changes taking 
place are not equally large although they all significantly impact the social status of 
the default-debtor. But in eight of the cases the transition is indeed striking as they 
involve trespassing class boundaries. In the table, these instances are marked by a ‘C’.
Also, most of them are found in the bottom section of the table — i.e. among the 
climbers who not only have advanced in the occupational system before they ran into 
debt problems, but also have gone through a second shift in class positions by the 
time they reach ‘stage three’. This is symptomatic; without anticipating the course of 
events the most turbulent changes in social status along a wide range of dimensions 
take place among the climbers. 
Even though the three positional strata in table 6.2 are embedded in class theory, the 
analysis to be undertaken is not a class analysis as such. Rather, the notion of ‘class’
is used to signify broad, common denominators in package orientation and a context 
for economic action. In this sense, trespassing class boundaries represents large and 
fundamental changes in social reputation and lifestyles. But as indicated by table 6.2, 
enduring debt problems do not necessarily — not even typically— have that impact. 
The following sections of the chapter are therefore devoted to offering more fine-
meshed descriptions of shifts in social status along three dimensions; viz. the ‘job 
situation’, the ‘housing situation’ and the wider ‘social situation’. At the end of the 
chapter, the descriptions are brought together in a comprehensive discussion. 
6.3. FIRST DIMENSION: THE JOB SITUATION
Needless to say, having an income is crucial for any package pursuit — whether there 
are debt problems or not. Equally obvious, the most common source of income is 
work; being or becoming marginalised in the occupational system typically means 
less money, dependence on public support and higher exposition to deprivation proc-
esses because one’s buffers to fence off a crisis are weaker. Hence, as has already 
been shown in the previous chapter, finding a new job or a better job is perhaps the 
single most important strategy when trying to bring debt problems under control. But 
work contracts are not only significant income-wise; having a job also gives access to 
a number of other resources such as social networks and ‘in-kind’ fringe benefits. In 
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addition, work positions are associated with honour and reputation, and therefore 
function as important elements in anybody’s social identity and personal image. 
The overall impression from the interviews is that nine of the informants succeed in 
holding on to their work positions — or even improving it. The remaining eleven find 
themselves in less attractive jobs at ‘stage three’ as compared to ‘stage one’, or in 
rather marginalised situations. The following sections look at the impact of such proc-
esses in each of the occupational strata introduced in table 6.2.  
6.3.1. WORKING CLASS DEFAULT-DEBTORS
Starting out with the six informants in the upper section of table 6.2, they share the 
attribute that they — just like their parents — hold working class positions in the 
occupational system at ‘stage one’. Also, all six have low or no education at all. In 
fact, two of them never completed the nine years’ of compulsory schooling.20 Only 
two of them have intermediary level education — which they accomplished through 
special arrangements for adults and by support from social security programs. Since 
none of them have marketable skills in high demand and in most cases are easy for 
employers to replace, they end up in segments of the labour market that are typically 
insecure and characterised by low salaries (Goldthorpe 2000: 213-217).  
This is also reflected in their work careers in which instability and frequent job 
changes are characteristic. For instance, whereas one of them spent nearly twenty 
years doing miscellaneous manual work in all three Scandinavian countries, another 
did in fact not have a steady job until he finally realised he had to do something seri-
ous about his debt problems. Yet another spent many years in low-paid and unstable 
occupations such as assistant teacher for maladapted teenagers, seasonal worker on a 
relative’s farm, vacuum cleaner salesman and warehouse worker. A fourth informant, 
who got pregnant as a teenager, hardly had any work until she got divorced, upon 
which she found herself unable to keep a job longer than just a few months. The re-
maining two have similar stories, but have run into additional problems due to bad 
health. 
As a result, all six informants are left with limited resources to combat any crisis that 
may occur in their lives. Given their class background, this also includes few back-up 
possibilities from parents and other close relatives. In fact, during ‘stage three’ only 
two of them seem to have received support of any substantial importance including 
smaller amounts of money and, in one case, a car to ease certain disadvantages fol-
                                                          
20 Ungdomsskolen: comprehensive school up to fifth form. 
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lowing from physical and psychological health problems. Moreover, none of these 
informants report to have drawn upon their parents’ or relatives’ networks when try-
ing to get a job or establishing a workable plan for the future.  
On the positive side, the changes taking place from ‘stage one’ to ‘stage three’ show 
that half of these informants have in fact managed to maintain or upgrade their posi-
tions in the occupational system. Whereas one of them went from a part time to a full 
time contract and also from manual industrial worker to shop assistant in a reputed 
firm, the two others went from successive temporary jobs to full time contracts as 
unskilled labour. In these cases, the income situation as well as their social images 
clearly improved during the debt problem period. This does not mean that their budg-
ets went from minus to plus; their financial situation were far too serious for that. It 
did, however, make it easier to uphold their social identities. To illustrate, one of them 
presents himself throughout the interview as a trustworthy and competent worker. As 
he puts it:  
“Having a job is very important to me as a person. If somebody give me 
a job, I take pride in doing it well; if my employers are satisfied, I am 
satisfied .. Being without a job has always made me depressed.” [90] 
The remaining three cases are not that successful with respect to the job situation. 
They all have physical and psychological problems. As for one of them, she has re-
ceived disability benefit and social security for many years already, and in fact 
crossed into the underclass as a social client during ‘stage two’ — a situation that at 
the time of the interview had become permanent and a lever to obtain a disability 
benefit and eventually an old age pension. The two others participate in rehabilitation 
programs. But both of  them are critical cases and could be candidates for additional 
slides down the stratification system in the future; whereas the likelihood for one of 
them to return to working life is undoubtedly slim, the other makes the following 
assessment: 
“I have no current need for psychotherapy. I make progress, and I hope 
to be able to handle a part time job sometimes in the future.” [73] 
Although work is undoubtedly important, the overall assessment is still that the 
changes taking place during the debt problem period are relatively modest in the sense 
that the improvements or marginalisation with respect to the work situation do not 
take them very far from their initial social statuses. The three marginalised persons 
have in fact been ridden by health problems most of their grown-up lives. This even 
goes for the one who actually crossed class boundaries; at the time she was working 
she occupied the lowest positions in the work organisation and was continuously 
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supervised and supported by the social security apparatus in a number of ways. As for 
the three who improved their positions, the new jobs did not represent large shifts in 
social status; from random jobs to taxi driver, from warehouse worker to unskilled car 
mechanic, and probably the most significant improvement: from blue-collar worker in 
the industries to shop assistant. Still, they all end up in life situations marked by a 
constant shortage of money.  
6.3.2. WORKING CLASS CLIMBERS
The five informants allocated to the lowest section of table 6.2 have all succeeded in 
obtaining middle class positions from a working class point of departure; indeed, they 
are all small firm managers at the time when the financial problems start building up. 
Another common feature is that all of them cross class boundaries once again as they 
reach ‘stage three’ in the debt problem career. But beyond these similarities, there are 
significant differences with respect to key features such as education, job experiences 
and the nature of their businesses.   
As opposed to the working class defaulters, all of these climbers have at least inter-
mediary level education. Hence, they all have marketable skills to offer employers; 
whereas four of them have taken vocationally oriented exams qualifying them to work 
as cooks, accountants and technicians, the fifth has a university level education. For-
mal education is of course an important resource in building up professional careers; 
this is what enabled them to cross class boundaries in the first place, and is what they 
draw upon to combat debt problems and the prospects of being once more driven into 
working class positions in the occupational system.  
None of these informants have a class background that encourages careers as self-
employed managers of small firms, and in fact they all start out as wage-earners in 
working-class occupations. When they eventually establish their own businesses, the 
motive varies. Two of them simply find themselves out of work and see self-
employment as the only alternative to unemployment. In two other cases, creating a 
business of their own appears to be more of a natural step as they quit their jobs in a 
planed manner to start a company in more or less the same profession. The fifth in-
formant follows a commitment from his childhood: 
 “I grew up in an industrial area, and I’ve always had a strong desire 
not to become an industrial worker .. Working shifts, dust and heat in 
front of a melting furnace, not exactly a dream of a lifetime .. My father 
was a worker and an alcoholic and didn’t care much about what I did. 
My mother died when I was sixteen. But her sister had put some money 
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aside and said to everybody in the family that she would pay the first 
year of studies for anyone who went to the university. So I did.” [94] 
These rough experiences are clearly the power engine behind a remarkable upward 
mobility; from good exams to work opportunities that eventually turned him into an 
expert in his field and a manager of his own reputed business. Later, when he had to 
give up his firm due to the recession in the late 1980’ies, he became a product man-
ager in a high-tech company. During ‘stage two’ of his debt problems, however, he 
had to quit this job because he was unable to concentrate on his responsibilities. Now 
facing the threat of loosing everything, he once again is motivated by his experiences 
as a child and young man, and finds himself a job as a project manager in an interna-
tional firm — thereby consolidating his upward mobility into the higher classes. But it 
was not enough to solve his debt problems. 
An important feature of this story is that the crossing of class boundaries is based on 
high education and professional skills. This is not true for the other cases. Put boldly, 
working as a cook in the merchant shipping fleet or being a technician does not neces-
sarily mean one is fit to run a restaurant or a TV shop. As the latter puts it: 
“I made a common, but fatal mistake. I started the shop with too little 
capital and too little experience .. I did a lot of stupid things and be-
came more and more desperate.” [28] 
The overall impression from these cases is that the changes in social status are sub-
stantial; with the exception of the one who continues his climb into the upper classes, 
the four other stories are instances of emphatic downfalls. Just as improvements in job 
positions is typically based on educational resources and acquired skills, so is step-
ping down; the restaurant owner becomes a wage earner cook again, the fish food 
expert finds employment in a supermarket department for fish products, the techni-
cian becomes a factory worker, and the accountant starts to work in a friend’s accoun-
tancy firm. Still, they all enter marginalised positions in the labour market; short-lived 
work contracts, part-time jobs, prospects of unemployment and need for rehabilitation 
are cues that characterise their new job situation. As shall be demonstrated throughout 
the chapter, the result is devastating along a number of status dimensions. There are 
two main reasons for that. One is that small firm bankruptcies are substantial in terms 
of money. Secondly, such businesses are typically based on private assets, the impli-
cation being that whenever such a firm goes bankrupt the very existence of the house-
hold is jeopardised. As a consequence, a fundamental reorientation in package pur-
suits is extorted.  
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6.3.3. DEFAULT-DEBTORS FROM THE MIDDLE AND HIGHER CLASSES
Now turning to the nine informants who are middle or upper class people with middle 
or upper class backgrounds, yet another picture appears. In particular, seven of them 
sustain their class positions although the potential height of fall is obviously large. 
Even one of the two who cross class boundaries at ‘stage three’ is an incidence of 
upward — not downward — mobility. But let us make no mistake; these are still 
cases of substantial losses of social status.  
As for education all nine informants have formal qualifications at the intermediary 
level or higher; whereas two have vocational educations, four others hold university 
degrees. The remaining three have studied business economics and commerce at vari-
ous levels. Moreover, as a strategy to come to grips with the debt problems, five of 
the nine have taken supplementary courses to strengthen their positions and increase 
their incomes. Since their family backgrounds include professions such as bank direc-
tors, managers, administrators, factory owners, teachers and lawyers, the drive to-
wards education should not surprise us; as pointed out by Keller and Zavelloni 
(1964), education is a class-specific virtue and one of the most important vehicles by 
which middle and upper class families sustain their class positions across generations.  
The interviews indicate that the greater presence of higher formal qualifications is a 
major reason why class positions are largely sustained in this group of defaulters; 
their education is generally in line with family traditions and expectations, and seems 
more relevant for the jobs they have chosen. Hence, as opposed to the working class 
climbers where all but one firm manager ended up in lower working class positions it 
is the other way around here: only one of the six self-employed suffered the same 
destiny. As for the three informants who are not small firm managers at ‘stage one’
the relationship between education and the sustainability of class positions is even 
more evident; whereas two of them hold university degrees and have taken additional 
courses to stay competitive in pronounced intellectual professions, the third is a busi-
ness school graduate that in spite of health problems may offer attractive qualifica-
tions on the labour market in the future. 
A related resource of great potential impact is professional networks. Being well 
connected is for instance often helpful when it comes to getting a job. As for one of 
the informants, who had been drifting around for more than a year out of reach of his 
friends, colleagues and family, profits from this when he finally decides to do some-
thing about the situation: 
“I saw six vacancies in the newspaper. I called a well-connected friend 
of mine. I said hi it’s me. He said oh, it’s you, I thought you were dead 
CHAPTER 6: THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL DIVISION          155 
— let’s meet. And we had a pint in a miserable pub, and I asked him if I 
could apply for one of those jobs. Of course you can! I did, and a for-
mer colleague of mine turned out to work there too. Good old days 
were back again! Then another friend of mine called and said they had 
an urgent need for somebody to do a job I used to do before — can you 
still do it? I had to borrow a tie, you know, I couldn’t find my 
own.”[48] 
The overall impression is that the middle- and upper class informants manage to de-
fend their positions in the occupational system, thereby securing the means needed to 
at least reduce the potential gap between initial and new lifestyles. But as indicated by 
table 6.2 there are important variations to notice. Firstly, there is one case of upward 
mobility. Although he is undoubtedly well-connected, his achievements are first of all 
due to personal capacities; in spite of an incomplete business degree he manages to 
work himself up from a bankruptcy, via an ordinary wage-earner job, to become a 
manager in an international company. Secondly, there is one case of downward mo-
bility. This informant initially belonged to the upper class, but unlike his brothers he 
took an interest in machines and technical practicalities. He decided to follow his 
heart and got himself a vocational education. When his firm went bankrupt he became 
a wage-earner in the same trade as his company, thereby finding himself at the end 
stop of a downward slide from the upper via the middle into the working class. In 
terms of actual work and lifestyles, however, the transition has in fact been more 
modest than the table suggests.  
Finally, there are three informants who at ‘stage three’ find themselves in a rather 
marginalised position. This is due to bad health; one collapsed after years of strug-
gling with debts and marital problems, the other developed psychosomatic illness 
after interminable controversies with her parents since childhood, and the third was 
permanently injured in an accident. In spite of considerable difficulties at the time of 
the interview, the chances are reasonably high for all three of them to return to work-
ing life in the future. 
6.4. SECOND DIMENSION: THE HOUSING SITUATION
Obviously, everybody needs a place to live — whether they have debt problems or 
not. But at the same time, homes and neighbourhoods are among the most visible and 
prestigious signs of social status. Indeed, among Norwegians homeownership has a 
particular standing as a coveted good and a goal in life; as an exceptionally high pro-
portion of the population own their own homes, property is by far the most preferred 
object of saving, investment and self-realisation. However, financial difficulties typi-
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cally mean that homes are lost and households relocated. This is also visible in our 
sample; whereas nineteen of the twenty informants were homeowners at ‘stage one’
there are only six left at ‘stage three’. The following sections look at the degree to 
which default-debtors from different social classes have their housing situation turned 
upside down as part of financial problems, and how such processes affect their new 
lifestyles.
6.4.1. WORKING CLASS DEFAULT-DEBTORS
The high proportion of homeowners in Norway necessarily implies that homeowner-
ship is common among working class households. Although most of the six infor-
mants grew up in rented flats, five of them owned their own homes at ‘stage one’ — 
including three villas, one terrace house and one flat. The sixth informant alternately 
lived in his mother’s flat or in a rented place all through his debt problem career. 
Moreover, at ‘stage one’ all six informants live in typical working class areas. In fact, 
none of them distinguish themselves with respect to type of property, choice of 
neighbourhood or extravagancy; these are simply “ordinary” housing situations.  
This is not to say that their homeownerships — or lack thereof — are irrelevant to 
their debt problems; in one way or the other property is always a part of the economic 
equation, whether as a cause of the difficulties or as a means in coping strategies to 
reduce or even cross out severe deficits. For a start, two of the cases are classic exam-
ples of the impact of unfortunate market fluctuations. In the aftermath of the 1988—
1994 downturn in the Norwegian economy, the first ended up having to sell the fam-
ily’s house at a loss as part of a divorce settlement. It affected her life fundamentally; 
the next six years she alternately stayed in her parents’ home and a succession of 
rented flats. The second was also caught by the bad times, and got seriously over-
indebted when the flat was put on a forced sale. Like the former informant, she be-
came a nomad often ending up in small lodgings. But when she some years later ne-
gotiated a debt settlement, the main creditor caught her by surprise: 
“I went to the bank. At the time I had got myself a bed-sit where I didn’t 
have to share the bathroom and kitchen with somebody else. I was 
happy with that. But the bank said I had to get a flat that was more ex-
pensive. I think they had sympathy for my difficult situation.” [73]  
The advice could in fact also follow from experience; going successfully through a 
five years’ debt settlement presupposes a reasonable place to live. In addition, the fact 
that she used to work in the very same bank nearly ten years ago may have had some-
thing to do with it — even though it now had merged into a larger consortium. Any-
how, at the time of the interview she was living on a tight budget but at least well 
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situated in a small rented flat where she could lead a quiet life and even have guests if 
she wanted. 
The third homeowner is an example of the opposite as he acts in times of rising prices 
and falling interest rates. He bought his first house at a relatively low price, and could 
a few years later sell it with a profit. He then went on to buy a new home and in the 
same operation refinanced his growing consumption debts. At the time of the inter-
view, the family was comfortably settled in their new home but suffering from unsta-
ble incomes and — once again — continuously rising consumption debts.  
The households’ dependency on markets means that even defaulters may have their 
life situation changed fundamentally under economic upturns. The point is well illus-
trated by the fourth homeowner who in the early 1990’ies had had a substantial debt 
load inflicted upon him due to an unfortunate house sale. When he — well into ‘stage 
three’ — married, his wife was in a position to own property and hence able to bring 
them into homeownership. Through connections they were given the opportunity to 
buy the flat they rented at a very favourable price. But after a while the marriage 
stranded. He explains: 
“When we divorced, it was decided that I should keep the flat and buy 
her out .. The market value was now more than three times higher than 
the price we bought it for. So I contacted a lawyer and explained my 
case. While he negotiated with my old bank and made them an offer, I 
talked my new bank into refinancing the flat in my name and give me a 
loan that was below the market value but high enough to pay both my 
wife and the old bank. The lawyer made the transaction.” [90] 
This way, the informant could kill three birds with one stone; he paid off his ex-wife, 
repaid the old debts and continued to live in the flat — only now as a homeowner for 
the second time in his life. This is the only defaulter in the sample who has managed 
to get out of the debt quagmire without a public debt settlement. 
The fifth homeowner represents yet another type of process as she lost her flat as part 
of a substantial downfall into the underclass. Initially, she was made a homeowner 
through a combination of welfare programmes designed to help low-income people 
into stable living conditions including a reasonable place to live. As it turned out, she 
spent her scarce income on consumption and fell behind with the mortgages. In the 
end, the authorities refused any further support and demanded a forced sale. She came 
out of the process with a profit, but wasted it all during a few months. At the time of 
the interview, she had spent many years renting miscellaneous — and sometimes 
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rather miserable — flats, during which she had also accumulated a considerable 
amount of consumption debts.  
In spite of important variations across the six cases, a general pattern emerges as well. 
On the one hand, four of the five homeowners have suffered substantial losses at a 
certain point in time, and three of them are undoubtedly worse off at ‘stage three’
than they were at ‘stage one’. On the other hand, these differences are toned down by 
the fact that they manage to hold on to accommodations in more or less the same 
geographical areas and types of neighbourhoods as before. Moreover, visiting their 
homes do not give the impression of utterly deprivation — perhaps with the exception 
of the one who ended up in the underclass and who insisted to be interviewed else-
where than in her rented flat. As a consequence, they largely manage to preserve their 
social images and self-esteem in spite of their lost homeownerships and new status as 
tenants. The point is also underlined by the two informants who operate under rising 
market conditions; they clearly act to consolidate their housing situation rather than 
getting carried away with ambitions to move into more fashionable areas.  
6.4.2. WORKING CLASS CLIMBERS
As opposed to the previous category of defaulters, the five working class climbers are 
self-employed at ‘stage one’. As such, their homes play a different role in the devel-
opment of debt problems as small firm managers typically use them as assets to sup-
port their businesses. In all but one case the climbers own villas at the time their busi-
nesses collapse. The fifth was once a homeowner, but when he divorced the house 
was taken over by his former wife. Hence, when he had to give up his firm more than 
a year later, he was a tenant. But even tenants may suffer downfalls with respect to 
the housing situation. As the shop — situated in a small town — goes bankrupt his 
life is in pieces. He decides to leave it all behind and escape the stigma by moving to 
Oslo where he arrives empty-handed. As he explains:  
“Actually, I looked for my immigrant girlfriend .. But immigrants don’t 
let white people into their families just like that. At the time when I ar-
rived her younger brother had been thrown out of the household due to 
bad nerves and a drinking problem. So I could stay with him .. At that 
point in life I felt totally excluded — at the bottom of society .. But at 
least it felt good to have escaped my own problems ... They were refu-
gees and had experienced war and death. It really wasn’t easy. But af-
ter a year I got a job.” [28]  
As for the four homeowners, two of the cases are particularly severe. One of them 
reacted more or less the same way as the informant just quoted and escaped to Oslo, 
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but had the advantage that the house was in the name of his wife and therefore not 
part of the bankruptcy. She could therefore buy a flat and provide them with a fresh 
start — with the exception that the debts had to be left unattended. When they di-
vorced some months later, the informant somehow managed to talk a bank into fi-
nancing a house for him in spite of his bankruptcy debts. But he could not handle the 
mortgage, and the property was soon put on a forced sale. At the time he had a new 
partner and moved in with her. Eventually, they bought a house in her name. At this 
point, it almost looks as if the informant had regained major elements of his previous 
social status; besides living in a house with a wife and a new-born child, he worked in 
the same trade as he always had done — only now as a wage-earner. Unfortunately, it 
did not last for long; his new wife left him with the parenting rights to their strongly 
allergic son. After more than fifteen years of debt problems, he now suffers a heart 
attack. In this situation the son becomes something close to an asset:   
“I have had long discussions with the State Housing Bank. Six months 
ago I was given a loan to refinance the house in my name. In spite of 
my old debts. The Norwegian State Housing Bank has a special role in 
society, you know .. There is a social aspect to it. My son is only six 
years old and periodically needs treatment for his allergy several times 
a day. His mother left him. And I am sixty.” [8] 
The second severe case involves a bankruptcy that triggers forced sales of no less than 
three houses: his own, his father’s and his aunt’s. Also, the family broke up, and in 
the years to come he took on simple accommodation in the immediate vicinity of the 
countryside restaurants where he found work. He even spent one year in a caravan: 
“It cost nearly as much as renting a small flat, but I didn’t have money 
for the deposit .. So I stayed in that caravan for over a year among gyp-
sies and other foreigners .. It was hard to explain to the children.” [32] 
Later, in order to take on responsibility and provide some stability for his son who 
had run into trouble in school, he borrowed money for the deposit in the black market 
to get a proper place to stay. By doing that he inflicted upon himself not only a high, 
but also a dangerous type of monthly commitment. At the time of the interview he 
had changed addresses several times the last twelve months, and found his debt set-
tlement application turned down because of his disorganised housing situation.  
The two remaining cases in the ‘climbers’ category are not quite as chaotic but still 
instances of severe downfalls in status. One of them managed to avoid a forced sale 
and sold the house himself, but saw nothing of the money as it went into the bank-
ruptcy chasm. He then rented a small flat for his wife and himself. With only a few 
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years left of his working life, he feels disillusioned as he has lost everything he has 
built up during a long career. The other lives as a tenant in the house he once bought 
because his neighbour — financially backed up by the informant’s mother-in-law — 
took over the property when it was subjected to a forced sale, and then rented it back 
to him. Still, having successfully climbed into the upper classes, he feels uncomfort-
able about the situation: 
“The two or three weeks we were without a home — between the bank-
ruptcy and the day my neighbour bought the house — were the worst 
period in my life .. Now we are wondering if we may buy the place back 
somehow, maybe in the names of our children or something. We have 
already repaid my mother-in-law .. This is currently an unsettled and 
light-sensitive issue.” [94] 
On the whole, the developments with respect to the housing situation are indeed tur-
bulent among the climber informants. As they are thrown back into their class of 
origin at ‘stage three’, two of them hardly have a place to stay whereas the three oth-
ers find themselves in rather vulnerable positions. The interviews clearly leave traces 
of critical and disgraceful housing situations. A major factor is of course that the debt 
loads in company bankruptcies are considerable. Also, the changes have taken place 
rapidly. A final characteristic to be noticed is that all but one of these informants not 
only have climbed in the occupational system, but also seem to have actively avoided 
returning to their social environments of origin. As shall be demonstrated below, 
shame may be a major explanation.  
6.4.3. DEFAULT-DEBTORS FROM THE MIDDLE AND HIGHER CLASSES
As already noted, homeownership is a goal and a virtue among Norwegians. This is, 
of course, not the least true for members of the middle and upper classes. Hence, all 
nine informants with such backgrounds grew up in spacious, owned homes. As they 
themselves became economic actors and heads of households they continued to orien-
tate towards the same kind of package; hence, all nine are homeowners at ‘stage one’,
mostly villa owners but also holders of flats and terrace houses. At ‘stage three’,
however, only two of them have managed to hold on to their properties. Additional 
two have kept their statuses through new partners. 
One of the informants is very explicit about the importance of a home to her social 
identity. Her upper class background shows through when she tells about the home 
that she and her husband once owned: 
“Well, it was my first home as a grown-up, so we invested a lot in it — 
we built it, we decorated it, all that. I in particular spent much time and 
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money doing that .. It hurt a lot to loose it. I mean, loosing what is im-
portant in the Norwegian tradition: to create a home and a garden.” 
[41]  
Loosing one’s homeownership is no doubt traumatic to middle class people. Particu-
larly two of the interviews are accounts of frantic fights for their homes; one in the 
courtrooms, the other by investing in an additional flat where he could live at cheaper 
costs while letting out the more expensive residence. Both strategies failed. Faced 
with unsustainable debt loads, complex creditor relations and, in one case, failing 
incomes, the properties were lost long before the defaulters came around to applying 
for a debt settlement. When they eventually did, both were compelled to adjust their 
housing expenditures to the level prescribed by the law. As a consequence, they have 
had to accept a substantial downfall in housing status. For instance, instead of owning 
two flats, one of them now shares a small rented place with a friend — which means 
that he at least has freed some money to pay for the medicines he now depends on. 
The other has mostly ended up renting a succession of bed-sits. Part of her problem is 
that she used to live in spacious places: 
“I have lived everywhere. In a students’ home, in bed-sits, in a micro-
scopic place that was cheap because it was way out of town and nobody 
wanted to live there — not even me in the end. Twenty square metres .. 
You see, I have some pieces of furniture from the old days and have to 
pay for the storage. So I can only afford bed-sits. I feel like the woman 
in the film who had stored away her furniture because she could not af-
ford a place to live. And then they wanted to take that too. And she 
pointed to her items behind the bars and said: But that’s my home! It’s 
my home in there!” [1] 
Still, loosing the home is not necessarily the outcome of severe debt problems. For 
instance, two of the defaulters have managed to keep their homeownerships through a 
debt settlement. In addition, social circumstances can have an impact. Hence, one of 
the informants kept his house partly because of the children whose divorced mother 
was sick and unable to take care of them. Similarly, the second had an extra argument 
because of her psychological problems. As a result, they continue to live in their own 
houses and have avoided suffering downfalls in that respect. 
The remaining four respondents find themselves in even better positions. A major 
reason for that is that all of them have found new partners. This is a prerogative that 
has economic significance in a number of ways. Obviously, new partnerships mean to 
have someone to share the daily expenses with — including house rents. As a conse-
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quence, finding somebody to live with adds quality and facilities that otherwise would 
be out of reach. This is a major aspect of two of the cases. As one of them says: 
“I rent sixty-five square metres. But I can live now! My new partner 
makes some money and together we make a good team. I have painted 
the flat. It’s expensive, but I like doing things with my hands. The result 
is awesome.” [48]  
The two others share the additional advantage of having substantial incomes at their 
disposal. For that reason, they do not seem to be deprived at all with respect to the 
housing situation. One of them rents a flat — not because he has to but because he 
does not dare to own property, not even in his partner’s name. The other have chosen 
differently and enjoys homeownership through his new wife — a large villa with a 
pretty view. He is also an inventive person who manages to keep a substantial part of 
his income hidden from tax inspectors and creditors: 
“We live in luxury. We have fixed the house, added on to it several 
times. Whitewashed money, invested, sold things with a profit .. We 
plan to sell the house and move to another country.” [23] 
Obviously, the overall cue for these nine informants is diversity; on the one hand, 
they generally seem better off than their working class counterparts, and on the other 
hand some of them are clearly more comfortable with the housing situation than are 
the others. Still, it is important to emphasise that all nine suffer from being unable to 
live up to the expectations of their previous social standing. Indeed, even in the few 
instances where the current housing situation comes close to what they might have 
accomplished under normal conditions, the presence of unmanageable debt loads is 
detrimental.   
6.5. THIRD DIMENSION: THE SOCIAL SITUATION
Given the substantial changes in two of the most basic elements of any package pur-
suit — job careers and housing — the turn has come to take a closer look at the de-
faulters’ social situation. The point of departure is that they are all forced out of their 
ordinary package pursuits at ‘stage three’ and challenged with establishing new and 
cheaper lifestyles as defaulters. This means that even though they are not likely to be 
in equally bad situations, they have all suffered painful losses. But it also means that 
life goes on, and that they actually have to deal with the new everyday conditions. 
The question is in what ways their lifestyles are affected, and what the typical effects 
are in the three occupational strata. 
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6.5.1. WORKING CLASS DEFAULT-DEBTORS
As already pointed out, three of the working class respondents have been marginal-
ised in the occupational system whereas the three others have defended their positions 
or even improved the situation some. As for the housing situation, the changes are 
again largest among the marginalised. Hence, it should be expected that the reshaping 
of everyday life is more far-reaching in these cases. 
Starting out with the respondent who has crossed class boundaries and ended up in the 
underclass, the changes are substantial. From having a job and an income she is now 
receiving disability benefit — which is not enough to take her through the month 
because of her considerable consumption debts. Her solution has been to develop 
skills as a professional social client; a specialist of rules and rights, a collector of 
useful telephone numbers to municipality departments and lawyers, an expert of the-
atrical performances. Temporarily co-habiting with her daughter, who has also be-
come a social client, she leads a hand-to-mouth existence and spends money appar-
ently without quite knowing where they go — sometimes to the extent that there is a 
lack of food. But even a specialist can go too far:  
“What a beautiful social security office!! And nice people working 
there, too. We got a lot of help from them .. As they [recently] found me 
a new flat in a different part of town, I was very sorry to move .. The 
new social security office refused to help me. Instead, my case was sent 
back and forth between the two offices for months. In the end, I was ac-
cused of fraud and told there would be a monthly deduction in my dis-
ability benefit.” [64]  
As for the two other marginalised informants, they both live a quiet life with little 
money to spend. They also share the fact that they struggle with psychological prob-
lems. But a major difference in their life conditions is the fact that one of them has a 
debt settlement while the other has not. Coming out of a situation marked by loss of a 
home, attempts to commit suicide, years of psychotherapy and a succession of more 
or less dreary places to live, a debt settlement and a rented flat appear as major steps 
forward. She is not shameful of her debt problems any more as she regards them as 
caused by market conditions rather than her own mistaken acts. Embedded in a lim-
ited social network she has decided to lead a secluded life with only one main focus: 
“Honestly speaking, I have no wish to change my situation until the 
debt settlement is completed. I have one thing on my mind, and that is 
to have my debts deleted after five years. Then I can start afresh.” [73] 
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The one without a debt settlement finds herself in a more unstable situation. She can 
currently not apply for a debt settlement because her last credit card purchase took 
place less than a year ago. She has lost her home, she is harassed by her former hus-
band, and she has no job due to psychological setbacks. Her budget is very tight, and 
she can afford little else than fixed expenses. But thanks to her parents she has a car 
and occasional opportunities to go on vacations with the children. She also has a 
hobby that connects her to a wider network of people and enables her to travel to 
exhibitions and shows, but the activity must pay for itself through breeding and sell-
ing animals. An important feature of the situation is that her social radius of action is 
delimited by a constant worry about social reputation: 
“During the months where my expenditures are low I try to save up for 
a rainy day. I also save in on food. It’s always at the back of my mind 
that something in the house might break — something that I must have, 
the washing machine, for instance, the refrigerator, the stove, such 
things. Imagine that I’m in a shop buying a new stove and somebody 
handling my case saw me doing that! .. Or buying flowers — can she 
really afford that?.. I don’t tell my neighbours about my situation, they 
don’t know I’m victimised by debts. But I tell my close friends and fam-
ily. This is psychologically tough and I need someone to talk to.” [73] 
Such worries indicate that she is not at all comfortable with her identity as a default 
debtor. They also illustrate how quite ordinary acts become forbidden fruits in case of 
debt problems. The extent to which shame is part of economic life, a need for impres-
sion management arises. In this case, the informant solves the challenge by living a 
quiet life, perhaps avoiding a few situations for fear of being observed, and by care-
fully choosing who to let in on her financial difficulties. 
But the three remaining working class informants are less cautious about managing 
streams of information. In that sense, they seem to have a more balanced social iden-
tity which makes it easier for them to cope with the financial difficulties. Besides, in a 
materialistic perspective they have avoided negative changes with respect to both the 
job and the housing situation and are as such in a stronger position to adopt strategies 
that minimise the effects of economic problems in everyday life. As a result, the way 
they cope with the debt problems — even at ‘stage three’ — may be characterised as 
a continuation of previous lifestyles. As one of them explains: 
“The debt was at the back of my mind all the time. It affected my well-
being: I had a problem I couldn’t solve .. But it didn’t affect my lifestyle 
.. I had a job and I could […] live the way I’ve always done .. I contin-
ued to go to the pub. Perhaps I was a bit more depressed than before 
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and needed somebody to talk to .. I told everyone about my debt prob-
lems if they asked — my wife, friends, colleagues, neighbours.” [90] 
In this case, the main impact on everyday life is a constant torment from being unable 
to get out of his financial problems. Even though he continues to live as before, the 
psychological aspect of being a default-debtor is a real set-back that deteriorates his 
life quality. As a consequence, he is uncomfortable in his own company and needs 
more than ever to go to the pub. The second informant reacts much the same way. But 
in this case, obtaining a debt settlement has led to certain modifications of the life-
style:
“I can’t afford to play horses the way I used to. I have discovered that 
it is just as fun with smaller amounts of money .. I tell everyone who 
asks about my debt problems. I’m not ashamed. Of course, I have 
wasted a lot of money and partied away a lot of money and gambled 
away a lot of money. But that’s no big deal. I mean, I didn’t rape any-
one; I just borrowed some money, so why not talk about it? [99] 
The same features generally apply to the third informant as well. To avoid further 
aggravation, he has got rid of his credit cards. As a consequence, it has become easier 
to resist temptation, but at the same time more difficult to finance unexpected needs, 
such as roof repairs and a hot water tank replacement. Also, there are certain things 
that they cannot afford, including child minding, holidays, bicycles for the whole 
family and visits to the amusement park with the children. Since they have just moved 
into a new area, their local network is modest. But the informant sometimes takes his 
wife for a Saturday afternoon pint and visits old friends once in a while. As for the 
identity as a default debtor he seems relatively unaffected by the debt load as it has 
been part of most of his grown-up life. However, he is a bit more cautious about talk-
ing about his financial problems to everyone. For instance, only one of his friends 
knows because: 
“I don’t like to tell people I have not known for a long time. I must trust 
them .. As for myself, I usually don’t worry too much about things. But 
of course, sometimes I think about it .. If there’s somebody who abso-
lutely shouldn’t know? My mother-in-law!” [86] 
As a general impression, these interviews leave little doubt that the budgets are tight 
and that it is difficult to live up to many of the social demands. Also, the psychologi-
cal strain is a prominent feature of their new lives; whereas some of them cope with 
this by leading a secluded life, others actively use the public room to ease the anguish. 
Still, they seem to have adopted to the default-debtor situation by implementing nec-
essary — but nevertheless — often undramatic adjustments to previous lifestyles; 
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indeed, most of them seem to be able to maintain their social networks from before 
the troubles started. The exception is the one who has stepped down into the under-
class as a long-term social client; her lifestyle has of course changed fundamentally. 
6.5.2. WORKING CLASS CLIMBERS
It is among the climbers that the largest shifts in status are found so far. They are all 
former small-firm managers who have lost everything including their businesses and 
— with one exception — at least one house. Four of the five informants are back into 
the working class after having lost their middle class positions in the occupational 
system. During the downward slide all but one deliberately avoided the social envi-
ronments they once came from. The fifth has managed to continue his upward mobil-
ity into the upper class, but under considerable strain. Such rises and falls in social 
status are likely to strongly affect the everyday lives of those involved. 
In many ways, the changes in lifestyle seem the least for the informant who has more 
or less stayed put in his social environment. When he midway through his working 
life decided to leave the company he once worked in and start his own business, he 
stayed in the same trade and kept much of his social network. And when he in his late 
fifties went bankrupt, he sold his house and rented a small flat in the same geographi-
cal area. The bankruptcy came as a surprise to his friends. At the beginning, they 
started inviting for dinners and get-togethers, but as the default-debtor went into a 
depression it came to a halt. As a consequence, the network has become somewhat 
reduced, but is still there. At the time of the interview, the informant lives a secluded 
life, where TV-watching and a feeling of approaching retirement without future pros-
pects dominate. His previous satisfaction of making money is gone, and along with it 
activities such as shopping and travelling and many of his hobbies. However, he has 
lately allowed himself a few CDs and a jazz club membership. Also, since bankrupt-
cies are publicly announced he sees no point in hiding his new identity as a default 
debtor, even though reconciliation is never easy: 
“It is psychologically hard. It doesn’t show much on the outside, but on 
the inside I struggle .. In some people’s eyes I know I have lost status. 
I’m quite sure about that. But in my own eyes I’m just the one I am .. I 
don’t feel different or inferior in front of my friends.” [45] 
The four other informants are not as relaxed about their new ‘stage three’ identities. 
One of them, who is about the same age, lives an even more secluded life as he is 
currently out of work and has only a few friends to turn to for company. His six year 
old son’s allergy takes up much of his time and all his money; in fact, the need for 
natural products to periodically replace ordinary medicines is one of the reasons why 
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he does not have a debt settlement as some of his creditors refused to allow him to set 
aside money for that purpose. Everyday life centres on the son’s demand for treat-
ment, which involves a continuous development of skills and knowledge as well as 
hard work since the skin must be treated with special oils, herbs and baths up to sev-
eral times a day. The evenings are typically spent alone in front of the PC: 
“I surf on the internet. Sometimes a neighbour comes by for an evening 
coffee. But I mostly talk to people on the phone .. The year I was de-
pressed I used to call the church relief service. I got nice and useful an-
swers and you don’t have to tell them your name. I was comfortable 
with that.” [8] 
A core element in his everyday life is shame. When he went bankrupt he escaped 
stigmatisation by moving to Oslo. And when he some years later could not sustain his 
new homeownership he simply gave the keys to the creditors and left the scene. He 
cannot explain why he reacts like that. But he knows the feeling: 
“I have learnt to take a beating .. I often compare my situation with the 
farmer who is out in the wood with his horse and loads one log after the 
other onto the sleigh, saying: if you can take this one you can take an-
other one, too. In the end the horse is nearly dead. That’s how I feel.” 
[8] 
Shame is the common denominator in several of the other stories as well. In one of 
them, three homes and a marriage were lost. The informant tells how he during ‘stage 
two’ started to loose his temper and self-respect and went mad at home, smashing 
window panes and other physical objects. At ‘stage three’ he is a broken man: 
“I am so angry with myself because I have ruined the lives for so many, 
you know, and it’s a shame .. I feel very bad, especially in front of the 
children. And my wife — when we got divorced she tried to kill herself 
and everything .. Luckily, the stress at work is so intense that I have lit-
tle time to indulge in it. And that is maybe why I work so hard.” [32] 
One of the reasons for not having obtained a debt settlement is his difficulties in talk-
ing about personal — including financial — problems. He has been to a number of 
public services and always asked for his rights without being able to pass across a 
comprehensive account of his troubles; the interview was in fact one of the rare ex-
ceptions. Having tried for years to solve his debt problems, he now tries to get his 
family back on tracks; he has currently rented a flat large enough to house them all. A 
major motive is to give the son some stability as he is not doing well at school and 
keeps on running into trouble there. However, the informant does not see his wife so 
often since they both work shift and try to arrange the everyday routine in such a way 
168          INTO THE DEBT QUAGMIRE
that while the one works the other is at home for the son. In addition, the bad econ-
omy leads them both into accepting extensive overtime work. The result is no spare 
time, little time for the son and no time for each other. 
As a social phenomenon, shame impacts social relationships in settings where the 
ashamed person falls short of complying with the ongoing standards. It follows that a 
way to avoid shame is simply to keep away from these settings. In that respect, mov-
ing to a different town may be a — drastic, but still: quite typical — solution. The 
point is particularly well illustrated by another informant who takes the strategy even 
a bit further as he does not only move to Oslo but also settles down in social sur-
roundings where the standards of his pre ‘stage one’  life are invalid: 
“Arriving in Oslo I found myself among equals, among people who all 
were in a difficult situation. So — well — when you hide among the low 
status people you don’t feel your own problems so pressing.” [28] 
This informant ended up in poverty-like conditions for more than a year. In this way, 
he also escaped his hard-working father who flogged him for the bankruptcy. Later, 
when he got himself a job the situation somewhat improved, especially after he ob-
tained a debt settlement. But as he now faces the prospects of unemployment there are 
once again dark clouds on the horizon. At the time of the interview he lives alone and 
dreams of a partner and a place to live with a spare room for his hobbies. 
The fifth of the climbers distinguishes himself by the fact that he has consolidated his 
position in the upper classes. But his high income does not necessarily mean that he 
has correspondingly more leeway in everyday life; the wage deductions to cover his 
considerable tax debt is substantial, and as he has experienced that some of the other 
creditors have managed to get at his bank account, he takes out whatever is left of the 
monthly salary and stores the cash in envelopes at home. When the fixed expenses are 
paid there is very little left for food and everyday needs. In this situation, two features 
characterises the informant’s dispositions. Firstly, taking care of family relationships 
and protecting the children from the consequences of the debt problem situation is 
important:  
“We have had a strong focus on providing the children with as normal 
conditions as possible. My wife has taken on odd jobs to get money to 
send them on school trips so that they should not be outsiders. And our 
daughter get fashion clothes for the same reason .. We have had to save 
in on food and clothes for us parents.” [94] 
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Secondly, in order to sustain a position in the upper class the streams of information 
must be carefully controlled; whereas the identity as default-debtor is openly commu-
nicated within the household, it is concealed in most other social settings: 
“We have gradually told the children the truth as they have grown 
older. But in the beginning we protected them as much as we could .. 
Up to date nobody but the family knows what we have gone though. Ex-
cept from a couple who now lives abroad, none of our friends knows .. 
They may suspect it, but they are polite and they don’t bring it up .. It’s 
like a theatre play — schizophrenia — the game is: everything is fine, 
we’re ok. But deep inside you know it’s not true.” [94] 
The informant is very uncomfortable with his identity as a default-debtor. As he lacks 
the means to live up to the standards of his upper class position, he points to himself 
as a grey-haired and ordinary-dressed middle-aged man. Also, he knows by experi-
ence that he may loose everything if his employer gets to know the truth since a debt 
problem often is considered incompatible with concentration, leadership and budget 
responsibilities. As he explains: 
“My employer knows about my tax debts. Nothing else! In my former 
job I played with open cards and told them everything. As a result I was 
given the choice between quitting the job and getting sacked. Never 
again.” [94] 
On the whole, the working class climbers leave us with the impression that they have 
had to adapt to rough everyday conditions that are way below the standards they ori-
ented towards as small firm managers. Consequently, they struggle with the new 
identity as defaulters. In particular, they typically experience their current positions as 
shameful setbacks that exclude them from many of the social arenas of which they 
used to be a part. In fact, most of these informants live secluded — and sometimes 
lonely — lives. Those who still try to hang on to elements of their previous social 
lives are likely to be challenged with the costs and the need to exercise extensive 
impression management. Such behaviour is probably more pressing the higher up in 
the occupational system one gets. 
6.5.3. DEFAULT-DEBTORS FROM THE HIGHER CLASSES
In spite of considerable variation, middle- and upper class informants have so far 
appeared to be in somewhat better situations than the rest of the sample. On the other 
hand, the standard packages in these segments are generally harder to translate into 
action since they are more expensive to finance. Keeping that in mind, seven of the 
nine middle- and upper class informants have debt settlements, and hence are left with 
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apportioned means at their disposal. Also, the potential downfalls are large. It follows 
that the discrepancies between former package orientations and actual lifestyles could 
be substantial. High levels of discomfort with the ‘stage three’ default-debtor identity 
should therefore be expected.  
Still, four of the nine informants seem to have come more or less at ease with their 
new ‘stage three’ identities as defaulters. In two of these cases, mental breakdowns 
appear to be a major cause. Such events tend to render nearly any other problem — 
even debt quagmires — into minor difficulties. This, in turn, can be used as a thera-
peutic device; if a sick person gets inspired to try and solve less complicated muddles, 
any success may supply the confidence needed to handle the more complex psycho-
logical disturbances. Debt problems are in fact well suited for the purpose as they 
confront the default-debtor with oppressive — but after all: very concrete  — actions 
such as going through a pile of bills, getting an overview, creating a budget, making a 
plan and presenting it to the creditors. As one of the informants explains: 
“The debt problems became my lifeline. The only lifeline I had. If I had 
not had a debt problem to solve I would not have managed to sort out 
my life .. I went to the social security office and documented my eco-
nomic situation in such a way that I was convinced they would see me 
as the worthless fool I believed I were. Instead, they asked me how I 
had survived, and gave me recognition ..  ” [91] 
Both of these informants have been tossed into poverty-like ‘stage two’ situations, 
loosing themselves on the way as persons. At ‘stage three’ however, they clearly 
achieved major steps forward by standing up to well-defined challenges including 
making honest assessments about their personal capacities. Under such conditions, the 
default-debtor identity is turned into a positive element in life; accepting it becomes 
the cure and the ticket to the Promised Land. But let us make no mistake: the means 
by which they orient towards new packages are scarce: 
“I have a resource others don’t have: time. So my nephew loves to visit 
his aunt. We go to the library .. Sometimes I offer to buy him a choco-
late. I don’t tell him I can’t afford buying one for me. But he looks at 
me and says: ok, but only if we share.” [91] 
The two others at ease with their identity as defaulters are both former small firm 
managers. Their downfalls have been substantial. In one of the cases, a large social 
network and a marriage was lost along with two firms, a business license, a spare flat 
and a nice car. Since he managed to keep the home through a debt settlement, he still 
lives in a wealthy area. This is an everyday challenge since he is stripped of most of 
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his incomes and all the materialistic luxuries he once enjoyed, at the same time as his 
children are still part of economically demanding social environments. In the inter-
view he tells about how they together have developed the skills necessary to operate 
in wealthy as well as less wealthy settings, and how they have managed to keep ac-
cess to facilities such as cottages and holiday opportunities through family relations. 
From the very beginning of his debt problem career he has kept no secrets about his 
situation. Part of the reason is that he not only went through a publicly announced 
bankruptcy, but also that the case was taken to court involving several of his former 
friends and associates. Besides, as he knows several of his creditors personally, he 
saw no reason to hide his problems; everyone knew the circumstances that triggered 
the bankruptcy — to the extent that his main creditor even named him their most 
unfortunate customer ever. But openness has its disadvantages: 
“If I try to pursue a business idea, it doesn’t work because everybody 
seems to think I’m Al Capone’s cousin or something.” [80] 
The obvious loss of trust is accompanied by a lowering of ambitions; he no longer 
aims at becoming rich and successful but simply wants a decent job. This, of course, 
makes it easier to accept the identity as a default-debtor.  
The same kind of adaptation is shared by the other former firm manager who has even 
crossed class boundaries twice and ended up in the working class. He seems quite 
comfortable with that as he embarked on the route more or less voluntarily. He gives 
the impression of having adopted not only a working class style, but also a typical 
working class attitude towards debt problems: to tell everyone who asks. He admits 
he does not like to involve employers, but sees no real threat in doing so since he has 
already changed jobs several times and knows that his skills are in demand. After 
nearly twenty years of economic scarcity he has developed a rather modest lifestyle 
spending very little money on consumption; he never visits pubs or eats expensive 
food, and he always invites friends to his home instead of participating in costly social 
events. On the other hand, he has obviously kept certain elements of his previous 
middle class lifestyle through his new partner:  
“She owns everything — I have nothing but my clothes. I don’t like it 
because there’s always a chance that we’ll break up some day .. I have 
a car and a cottage in her name .. I go there on vacations. I can live 
just as inexpensively there as I do at home.” [63]  
The remaining five informants are clearly more uncomfortable with the default debtor 
identity. Three of them share a distinct feeling of shame about their situation. In two 
of these cases, many years of economic scarcity have not only led to housing situa-
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tions way below previous standards, but also to an off-centre existence in diminishing 
social networks. One of them has in fact very few friends left. As he explains: 
“Friends are to be used whenever you need them. But you can’t con-
tinuously bother them with all of your problems without giving anything 
back .. In the end, I didn’t even have money to go to the cinema, I 
couldn’t afford anything social, you know. So when they phoned me up 
and invited me I made up excuses: I don’t have time, I already have an 
appointment, etc. In the end, I lost contact with most of my friends.” 
[65] 
He went through many dramatic events including forced sales, a bankruptcy and a 
severe accident. On top of it came shame. He started to make up stories for his family. 
For instance, he told them he had sold his two flats at a loss, but not that the sales 
were ordered by the court; and since his family lives in a different part of the country 
there was little risk involved in telling them that he had quit his position as a manager 
without mentioning the bankruptcy: 
“It’s prestige, you know. I couldn’t admit the truth to my family be-
cause they are so successful. I couldn’t stand the thought of having 
them looking down at me as a bankrupt looser.” [65] 
The other informant shares many of these experiences. She is not at all comfortable 
with the fact that she can no longer afford the lifestyle she used to enjoy. For a start, 
neither her housing situation nor what is left of her income under the debt settlement 
regime permit her to entertain and socialise as she used to. As she puts it: 
“I’m a very social person. I have always filled my home with people. 
But nowadays I can’t even be a member of the bridge club or the litera-
ture circle because everybody has to take turns hosting the meetings .. I 
can’t invite people. The telephone is silent and this Christmas I really 
felt there was nobody ..  Three of my fiends told me I’m not nice to be 
with any more. I’m quarrelsome. I get irritable from the constant pres-
sure.” [1] 
For many years she has made up stories and half truths to conceal her debt situation 
from family members, colleagues and most of her friends. She tries to give the im-
pression of pursuing a next-to bohemian lifestyle, inspired by the critics of society, 
the nonconformists and the artists. In that way, her frequent change of homes and 
apparent preference for bed-sits fit in. The same goes for the fact that she no longer 
has a car or shows up on costly social events such as seminars abroad. But the truth is 
that she can only occasionally afford to socialise — let alone go travelling. She hides 
because:
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“I don’t like the image. Defaulters are people who just borrow and bor-
row and give a shit about paying back .. It’s so humiliating. I sometimes 
borrow money from one or two of my friends, but never family members 
— they easily start gossiping, you know .. And my colleagues know 
nothing, except from my superior .. You know, people with little money 
may at least have some fun, some experiences. But I can’t even have 
that. My life is in a deadlock.” [1] 
As for the third informant, her social life used to centre on the activities of the firm. 
Since a crucial part of her social identity was embedded in an idealistic vision about 
how to organise and develop a company, she found herself in the middle of a large 
network hosting major social events for business associates and friends as well as her 
employees. The bankruptcy destroyed a cohesive, integrated life project: 
“My husband and I did not involve our friends at all. In the beginning it 
was so shameful that we couldn’t possibly bring it up in conversations 
— shame associated with a failure so large that everything was lost .. It 
took many years until I could tell anyone about the bankruptcy. I simply 
said we moved to Oslo, made up a story if necessary .. I eventually told 
my family about the bankruptcy, but not the full story, how bad it was.” 
[41] 
Her parents are rich, and as she finally got a debt settlement she has accepted the new 
conditions of life as a temporary situation to be replaced by better times in the future. 
Socially, however, she has divided her lifeworld into two distinct spheres: 
“I have told a few about the debt settlement .. Exactly what makes me 
tell some of my friends and not the others I don’t know. But perhaps it 
is simply because it is convenient to operate in two separate channels; 
one where it is ok to talk about it, and one where debt problems are 
practically non-existent, where I can be on equal footing with every-
body else.” [41] 
However, as illustrated by the remaining two informants, shame is not necessarily a 
part of the resistance against the default-debtor identity; rather, it follows from actu-
ally being in the position to ignore the debt and continue to pursue a lifestyle of one’s 
own choice. This, of course, presupposes incomes that are high enough to render debt 
settlements uninteresting. Also, it probably involves access to additional resources 
such as a partner who can own property. Both of these informants make a lot of 
money and they have new spouses. In addition, they share the attitude that the prob-
lematic debt can be left as it is; they do not regard it their fault in the first place, and 
they claim to have made every effort to try and solve the difficulties. As a conse-
quence, however, they have a need for specialising in impression management. 
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One of them occupies a leadership position in a large company and is responsible for 
a considerable budget. As such, he pursues a social image that is inconsistent with the 
default debtor identity. It is handled in several ways. For a start, he is well connected, 
so he gets credit to finance his package orientations. The new financial obligations are 
carefully observed. Secondly, he acts in social environments where the cardinal norm 
is be on equal footing with anyone in corresponding positions. This also includes 
problematic debt. The most honourable solution is therefore a negotiated compromise 
between equals — and definitely not a debt settlement. At the time of the interview, 
he has had a lawyer working on the case for some months already. The third approach 
is to observe a principle of honesty. As his creditors have demanded wage deductions, 
he knows that his trustworthiness may be questioned by his employers. So he has to 
do his job well. In particular, he is focussed on economic honesty: 
“My responsibilities are considerable .. In my job I employ people and 
I sack them — mostly because of embezzlement and misguided use of 
money, and I check my employees in the registries .. I sometimes em-
ploy people with debt problems. But there is a difference between being 
honest and broke, and being dishonest and broke .. I get extremely 
sceptical whenever I feel somebody is not playing with open cards.” [5] 
As for himself, he monitors his reputation carefully: 
“You know, nobody gets to know about my problems by just looking at 
me .. And I know how they look at defaulters, they patronise them .. So 
only very few people knows my history .. I have informed my superior 
that I have some old debts that I’d like to get rid of. But he doesn’t 
know the story.” [5] 
The last informant is self-employed, taking on assignments from a number of differ-
ent companies. He makes a lot of money and manages to conceal most of it from the 
tax authorities, although he takes great care keeping enough of it white as a cover-up. 
Since major parts of his economic life is light-sensitive, he is an expert of information 
management. Except from a few friends who were close at the time of the bankruptcy, 
nobody knows the full story. Slightly paranoid, he explains: 
“Nobody knows. That would be impossible. I have to stick to the cover-
up stories. My wife knows a great deal. She does. But not every detail. 
No. I got divorced once, and, well, I don’t tell things that could nail me 
in court in the future .. I sometimes wish I had a confessor. But that 
wouldn’t be right; much of what I do is illegal. And one gets dirty from 
shaking hands with the chimney sweeper.. The last seven-eight years 
I’ve had a strong inclination towards — you know, when I need to relax 
I find myself reading spy literature. It’s like, you’re deep inside enemy 
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territory, and you must not leave any traces, you must not let them get 
at you. Apparently, it’s at the back of my mind all the time.” [23] 
On the whole, the middle- and upper class defaulters once again leave us with a com-
posite impression. The everyday life conditions vary considerably, from quite ordi-
nary and even luxurious situations to economic and social deprivation in combination 
with bad health. Most of them do not easily come to terms with the default-debtor 
identity — but for various reasons. At the core of their everyday life situation is a 
fundamental imbalance between current economic capacities and previous package 
orientations. As a consequence, many of these stories carry the imprint of shame. In 
fact, five of the nine informants exercise extended impression management based on 
half-truths and cover-up stories. 
6.6. THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL DIVISION
The empirical descriptions have documented major shifts — mostly downfalls — in 
all three status areas in all three occupational strata. The overall picture is that the 
working class informants have suffered modest changes as compared to where they 
were before the troubles started, that the climbers have gone through substantial 
losses, and that the middle class defaulters seem face considerable deprivation as well 
but in most cases seem to have steered clear of the emphatic downfalls that they po-
tentially risk. However, such assessments are ambiguous, especially since all infor-
mants define themselves as being in difficult and unwanted life situations. Also, the 
changes taking place are often similar in kind; for instance, jeopardised job careers, 
losses of homes and instances of disgrace are found among informants from all layers. 
So what exactly are the impacts of social division?  
Following Keller and Zavelloni (1964), the clue is to regard class situations as an 
intermediary variable whereby social events are filtered and interpreted relative to the 
resources at one’s disposal — or in our terminology, as a weighty contextual parame-
ter in economic life. In such a perspective, the significance of a given event — say, 
losing a homeownership — appears as conditional upon the social stratum in which it 
occurs. Correspondingly, the extent to which any specified resource — say, education 
— is an asset in coping behaviour largely depends on the social setting on which the 
default-debtor is part.  
6.6.1. THE JOB SITUATION REVISITED
As some of the interviews show, jobs can be lost because of debt problems. The most 
direct relationship identified in our data is small firm bankruptcies. But it is also a 
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threat among wage-earners as reduced concentration, less trustworthiness and cum-
bersome administration of wage deductions may contribute to becoming marginalised 
and eventually dismissed from the company. On the other hand, strengthening one’s 
position on the labour market and getting better jobs are obvious coping strategies to 
minimise the effects of financial problems. Both types of processes have been identi-
fied in all three occupational strata. 
The informants predominantly sustain or improve their positions in the labour market 
by activating one of two resources; social networks and education. As for the former, 
the core of most networks tends to cover people of more or less equal standing. In as 
much as that is the case, their capacities naturally vary across social divisions. Hence, 
when an industrial worker in the sample needs a better job a friend helps him to a 
position as a shop assistant, whereas a former lawyer finds a job that fits his qualifica-
tions and ambitions through quite a different web of connections. The climbers repre-
sent yet a variant, as they have trespassed class boundaries and may have a more 
composite networks to draw upon. As it turns out, most of the informants in this cate-
gory do not have extensive middle class connections. Hence, when the restaurant 
owner goes bankrupt he is able to stay in the business — not in fashionable estab-
lishments but as a wage-earner cook in countryside pubs and cafeterias. The exception 
is the one who managed to make further advancements in the occupational structure, 
where personal connections were partly responsible for the continued climb.  
But networks are of limited value unless one has the qualifications necessary to fill 
the requirements of the new job. Hence, formal education typically enters the equa-
tion as a key resource. But the attractiveness of taking on years of schooling varies 
across social division. As Keller and Zavelloni (1964) point out, working class per-
sons prioritise secure jobs over prestige. People from the middle classes, on the other 
hand, opt for both; indeed, higher education is a necessity to hold on to their positions 
in the social stratification system, and therefore an inherent part of their socialisation 
into society. These differences are traceable in coping behaviour as well. As already 
noticed, the working class informants are the lowest educated in the sample. If they 
add on to their qualifications, it is through short-term training to fill the immediate 
requirements of a specific job within reach — such as taking the necessary courses to 
become a taxi driver. As for more than half of the middle class informants, however, 
it is different; they readily call on the educational system to build on to already high-
level formal skills — e.g. university courses or full degrees.  
The pattern is further supported by the climbers whose social backgrounds are in the 
working class; as they go bankrupt all but one take on subordinate wage-work, 
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whereas three of six former middle class small firm managers return to higher level 
education. This is undoubtedly an important strategy whereby they successfully avoid 
the substantial social downfalls of their climber counterparts. 
6.6.2. THE HOUSING SITUATION REVISITED
Serious and enduring debt problems activate money collection routines and court 
proceedings that inevitably lead to loss of property unless some kind of solution is 
found. Hence, the nineteen homeowners at ‘stage one’ are reduced to six at ‘stage 
three’. As the interviews show, homes are lost due to a number of circumstances, such 
as firm bankruptcies, falling incomes, rising interest rates, divorce and health prob-
lems. Also, as mentioned in chapter two there is always a risk for creating unsustain-
able homeownerships by spreading it to layers of the population where the income 
situation is too insecure and the culture for maintaining such responsibilities over time 
is lacking (Ford 1988). The working class informant who was given homeownership 
through a welfare programme and later ended up in the underclass as a long-term 
social client may be such a case.  
However, given the severity the debt situations in the sample, the few who manage to 
sustain their homeownerships are more of a surprise than the thirteen who lost it. 
There are basically three ways in which the informants manage to hold on to their 
property. One is by acting under favourable market conditions and sell, refinance and 
buy homes. The second is through a new partner. And thirdly, one may take advan-
tage of certain institutionalised schemes such as welfare programmes and debt settle-
ments.21 As for the latter option, two informants have kept their homes this way. 
Since keeping as well as loosing homeownerships are found among informants from 
all three occupational strata, it is not easy to see a clear-cut pattern with respect to the 
impact of social division. Still, the data leave us with important cues. One is knowl-
edge; all three middle class informants who sustained a homeownership are well in-
formed about credit markets and legal institutions. Whereas one of them specialised in 
tax evasion and cunningly started to accumulate wealth in his new partner’s name, the 
two others focussed on debt settlements. As one of them says: 
“I paid close attention to the preparation of the debt settlement act — 
the legislative history. I knew I was going to apply [once it passed 
through Parliament]. So I was speculative .. I simply let it slide.” [80] 
                                                          
21 Cf. chapter 1.3.2. 
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These types of resources are not preset in the stories offered by informants from the 
other occupational strata. Instead, the three sustained homeownerships in these seg-
ments seem to be secured by a fair portion of chance — including favourable markets, 
a remarkable divorce and contact with vigilant administrators of welfare programs. 
Finally, it should be noticed that the meaning of a home varies across social divisions. 
This is not the least apparent among those who have lost their homeownerships. For a 
start, middle class informants are used to spacious homes and typically talk about the 
lack of a garden or opportunity to invite people and participate in networks where this 
is a key element. As opposed to this, such wants are not present in the accounts from 
working class informants; rather, they seem to have ended up in rented places much 
like the ones they lost. The climbers offer a divided picture. On the one hand, the four 
who ended up back in working class positions share the more modest ambitions of 
this segment. One of them describes his hopes for the future like this: 
“I hope to find a partner. And to have a little more space. I would like a 
hobby room for myself .. where I could have some fun .. A big house 
and a car is not my thing.” [28] 
On the other hand, such simple dreams are contrasted by the fifth climber who con-
tinued his upward mobility at ‘stage three’. But loosing his home on a forced sale 
leaves him in a position where he cannot meet the standards of his social environ-
ment; he simply lacks an important package device. Therefore, he sincerely considers 
getting back into homeownership through shady procedures — as for instance by 
buying his lost property back in the name of his children.  
6.6.3. THE SOCIAL SITUATION REVISITED
The default-debtors’ everyday situations are multi-faceted social realities. However, a 
good summary indicator of the developments from ‘stage one’ to ‘stage three’ is 
shame. As has been shown, this is a feeling that is found among informants from all 
three occupational strata. It basically reflects failure to live up to social expectations, 
often associated with guilt for being more or less responsible for some event that has 
imposed irreversible negative consequences upon oneself and others. In as much as 
social division has an impact, it is because expectations as well as assessments about 
what and to what extent something is shameful vary across socio-cultural segments of 
the population. This is communicated to the default-debtors by people in their social 
environments, and is immediately recognised as they themselves used to be part of 
ordinary life.  
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A Norwegian focus-group analysis from 2001 that is based on participants without 
debt problems offers information on such constraints. The study generally finds work-
ing class groups more — and middle-class groups less — accommodating with re-
spect to debt problems. A major reason is social distance; whereas debt problems is 
recognised as a real threat by the working class groups, including personal knowledge 
of people with such difficulties, middle class informants treat the issue with more 
distance; this is not something that is likely to happen to them. The causal explana-
tions differ as well; whereas middle class informants tend to blame individual, work-
ing class participants typically hold institutions and systems responsible. They also 
verbally refer to default-debtors as less of an out-group than do middle-class infor-
mants (Tufte 2005: 235-265). 
As a consequence, shame should be expected to be more prominent among defaulters 
from the middle- and higher occupational strata. The data seem to support the antici-
pation. As has been demonstrated, these informants feel humiliated by not being able 
to live up to the standards of family, friends, colleagues and business associates. They 
exercise extensive information control to hide among equals, conceal their downfalls 
and avoid condemnation. Moreover, those who choose transparency as an approach 
tell about being recurrently exposed to stigmatising episodes. Says one who tried 
openness just once: 
“I recently told somebody wealthy about it [the bankruptcy], but it 
made me feel such a failure.” [41] 
As opposed to this, working class informants generally seem to be in more accepting 
social environments. Although some of them obviously live socially deprived lives, 
many of these interviews show less concern for information control and issues such as 
shame and humiliation. One of them even says: 
“I don’t think people look down on anyone who’s got a payment prob-
lem. If they do, it’s pure ignorance.” [90] 
As for the climbers, the upward slider is still subjected to middle- and higher class 
constraints and submits to the patterns displayed by informants from this occupational 
stratum. The remaining four find themselves in a kind of a vacuum. On the one hand, 
they are no longer directly exposed to the influences of the segment they have left.  
On the other hand, the substantial downfalls they have been through have forced them 
into living secluded lives. Obviously, the feeling of shame dominates their social 
situation. Also, a thorough portion of self-blame probably adds considerably to a poor 
self-image.  
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6.6.4. OTHER IMPACTS
Needless to say, there are many other influences impacting the defaulters’ routes into 
‘stage three’ than those mentioned here. Two of them deserve a short comment. One 
is health; in all three occupational strata, defaulters who are physically or psychologi-
cally sick are worse off than those who are not. The other is age; younger defaulters 
are predominantly more optimistic than those who are approaching retirement. As a 
forty year old middle-class informant with a debt settlement puts it: 
“Nobody has told me face-to-face, but I think some people find it a bit 
too much that I shall be totally free of debt in only a few years’ time. At 
the time when others of the same age still struggle with their student’s 
loans .. Eventually, I will inherit my wealthy parents.” [41] 
Obviously, with such prospects for the future it is a lot easier to go through a debt 
settlement than for somebody who is in the late fifties with all property lost and no 
heritage in sight. The quotation also suggests that the impact of age may vary consid-
erably across social divisions. 
6.7. SUMMARY
In this chapter, the twenty informants have been classified according to a typology of 
occupational classes developed specifically for Norway. At ‘stage one’ when the debt 
problems start building up, three distinct class situations are identified; viz. working 
class informants with working class backgrounds, middle class informants with work-
ing class backgrounds (the climbers), and middle- and upper class informants with 
middle- and upper class backgrounds. The three occupational strata is useful in de-
scribing the changes that have taken place from ‘stage one’ to ‘stage three’, and in 
making assessments about the impact of social division on such processes. 
Access to socio-economic resources represents specific opportunities enabling de-
faulters to cope in ways that people without such access cannot. The analyses suggest 
that inequalities with respect to assets such as powerful social networks, formal skills 
and knowledge about markets and legal institutions are particularly important. Even 
though all twenty informants suffer very real and severe material and social depriva-
tion, the analyses show that their unequal resource situations at ‘stage one’ of the debt 
problem career nevertheless has lead to different end results at ‘stage three’.
The overall impression is that the transition after all is less dramatic among the infor-
mants with working class backgrounds as they largely retain more or less the same 
type of positions in the occupational structure, continue to live in the same kinds of 
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neighbourhoods and typically manage to keep a core of their lifestyles and social 
networks intact. Status-wise they have, in other words, ended up relatively close to 
where they were before the troubles started. Informants with middle and upper class 
backgrounds, on the other hand, have suffered substantial status losses along nearly 
all dimensions considered here — including housing, lifestyles, social networks and 
in some cases even employment conditions. Still, although further marginalisation 
looms large for some of them, they have generally steered clear of the most severe 
downfalls into the lower classes that they in fact risk. The most dramatic instances of 
downward mobility have undoubtedly taken place among the climbers; with one ex-
ception, all of these informants find themselves firmly marginalised and well back 
into working class positions at ‘stage three’. Obviously, they have not managed to 
build up enough of the right kinds of resources in time to sustain the positions they 
had achieved prior to the financial problems.  
The pattern is also underlined by the fact that shame is first and foremost traceable 
among informants whose status situation has changed the most; viz. among the climb-
ers and informants from the middle- and upper classes. An important difference be-
tween the two groups is that whereas the latter is still exposed to middle-class con-
straints, the former is not. Instead, they are left in a social vacuum where shame is 
accompanied by high levels of isolation, frustration and condemnation.  
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7.   THE DEBT QUAGMIRE MORAL 
7.1. INTRODUCTION
In the last two chapters it has been argued that over-indebted people cope with their 
debt problems in stages, and that the end result is a ‘stage three’ situation character-
ised by social downfalls and class- and status-specific sets of resources for pursuing 
new lifestyles. Also, a defaulter’s identity is now a recognised part of their biogra-
phies. However, as pointed out in chapter one, this process does not exempt them 
from the repayment norm; bills are still to be paid according to standing agreements. 
It follows that the permanent lack of sufficient means during ‘stage three’ is incom-
patible with one of the core principles of ordinary life. As a consequence, debt quag-
mires are not only financial muddles, but moral ones as well; given an unmanageable 
debt situation there is no way to comply with ongoing normative constraints.  
Faced with this, the defaulters are left with two options: submitting to the role of a 
moral degenerate or justifying the failure. The first alternative is unbearable for most 
people — at least in the long run — since it implies a huge amount of pressure and at 
best allocates the default debtor to the grey and black economy as a cheat and perhaps 
a criminal. The second is a more viable route, even though it is hard to entirely escape 
the feeling of shame. But in as much as a lessening of embarrassment and discomfort 
is obtained, any such justification is a piece of achievement since it has to be on a par 
with the repayment norm. This chapter is devoted to the third of the research ques-
tions developed in chapter 2.6: 
How is the continued lack of repayment justified? 
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The chapter starts out by presenting the doctrine of what may be called ‘the debt 
quagmire moral’. But even though all twenty informants generally seem to live by the 
same normative rule, the grounds for doing so vary. In the next sections of the chapter 
a typology of justifying principles is therefore developed. Finally, a prominent feature 
of the justification processes is addressed; viz. the emergence of dismay and even 
distrust in social institutions.  
7.2. THE DEBT QUAGMIRE MORAL
By the time the default-debtors reach ‘stage three’ their inability to pay bills is recog-
nised as a permanent feature of everyday life. As such, it is not only an economic and 
legal issue, but also a continuous normative offence that affects them as persons as 
well as social actors. Of course, a debt problem is not a visible stigma like for in-
stance race and physical disability. Still, as have been accounted for in the previous 
chapter, the downfalls they suffer and the consequences associated with those losses 
are hard to conceal from the outside world. Also, in cases where they somehow suc-
ceed in creating feasible smokescreens a deeply felt fear for being exposed has been 
detected. But above all, the repayment norm is typically internalised and assigned 
general validity in interpersonal relationships. As such, complying with it is a cardinal 
sign of honesty and trustworthiness. Indeed, as pointed out in chapter one, societies 
have throughout history considered the repayment of debts — whether economic or 
honorific in kind — as a virtue and failing to do so as immoral. Therefore, whenever a 
normative offence takes place on a permanent basis it raises an urgent need for justifi-
cation — socially as well as personally.  
To stand up against the repayment norm day out and day in is a ruthless experience. 
As one of the informants puts it:  
“Fourteen days ago I got one of those letters: pay within two weeks or 
else.. Well, I’ve heard it before. I can’t let it upset me. If I did, I would 
not be here talking to you. I’d been six feet under, you know. I had an 
economic counsellor once, and a person he had tried to help had just 
killed himself. What’s the point? To money collection companies such 
letters are standard procedure. But they don’t know how the formula-
tions affect people because they don’t know the recipients’ situation. 
[94] 
However, it is important to notice that the normative violation is seldom one hundred 
percent. During ‘stage two’ and even ‘stage three’ the informants typically pay at 
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least some of the claims. But as the ability to handle financial obligations decreases in 
step with the courses of events, it becomes increasingly important to prioritise be-
tween creditors to meet at least some commitments — even though it takes place at 
the expense of other claims. When it comes to living under debt settlements, such 
needs are formally addressed; debts are then prioritised according to the law, and any 
surplus is divided between the creditors according to an established codex. The alter-
native to full compliance with the repayment norm is, in other words, not a principle 
of no repayments. As shall be seen later, this is a general argument that is used in 
defence of the new moral. 
The constant need to prioritise between bills also initiates a distinction between ‘for-
mal obligations’ and so-called ‘debts of honour’. As the debt problems aggravate and 
it gets more and more difficult to observe financial commitments, it becomes very 
important to avoid having one’s moral standing questioned by members of the groups 
and networks of which one is a part. Hence, to secure social honour and group affilia-
tions, the ever scarcer resources are canalised to serve ‘life world’ obligations rather 
than the formal debts of the ‘system world’. Explains one of the informants: 
“If I had borrowed money from some guy and not paid it back, I would 
have been an asshole. This is personal debt. Not that I’m in favour of 
giving a shit about bank loans. But if you borrow money from a private 
person it is normally a friend or a relative, and then it becomes a mat-
ter of trust.” [90] 
Another informant develops the issue: 
“I don’t pity banks .. Had I borrowed from a common acquaintance 
without paying back, my friends would tell me right away what a bad 
person I am .. Debts of honour directly characterise you as a person. 
This you-and-me moral is much stronger than when dealing with banks. 
If I had treated my friends as I treat my creditors I would get loads of 
reactions — well deserved ones, too, as I see it.” [99]  
As indicated by these statements, there are hardly any excuses for failing to comply 
with the repayment norm in personal, ‘life-world’ relationships; doing so may put the 
defaulter in a severe situation and lead to social exclusion. But when it comes to for-
mal debts, a new normative guideline emerges based on the notion that these creditors 
are ‘system world’ organisations and not members of one’s personal networks. In such 
cases, all twenty informants — independently of each other — have replaced the 
repayment norm with a principle that in general terms may be formulated as: 
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Pay what you can whenever you can 
At first sight, the formulation may appear peculiar — even ridiculous — as a guide-
line in economic action; clearly, no society can survive for long were it to be based on 
such a precept. Still, it is recognisable from a number of other social settings. For 
instance, children are told that they don’t necessarily have to be number one at school 
or in sports; as long as they do their best they may be content with the achievements. 
Indeed, whenever such performances are carried out, the actors deserve — and may 
expect — social recognition. As shall be demonstrated throughout the chapter, this is 
exactly what the ‘debt quagmire moral’ is about: to do one’s best. As long as the 
creditors get what there is the defaulters can do no more — and should not be ex-
pected to, either. Thus seen, the new guideline appears to advocate a rather common 
‘life-world’ principle that under unfortunate economic conditions is projected onto 
market relations.  
When acting upon the new code, default-debtors may in fact lean on certain formal-
ised practises in the legal institution — most notably the Debt Settlement Act. Here, 
‘pay what you can whenever you can’ is turned into a precept that can be mathemati-
cally calculated according to legal definitions and agreed-upon economic standards 
about costs of living. Indeed, the Act establishes a routine whereby defaulters are 
granted the right to keep a certain amount of money to meet these agreed-upon stan-
dards, whereas the creditors’ right to claim whatever surplus beyond that level is 
equally indisputable. This combination of market demands and civic society needs 
extends beyond debt settlements as such, as default-debtors may explicitly refer to 
these principles in extrajudicial negotiations or in staging a defence of their normative 
violation.  
Still, projecting ‘life world’ principles onto ‘system world’ relationships is not auto-
matically acceptable in everyday social settings; as the repayment norm is relentless 
in interpersonal relationships, anybody who fails to pay back debts is inevitably sub-
jected to moral assessments — irrespective of the kind of creditor involved. As a 
consequence, the normative offence has to be justified in face-to-face interaction 
whenever it becomes an open issue. This is far from just an intellectual excursion. 
Indeed, if the new moral principle is to gain sympathy and social validity, the causes 
of the situation must be acceptable. This is normally easier to obtain if the debt prob-
lems can be traced back to ‘system world’ risk factors that are common to most 
households. It also helps if the causal account includes experiences that others can 
recognise and relate to. But above all, the defaulters must establish themselves as 
cases where ‘system world’ demands must give way to ‘life world’ needs. 
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This is done in several ways — and probably in many more ways than our twenty 
interviews suggest. But based on the data, a typology of causal accounts is presented 
in figure 8-1 above. As the illustration shows, the accounts fall in two broad catego-
ries; viz. ‘productive’ and ‘non-productive’ explanations. The distinction refers to 
whether or not a given account succeeds in placing a major part of the responsibility 
for what happened on ‘system world’ agents. For in as much as it successful in that 
respect, it also tends to lend legitimacy to the fact that the repayment norm is not 
observed. According to figure 8-1, fourteen of the twenty informants offer one of 
three such types of ‘productive’ explanations: ‘bad luck’, ‘deception’ and ‘bad 
health’. The remaining six, on the other hand, advance ‘non-productive’ accounts. 
Here, it is distinguished between ‘self blame’ and two shades of intentional action: 
‘bad intent’ and what is tentatively called ‘routinised intent’.
There are, in other words, six detectable types of causal explanations in the data. It is 
important to underline that such stories need not be objectively true in the sense that 
all parties involved would support the truth content in them. Rather, each account 
represents a specific self-perception or self-understanding. But this does not prevent 
them from being influential forces on social arenas; any defaulter is likely to act in 
accordance with the way he sees himself and causally explains how he ended up in 
over-indebtedness. 
In what follows, the six types of accounts are reviewed in turn. 
Figure 7-1 Typology of causal accounts. Number of cases in each category 
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7.3. PRODUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS
Productive explanations generally share the attribute that the causes in question are 
largely beyond individual control or obviously instances of coincidence that in princi-
ple may thrust anyone into a debt quagmire. Furthermore, the devastating effects of 
being exposed to the causal processes are mainly established as ‘system world’ defi-
ciencies. In such cases, the defaulters have a right to defend their ‘life worlds’. Still, 
the potentials for exempting the person from the repayment norm varies across the 
three different types of accounts registered in the interviews.  
7.3.1. BAD LUCK
Bad luck is perhaps the most typical explanation among the default-debtors; in fact, 
there are traces of it in all variants of causal accounts. The purest version, however, is 
about how remote ‘system world’ processes and other people’s dispositions may af-
fect the household negatively — and sometimes unreasonably hard. The four infor-
mants belonging to the ‘bad luck’ category argue precisely along these lines. Two of 
them refer to well-known features of the economic crisis at the end of the 1980’ies 
and early 1990’ies when they explain their debt problems; whereas the one blames the 
banks for having been too open-handed in their lending policy and given him — and 
many others — too much credit, the other claims to have been victimised by a sudden 
downfall in the markets in which his firm operated. The latter explains: 
 “I moved out of Oslo and started a boat building company. The first 
two or three months or so we were doing just fine. But then came the 
stock market collapse, and our market died over-night .. The bank 
named me their most unfortunate customer.” [80] 
The third informant belonging to the ‘bad luck’ category has a different story, as she 
does not blame the market system but her ex-husband’s economic dispositions for a 
financially fatal divorce. He was a self-employed truck driver, and she was responsi-
ble for the firm’s accounts. But as it turned out, the husband had a liability towards 
cashing out too much money without her knowing. She explains: 
“In May my husband spent a lot of money on a new driver's cab for the 
truck. I didn’t know until it was placed in front of my kitchen window 
one morning. Then I new I couldn’t go on. I left.” [75] 
A more complicated explanation is offered by the fourth informant. Based on how a 
downfall in the market undermined the company’s business, she continues to assess 
the impact of the banks’ lending policies up against personal responsibilities: 
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“The simplest explanation is the credit institutions. Everybody knows 
how the banks behaved during the late 80’ies. But it’s too simple. After 
all, our business was my husband’s project; it was he who had the ex-
perience and the knowledge, so he must take much of the blame.” [41] 
These accounts do not totally excuse the acting individual from all responsibilities. 
Rather, as a means of defending a moral offence they put the causal course of events 
in social contexts that are well-known and recognised as the way the ‘system world’
works. The implication is that although the individual always has to take on responsi-
bility for his own actions he nevertheless acts within — and upon — the workings of 
complex systems — including international structures such as economic fluctuations. 
The core of the ‘bad luck’ accounts is therefore the locus of the emergent causal pow-
ers; in as much as debt problems can be related to ‘system world’ processes, individ-
ual defaulters may declare blamelessness in this sense and argue the right to honour-
able solutions since ‘life world’ groups and institutions should be sufficiently pro-
tected from precisely such forces. It follows that, as long as the problems remain 
unsolved, they may also claim sympathy for not complying with the repayment norm 
and being left to live by a different moral rule.  
This logic is particularly distinct when accounts about ‘system world’ deficiencies are 
explicitly supported by arguments about ‘life world’ primacy. As pointed out by 
Sykes and Matza (1957: 669), normative offences may occur not because the norm in 
question is rejected as such, but because other values are accorded superiority. This 
line of argumentation is clearly demonstrated by the former boat firm manager: 
“I felt it was much more important to rescue myself as a person — and 
above all: the children — than to pay the tax debts. The deciding prin-
ciple behind my priorities is in fact the children; to avoid making them 
suffer.” [80] 
In this case, the informant backs up the argument about downfalls in international 
markets by a second argument about the need to protect the family; according to both 
defences, it is only fair and proper that the repayment norm gives precedence to ‘life
world’ requirements. 
7.3.2. DECEPTION
The next category of causal explanations includes courses of events that are marked 
by false accusations, conspiracy and fraud allegations. Such accounts share all the 
attributes of the ‘bad luck’ approach: the locus of the problem-generating processes is 
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placed in the ‘system world’, and the right to an honourable solution is clamed by 
referring to the primacy of ‘life world’ conditions. Hence, while all six informants 
belonging to the ‘deception’ category blame market actors for their debt problems, 
three of them also locate responsibility to the state domain of the institutional order. 
In addition, innocence is claimed on the basis of processes where the informant has 
been exposed to bad intent and criminal action by ill-intended third-parties. For in-
stance, one of the informants explains that his previous partner sold him the company 
without telling him that he had not paid VAT for a longer period of time. Another 
says he was falsely accused of paedophilia by his ex-wife as a revenge for leaving 
her, which in turn led to fatal reactions by public authorities. He explains:  
“The divorce took a surprising turn: the children wanted to stay with 
me. So my wife went to the child welfare and told them you don’t know 
my husband’s dark side! Then the authorities called back the permit for 
the kind of business that I had already established .. Nonsense, you 
know! What happened was not my fault. It’s like being on the highway 
and somebody falls asleep behind the wheel and suddenly you’re in a 
head-on collision.” [23] 
The idea of being exposed to some kind of conspiracy is often a central element in 
these explanations. To illustrate, a former home-owner suspects that two persons — 
one of them the holder of a building company and the other the head of the firm sell-
ing the houses — jointly stripped her for her capital. When the contractor went bank-
rupt after a series of scandals — before her house was completed — she found herself 
in severe trouble: 
“The estate agent, who sold my old flat and then sold me a new house 
that was still under construction, must have known everything. But I got 
no warnings — and no papers, no conveyance, not to mention a certifi-
cate of final completion. I said I wanted my money back. I got nothing. 
And without papers I couldn’t even sell the house. I took the contractor 
to court — as did many others. I lost the case. I had no strength left to 
bring a lawsuit against the estate agent. I felt like being stripped off my 
legal capacity.” [1] 
Such stories may also involve actors belonging to the state domain. Explains one 
informant: 
“The bank and the social security office joined forces, called a meeting 
and demanded to put our home on a forced sale .. The social security 
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office promised to find us a place to live. But the day our home was sold 
cheaply to some employee in the bank and we stood there, they said no, 
we have no rentals to offer you; you have to handle it yourselves. I 
complained to the municipality, but in vain.” [32] 
As legitimising devices for living by a different moral rule, such accounts are essen-
tially about personal integrity; in that respect the core of the stories is that the teller is 
a person who stands up to the unfairness imposed on him. In as much as such a mes-
sage is passed across, failing to comply with the repayment norm no longer appears as 
a rejection of a common value, but a necessity and even as a form of rightful retalia-
tion (Sykes and Matza 1957). The attitude is typically expressed by one of the infor-
mants: 
“Why I didn’t apply for a debt settlement? I simply didn’t want to pay 
for something that I feel is the bank’s and estate agent’s fault.” [90] 
However, although justified resentment may preserve a certain degree of self-dignity 
among defaulters, the extent to which it yields sympathy on wider social arenas is a 
different question. Clearly, it depends on evidence and the story itself — including its 
plausibility and typicality for a larger number of default-debtors. But above all, run-
ning into ill-intended third-parties do not automatically free the individual from re-
sponsibility for his own actions; after all, even cases like these involve individual 
decision-making and hence the duty to act rationally in market contexts. As pointed 
out by Sykes and Matza (1957), attacking others also serves to provide a smokescreen 
by repressing the acting person’s own wrongful actions. Especially in complex causal 
processes that are hard to verify for outsiders, this is common knowledge that may 
threaten the credibility of the story. In such cases, there is a particular need to back it 
up by positive lines of argumentation — such as in the following statement: 
“I don’t think it’s stupid to change flats and triple the housing wealth 
over-night. And I’m not clairvoyant; how could I know that when I did 
it for a second time and moved on to a new house I would end up bank-
rupt and struggle with debt problems for the next fifteen years? I 
couldn’t foresee that. I couldn’t know about the markets and that even 
the banks would go bankrupt.” [1] 
Again, a double line of reasoning is used: the informant backs up the point about 
‘system world’ property sharks by portraying herself as an ordinary person doing 
ordinary things on the basis of commonly shared — and basically: uncertain — 
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knowledge. She makes the point that even professional actors such as the banks some-
times get stung. But first of all the argumentation serves the purpose of reducing 
complex causal mechanisms to a plain and simple threat that may affect everybody’s 
‘life world’ existence. In as much as the idea is successfully communicated, sympathy 
for setting the repayment norm aside is not far away. 
7.3.3. BAD HEALTH
The third type of explanation is ‘bad health’. The four informants belonging to this 
category all share the attribute that their debt problem careers are marked by enduring 
health problems. Two of them developed severe psychological problems and went 
through years of therapy to get through the hardship. The third suddenly got enough 
of the life he led and spent nearly two years drifting around before he once again 
found himself capable of having a job. The fourth never recovered from a multitude 
of physical complications and had to give up work.  
As a way of defending a normative offence, these accounts are straight-forward; since 
everybody can get a health problem the core of the argument is to appeal to human 
compassion and understanding. Also, in a welfare state like Norway health is a public 
responsibility that may extend beyond hospitalisation and medical treatment to thera-
peutic schemes including elements such as economic support, debt counselling and a 
wide variety of other steps to ensure social rehabilitation and integration. Hence, 
health accounts are not only suited to create sympathy on social arenas, but may also 
function as means to access extensive professional help.  
Straight-forward as it may seem, sympathy on social arenas must still be earned. It is 
not enough to just refer to bad health; the struggle against unavoidable debt problems 
must also be demonstrated. This is typically done by showing that in spite of being 
severely ill one has actively fought a double battle; one against disease and one 
against over-indebtedness. ‘Bad health’ explanations are therefore typically stories of 
achievement; as the defaulter finally embarks on the route to recovery he is also on 
his way to regain control over the economy. Unlike those seeing themselves as vic-
timised by conspiracies and fraud, there are no accusations or bitterness in these ac-
count. Instead, they are tales of optimism. Says one informant: 
“I collapsed, I couldn’t take no more, I simply left everything behind. 
Did nothing. Didn’t pay a bill. Nothing! For one and a half years. At 
one point I put all my bills in a plastic bag and tried to get a debt set-
tlement. But my courage let me down .. Do you want to die? Ok, some 
wants to, or don’t but die anyway. I was lucky, and I thank God for it, I 
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have every reason to do so. And as it turned out, there was something 
divine about it; when I finally started to act, everything worked out fine, 
I took some education, got a job, a debt settlement .. and a girlfriend, 
we have such a fine thing going on between us.” [48] 
Another informant underlines the importance of professional assistance to set prob-
lem-solving processes in motion: 
“I got help to sort out my life. And suddenly I found myself capable of 
keeping a straight dialogue with my creditors .. I have really struggled 
to get where I am today. The creditors saw it, and they have accepted to 
include my needs for treatment into the debt settlement.” [91] 
Just like the informants from the previous categories, ‘bad health’ accounts are 
backed up by positive arguments about sensible economic behaviour before the trou-
ble started. As the third informant declares: 
“If I had been careless with money, if that had been the cause of my 
debt problems, I would have felt shameful because it had been my own 
fault. But I don’t feel that way.” [73] 
This kind of defence is important because not everybody is in a position to success-
fully legitimise non-compliance with the repayment norm by referring to bad health. 
The point is well illustrated by the fourth informant. When she was no longer able to 
work, she was established as a homeowner through special lending programmes de-
signed to provide a home to targeted groups that otherwise would be excluded from 
adequate living standards. But she was not satisfied:  
 “I told social security that I don’t want their shit. I don’t want holes in 
my walls and plastering falling off. Just get over here and fix it! I wrote 
letters, got a lawyer .. And two months later everything was fixed. 
Painters came and I got exactly the colours I wanted. And I kept on like 
that.” [64] 
As she continued to demand support from the social security system without manag-
ing to help herself onto a stable life situation, she finally lost credibility and eventu-
ally the flat. Hence, as opposed to the three other informants she cannot substantiate 
the ‘bad health’ story with accounts about how the debt problems have been ade-
quately addressed to find solutions. The image of a worthy recipient of further support 
is simply not there. Lacking this element, the ‘bad health’ argument looses much of 
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its power to yield sympathy on most social arenas — let alone legitimising the fact 
that she does not comply with the repayment norm.  
7.3.4. PRODUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS: BRIEF SUMMARY
Productive explanations causally place a major part of the responsibility for the debt 
problems on ‘system world’ processes. The fourteen informants who give such ac-
counts fall into three categories: ‘bad luck’, ‘deception’ and ‘bad health’. As for the 
two former, it is typically referred to instances like unfortunate market developments, 
creditor lending policies and certain life events such as divorce. In addition, accounts 
of ‘deception’ include instances of false accusations, conspiracy and fraud. As for 
stories of ‘bad health’, they provide a link between misfortunes that can strike every-
body and the wide responsibilities of the welfare system. Productive accounts share 
the common feature of drawing the attention to the opposition between the ‘system 
world’ and the ‘life world’. In doing that, they serve to legitimise the failure to com-
ply with the repayment norm since primary groups should be protected from problem-
generating processes located in the ‘system world’; as long as creditors do not step 
down and state institutions waive legal solutions, it is only fair and proper that ‘life
world’ needs are ensured by an alternative moral rule.  
7.4. NON-PRODUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS
Non-productive explanations diverge from the productive ones by not placing the 
causal processes — and hence the responsibility for what happened — in the ‘system 
world’. Instead, the financial problems are seen as resulting from individual choices 
of action. The implication is that as long as ‘system world’ agents cannot be held 
responsible, the defence for not complying with the repayment norm cracks.  
7.4.1. SELF BLAME
The first of the non-productive explanations is ‘self blame’. Such accounts do not 
imply that ‘system world’ processes are entirely overlooked in explaining the financial 
difficulties. But the four defaulters belonging to this category nevertheless share the 
attribute of according the largest portion of the responsibility to their own actions. 
They all admit to have done many “stupid things”, ranging from fatal choices in the 
housing market to equally devastating business decisions. As one of them says: 
“It’s definitely my fault. My fault. I shouldn’t have taken on as many 
assignments as I did, and I should have had a cheaper lifestyle.” [45] 
But sometimes social factors have an even larger impact: 
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“As long as I lived by myself — cheaply, no fooling around with 
women, just working — everything went all right, really .. But I had 
chaotic three years, women everywhere, jumping directly from Lapps to 
immigrants. It’s hard to talk about it. I have screwed it up myself, you 
know.” [28] 
There are several problematic aspects related to this type of explanation. The most 
obvious is perhaps guilt; these are people who have not come to terms with what 
happened and hence continuously struggle with themselves. One of them seems to 
break the pattern by portraying himself as a back-laid and “happy-go-lucky” person. 
But the story he tells is in fact one of hiding, where he does everything he can to 
avoid being confronted with the creditors’ claims. In fact, when the Debt Settlement 
Act was introduced he showed no interest in it until — more than a decade later — 
the option was accidentally proposed to him by an executive who handled his com-
plaints against a recent wage deduction. 
Another problematic aspect of blaming oneself is self-confidence; these are people 
with low self-esteem. One of them makes a joke about his bad luck as he once more 
faces unemployment: 
“It must be me. Maybe it’s contagious. Like if I sit down outside the 
Statoil building and the next thing that happens is that the oil prices 
fall.” [28] 
It is symptomatic that two of these informants — as the only ones in the sample — 
call for paternalistic solutions. They both argue the need for some public institution to 
stop people and companies in time to avoid serious debt problems. One of them is 
rather diffuse about it, except from insisting that the responsibility should not be 
placed at the social security office. The other is more concrete: 
“There’s an obvious need for some kind of control mechanism executed 
by the chief municipal treasurer or the tax authorities; that they can say 
hey, stop, it can’t go on like this no more.” [45] 
The main problem with all this is that blaming oneself is not a productive explanation; 
it may be more or less adequate with respect to what actually happened, but it does 
not necessarily yield much sympathy on social arenas. For these are accounts about 
personal mistakes with severe consequences for all parties involved — including 
inflicting economic losses upon society as a whole whenever taxes are unpaid and 
public support is needed. There is, in other words, no immediate element of justifica-
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tion in the ‘self blame’ account; the debt problems may be causally explained, but 
they do not offer any defence for failing to comply with the repayment norm. An 
option would perhaps be to say sorry and ask for forgiveness; one of the interviews 
may be interpreted as implicitly hinting at that. But none of the four informants make 
such a point explicitly. Instead, they seem to choose one of two solutions. The first is 
resignation: 
“It makes no difference, really. You can’t pay, anyway. There’s nothing 
you can do about it.” [45] 
The second solution is to face the mess and accept a penalty. This is not something 
that is excessively embraced — but it is a way out. As one of them puts it: 
“All right, I’ll do the debt settlement. But they’ll only get what’s written 
in those papers, and no more. As simple as that!” [63] 
The informant has obtained a debt settlement. Having already suffered more than 
fifteen years of debt problems, he basically sees it as a continuation of a difficult life 
situation. But it is more than that; the way he says he shall “do the debt settlement” 
defines it as something close to serving a sentence; i.e. a penalty. He accepts it as a 
way of settling the scores and getting out of the problems, but he also hits back; the 
creditors shall have no more than exactly what is stated in the agreement.    
7.4.2. BAD INTENT AND ROUTINISED INTENT
If it is hard to get wide-spread sympathy for bringing financial problems upon one-
self, it is even harder for default-debtors’ whose good intentions are doubted. The two 
types of accounts where this is an issue differ from one-another in degree of calcula-
tion. Starting out with the ‘bad intent’ category, it primarily refers to processes where 
somebody deliberately accesses goods, property or credit he cannot afford. A 
“milder” variant is when a person changes his attitudes from being willing to being 
unwilling to pay back already acquired debts. Both instances are hard to sympathise 
with — be it from a ‘system world’ or a ‘life world’ perspective. The one informant 
that submits under the ‘bad intent’ category is probably a case of both. For although 
he insists that he always intended to pay back what he acquired through regular con-
sumption loans, credit card abuse and unwarranted cash dispenser withdrawals, he 
admits there have been elements of ulterior motives in acquiring and neglecting the 
debt load he now struggles with: 
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“I wouldn’t say I’m a criminal. But of course, I’m a borderline case .. 
So if you compare me to debt victims in general, there are many who 
deserve a debt settlement more than I do.” [99] 
As opposed to this, the ‘routinised intent’ category does not refer to instances of cal-
culated action. Rather, it designates debt problems that arise from habitualised eco-
nomic behaviour. The one informant in this category does not explain his problems in 
terms of external events such as market downfalls, company bankruptcies or exposure 
to fraudulent behaviour. Neither does he blame bad health or his own choices as eco-
nomic actor. Instead, he traces the problems back to excessive credit card usage under 
varying income flows, in ways suggesting that is an automated, integrated part of 
everyday life; to cover daily and unexpected expenses by cards is simply the way that 
the budget is brought to a successful close. It should be noticed that he has been in a 
similar situation once before and that he solved the problems by selling the house and 
investing the remaining capital in a new home. Now he faces the same kind of cir-
cumstances for a second time — not because of a crisis or a specific budget drain but 
as a result of a well established routine in economic life:  
 “It’s so easy. You just get into some sort of habit .. I don’t know. It’s 
hard to explain, but everything is so easy.” [86]  
None of the two explanations exempt anybody from complying with the repayment 
norm. Besides, even though both defaulters may enjoy social recognition in limited 
social networks, their stories jeopardise the self-image. Following a well-known tech-
nique for neutralising moral offences, both informants argue that they have not hurt 
anybody by their behaviour (Sykes and Matza 1957). As one of them puts it: 
 “I want to say that not many people have suffered from what I have 
done. I didn’t kill anybody or inflict permanent injury upon anyone.” 
[86] 
Also, both are very particular about emphasising that they are righteous persons. 
‘Debts of honour’ are carefully observed. The maxim of impeccable moral conduct in 
primary relationships is also extended to street life behaviour: 
 “If I see some old lady loosing money out of her purse I pick it up and 
run after her. And if I get too much exchange I notify the shop assistant 
immediately. It has happened many times. Otherwise I know she has to 
cover it from her own salary.” [99] 
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Still, to have one’s intentions doubted is hard in the long run. A possible strategy 
would be to say sorry and call for a penalty. But none of them do. Instead, they make 
a point of having changed their lifestyles. One of them have found a job and recently 
obtained a debt settlement. He argues he deserves the second chance: 
“I have changed my attitudes radically, and I have proved that I can do 
a job and keep a job. I have not been sick for four years and I never 
skipped work. I have started to send in the income tax form and taken 
responsibility for my economy. In a way, I think society benefits from 
giving me a debt settlement because now I am a law-abiding wage-
earner that pays bills and taxes.” [99] 
The other informant has cut his credit cards in pieces and applied for a debt settle-
ment. He justifies the move by appealing for forgiveness; no mistakes should be fatal: 
“If it is fair that I get a debt settlement? Yes, I think so. Because every-
one can make a mistake.” [86] 
This is in fact one of the most direct calls for ‘life world’ protection in the data set. On 
the one hand, it invokes forgiveness as a virtue in economic life. On the other hand, it 
encourages anyone who lends it an ear to think about what society would be like if 
mistaken market behaviour was to be fatal. In controversies over normative behav-
iour, the argument is probably quite disarming in many social settings. 
7.4.3. NON-PRODUCTIVE EXPLANATIONS: BRIEF SUMMARY
Unproductive explanations are characterised by a failure to causally place the respon-
sibility for the debt problems on ‘system world’ processes. The remaining six infor-
mants who give such accounts fall into three categories: ‘self blame’, ‘bad intent’ and 
‘routinised intent’. Whereas the former refers to personal mistakes, ranging from fatal 
choices in the housing market to equally devastating decisions in business and per-
sonal affairs, the two latter types of account concern calculated action where one’s 
good intentions are doubted. These stories hardly have any justifying powers since the 
responsibility for what happened remains with the defaulter; for even though they 
may yield sympathy in close social relationships, creating problems for oneself and 
others do not justify normative offences. Therefore, such explanations are hard to live 
with in the long run as they tend to detach the individual from personal as well as 
social dignity. The six informants are instead left with options such as resignation, 
guilt and a need to prove their worth by changing their lifestyles, which over time 
may — or may not — earn them renewed social honour. 
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7.5. FROM CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS TO DISTRUST
The six different types of causal accounts are important for their potentials to justify 
why a given person do not comply with the repayment norm. Indeed, they provide the 
ideological basis for cynically coping with formal debt items at ‘stage three’ when 
economic action is essentially about protecting primary relationships and building up 
new social identities. Causal explanations are also important for one’s self-esteem as 
devices to come to terms with the considerable material and status losses that have 
taken place.
Still, the degree to which an alterative debt quagmire moral is justified varies. Obvi-
ously, non-productive stories have practically no legitimising powers as compared to 
productive accounts where the responsibility is placed in the ‘system world’. But even 
when causal explanations succeed in supporting the quagmire moral it is never in 
terms of a general warranty. Empirically, this is well expressed by the widespread 
shame that many of the informants feel even at ‘stage three’ — in general as well as 
towards specific actors in their social surroundings. It suggests that any justification 
of not paying debts is conditional on the story itself and the arenas on which it is 
contended. This is the difference between a generalised principle such as the repay-
ment norm and the quagmire moral which is not; its legitimacy must instead be ar-
gued whenever and wherever economy becomes an issue.  
The lack of general exemption from the repayment norm has serious implications. 
Obviously, the difficulties to achieve social recognition for living by the quagmire 
moral comes on top of the material deprivation and losses in status that have already 
been inflicted upon them during ‘stage two’. Moreover, the causal accounts aiming at 
delivering valid arguments for market actors and state domain institutions to put an 
end to the difficulties, continue to have little penetrating power — or none at all. As a 
consequence, any coping activity is wrapped up in an ambience of disappointment 
and dismay. This is the source of the considerable cynicism towards ‘system world’
actors that characterises coping behaviour at ‘stage three’. But constantly falling short 
of approval and never obtaining a real breakthrough may also trigger sentiments that 
go beyond cynicism and well into the realms of anger and distrust. 
The data indicate that the prospects for this to happen vary across types of causal 
accounts. For a start, although all four informants who blame ‘bad health’ for their 
financial troubles have gone through dramatic ‘stage two’ processes, three of them are 
well on their way to a better life at ‘stage three’ — i.e. at the time of the interview. 
They make few complaints as they live under debt settlements and have benefited 
from welfare programmes; if they ever developed distrust in institutional actors much 
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of it is now mended. Next, even though their debt problem careers are complicated 
and painful, there are few traces of distrust among the informants from to the ‘self 
blame’ category. Unable as they are to hold others responsible, they have in principle 
nowhere to direct such sentiments. It does not mean that they are not discouraged, 
frustrated and even furious at times. Still, they predominantly seem to confine them-
selves to the cynicism that generally characterise all coping behaviour at ‘stage three’.
The same goes for the informants from the ‘bad intent’ and ‘routinised intent’ catego-
ries. This is not to say that such defaulters are unlikely develop distrust; indeed, dubi-
ous actions may be legitimised by precisely such sentiments. But as far as the two 
interviewed informants are concerned, they have come to a point where a life in the 
borderland of the tolerable is given up to put an end to the debt problems. 
It is the ten informants from the ‘bad luck’ and ‘deception’ categories that are inclined 
to express distrust in ‘system world’ actors. Especially those who feel deceived by 
dishonest and perhaps criminal third-parties are outraged by not being heard in dis-
putes with creditors and public institutions. This is also the case for informants who 
have been exposed to fatal processes by strokes of ‘bad luck’ — even though they 
tend to express their frustrations in more unassertive terms since there are no fraudu-
lent third-parties involved. Common to all of them is that the expressed distrust is 
always directed towards specific others — be it creditors, representatives of welfare 
systems and political bodies. In some cases, the critique is targeted at a generalised 
enemy: the wider institutional order or the “system” as such.  
The interviews generally show that any slide from cynicism to distrust results from 
complex interactions with institutional actors where adjacent sentiments such as pow-
erlessness and resignation are important components. In what follows, the develop-
ment of distrust is described as the end of the line of such processes. Only the ten 
interviews where distrust is a distinguished feature are considered. 
7.5.1. DISTRUST IN CREDITORS
As debt problems basically concern a contract between two parties, processes of dis-
trust naturally start in the default-debtors’ relationships with their creditors. The point 
of departure is that even though most people base their economic careers on a gener-
alised trust in the market institution, any concrete bank or finance house must earn 
their trustworthiness by interacting with their customers; unless they have a reputation 
for delivering the products and the services they are expected to, they are not likely to 
attract customers in the long run. As for debtors who run into debt problems, they 
expect their creditors to instil confidence also in times of hardship and to be ready to 
provide solutions when troubles loom ahead. In fact, reaching out a helping hand 
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when it is most needed is perhaps the most efficient trust-generating service a creditor 
can do — not the least because such deeds have clear parallels in the ‘life world’.
The expectation towards ‘system world’ actors to be forthcoming is of course particu-
larly strong with regards to public bodies and organisations located in the state do-
main. But also market actors such as constructors, estate agents, banks, finance com-
panies and money collectors are expected to show respect and tolerance in case of 
debt problems. However, some simply concludes that accommodating attitudes are far 
between at the opposite side of the negotiating table:  
“I have presented the banks with solutions. But they have never made 
ME an offer. If it had been a question of imprisonment like in the old 
days, and hence a trial, the BANKS would have been in deep shit: 
THEY could have done something, but THEY didn’t. Get lost!” [94] 
The distrusting outburst is the end result of a long process. Whenever the creditors are 
not forthcoming, the first step towards distrust is shock and disappointment. Next 
comes ‘stage two’, and with it the chaos, despair, and combats to fence off the threats 
and prevent financial and social disaster. At ‘stage three’, when the default-debtors 
face a total defeat, bitterness and distrusting accusations come to the surface. Says 
one:  
“The bank forced us to sell the house when the price level was at its 
lowest. If they had allowed us to keep the house, today’s value would 
surely have exceeded my debts and everyone would have been happy. 
Instead, they swept us under the carpet and ruined the whole family.” 
[32] 
There are many ways in which creditors can reach out a helping hand. The just cited 
accusation is for instance about being obliging and giving the defaulter a chance to 
hold on to his socio-economic achievements. Going by this principle implies that the 
risk remains at the creditor side, which under certain conditions — and for a period of 
time — can be defended even from a market perspective. But most creditors will 
sooner or later give it up, in which case a real conflict of interest arises between ‘sys-
tem world’ demands and ‘life world’ needs. Whenever that happens, the full responsi-
bility is given to the defaulter according to the rules of the market. As this easily 
seems highly unfair from a ‘life world’ perspective, another typical accusation and 
expression of distrust is based on an alternative principle of shared risks. Says a for-
mer small-firm manager whose debt problems originate from a bankruptcy: 
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“And the bank had all the information they needed, they checked and 
double-checked. They knew the risks involved. So why can’t they take 
on some responsibility? Why only me?” [23] 
Even though defaulters are given the full responsibility according to the contract, it is 
not a universal norm — not even in the market context. For instance, any joint venture 
between professional businesses may be founded on a principle of shared risks should 
anything go wrong. As a statement forwarded by a bankrupt small-firm manager, the 
above accusation should therefore first and foremost be interpreted in a market con-
text; his creditors simply behaved immorally from a business point of view by ruth-
lessly passing on the buck to the weaker party. This is not to say that the allegation 
lacks roots in the ‘life world’ as well; indeed, tactfulness and sharing are obvious 
virtues in non-professional relationships. The element of distrust expressed by the 
informant may therefore gain widespread sympathy across multiple social arenas. 
The creditors do not only come into discredit because they inflict losses upon the 
defaulters; it is also a matter of the way they do it. Several of our informants report 
about unpleasant meetings with the creditor side, including interrogation-like situa-
tions where they are outnumbered by representatives of the opposing party or chal-
lenged by friendly and unfriendly negotiators in the same room. The most compro-
mising situation is of course when money-collectors call during work-hours or turn up 
at the doorstep — typically during children's TV or later on in the evening when the 
family is likely to be at home. Such events create a feeling of powerlessness and add 
fuel to the development of distrust. According to one of the informants, who had 
money-collectors at the door found the behaviour both inappropriate and aggressive:  
“Hey, when are you going to pay? Look how much you owe us, take a 
look at this paper! They refused to listen to me. That I had a right to 
live was no concern of theirs. That’s the feeling they gave me. It’s very 
bad.” [8] 
As the creditors increasingly appear as enemies and no longer friends, the defaulters 
are driven into a trench. During ‘stage two’ money-collection procedures are frighten-
ing experiences. But at ‘stage three’, the default-debtors knows the rules of the game 
and the extent to which a given creditors poses a real threat. Besides, there is hardly 
anything more to lose. Commenting on being regularly exposed to calls from money-
collection companies, each time using arbitrary representatives who do not know the 
claim’s history, cynicism and anger as well as the seeds of distrust are brought to-
gether in the following statement:  
CHAPTER 7: THE DEBT QUAGMIRE MORAL          203 
“I really cannot be bothered to explain the facts. I’m rude. They have to 
find out themselves. I don’t want to have these money collectors on the 
phone in the evening saying hey, what about the money you owe us? I 
just hang up the phone.” [94] 
The same informant also indicates an underlying sense of powerlessness as he con-
cludes: 
“What’s the point in terrorising people? To the money collection com-
panies it is a question of standardised letters. But they don’t know how 
it affects the recipients because they don’t know their situation.” [94] 
In as much as concrete experiences with specific creditors develop into anger and 
distrust, everything from managing bank accounts down to everyday shopping rou-
tines necessarily change. Habits and practises no longer match the terrain; goods and 
services cannot be accessed as before, bills can no longer be paid according to estab-
lished routines, and financial institutions are no longer vehicles of package pursuits. 
Although a lack of money is enough to bring about such consequences, the element of 
distrust adds a special dimension to it as distrusting people basically operate in hostile 
institutional environments. A good illustration of the consequences it may have is 
when banks are no longer a trusted place and the accounts are emptied on pay to 
avoid having them taken by the creditors. 
7.5.2. DISTRUST IN THE WELFARE SYSTEM
The welfare system — including such domains as health the social security — is a 
cornerstone in the Norwegian institutional setting. Most people, including defaulters, 
expect to get help from public authorities and social statutes in case of a wide range of 
unforeseen misfortunes. In as much as debt problems are concerned, various social 
security schemes and debt settlements are the two most important help services to turn 
to. Unfortunately, there are often gaps between expectations and actual experiences 
— and they may be large. This is not the least true for the social security system. As 
shown already, several informants share negative experiences in the encounters with 
the service. As this may shatter hopes and break illusions about the Norwegian wel-
fare system, it is well suited to nourish distrust — especially if it is a matter of being 
denied life necessities: 
“I went to the social security office to try and get some money, but I’d 
rather not do it again. I could write a book about that service, it’s so 
shocking! .. I fought for six months to make them help paying the elec-
tricity bill. You know, it’s a life necessity, especially during the winter. 
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And to be able to make food and have hot water, hygienic conditions, 
everything — I had all the good arguments on my side. In the end, I had 
to make a complaint to the County Governor and they replied swiftly: of 
course! So I ask myself: why on earth does the local social security try 
to cheat you like that?” [94] 
When parts of the welfare system fail to come up to expectations, a relative compo-
nent may also contribute to a growing distrust. Says a former small-firm manager who 
went to the social security office to get money to cover basic subsistence needs:  
“I felt like being trampled on .. They were parsimonious. I didn’t get 
what I felt I should have, and I knew others who got more than enough. 
I felt unfairly treated.” [5] 
If there is a feeing of being denied the right to subsistence needs, it does not help if 
there is also an impression of others receiving a better treatment. In as much as the 
two factors coincide the inevitable conclusion to be drawn is that not only does the 
social security office fail to deliver a key service, but it also administers public means 
unfairly. In as much as such conclusions get a foothold, distrust looms large.  
As opposed to social security, whose primary functions are to provide emergency aid 
and help to self-help through measures such as rehabilitation and economic counsel-
ling, the debt settlements are permanent solutions to financial problems. As such, they 
should not be an issue in distrust statements. Still, in the previous chapters it is shown 
that some of the informants have negative attitudes towards such regimes. In particu-
lar, opposition may be strong if major elements of one’s package orientation are not 
supported or permitted — as for instance when a businessman prefers a voluntary 
arrangement over a debt settlement for reasons of self-dignity and social reputation. 
But preferences are not enough to trigger distrust; in addition, some assault on one’s 
socio-economic situation must be launched. This is illustrated by two informants who 
wanted a debt settlement but withdrew their applications; one because the court re-
fused to take into consideration that the creditors would profit from allowing him to 
keep his flat instead of demanding a forced sale, and the other because he believed the 
judge was sympathising with the creditor side and systematically misinterpreted the 
Debt Settlement Act to his disadvantage — and loss of property. He probably speaks 
for both of them when saying that: 
“If you have a decent income, don’t apply for a debt settlement. It’s a 
rip-off.” [94] 
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Even though many default-debtors consider debt settlements as a great relief — as for 
instance in the ‘bad health’ category — some informants find it a too bitter pill to 
swallow once the regime is agreed by the parties involved and legally enforced. Says 
a woman: 
 “The debt settlement act is so humiliating and terrible and destructive. 
It is destructive to put people in situations where there is no choice. 
And you don’t know what’s it’s like until you sign in. I know business-
people who went bankrupt, and they would never accept such condi-
tions .. Also, I risk loosing my debt settlement because I misunderstand 
my duties as the authorities put it. They have already threatened to do 
so. I have tried to explain that I can’t pay tax arrears and my twenty-
five creditors at the same time, but they won’t listen. It feels like having 
a fireball at my heels.” [1] 
The anger and distrust expressed in the quotation are rooted in a number of factors. 
The basic dimension is loss of choice — a coveted quality in life and an element in 
her package orientation that has now come to a halt. This is hard to take, and she 
claims it would never be accepted by businesspeople whose value orientations and 
experience would make them back out from the negotiations long before they were 
completed. She also argues that debt settlements do not offer the stability and protec-
tion from creditors as she had thought, and that the enforcement officer has no sympa-
thy for the difficulties she keeps running into when trying to comply with the contrac-
tual obligations. As a result, she feels that she has been more or less tricked into ac-
cepting unacceptable life conditions. As the debt settlement offers no freedom of 
choice, it has turned out to be a penalty rather than an honourable solution, and an 
enforced continuation of the hardships she already has been subjected to for more 
than fifteen years.  
7.5.3. DISTRUST IN THE POLITICAL AND WIDER INSTITUTIONAL ORDER
As is readily seen in most of the quotations so far, distrusting statements are concrete 
and directed towards specified actors in the market and state domains — i.e. towards 
banks and social security offices that the informants have actually dealt with to try 
and solve their problems. But many of the utterances also take the distrust one step 
further as concrete experiences are more or less automatically generalised to the 
whole institutional domains — i.e. from one bank to all creditors or from one social 
office to the welfare system as such. These are spill-over effects that, once triggered, 
seem to have dynamics of their own. But if it is worrying that a given institution may 
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be distrusted based on a singular problematic relationship, it is even more critical if 
the process goes beyond the institution itself into other realms of social life or society 
as a whole. Unfortunately, this seems to be the case for some of the informants. 
Spill-over effects are often triggered by simple chains of events. To illustrate, one of 
the informants struggled to establish a restaurant in a suburban area. Following the 
election, new political constellations in the city council led to a change in the alcohol 
regulations that strongly affected his business. Even though he managed to hang on 
for a while, he was finally made bankrupt. A complicated process followed, involving 
a number of creditors as well as city authorities and the local social security office. 
All of these relations became seriously strained. At one point, distrust in creditors and 
social workers shot ahead into practically any domain of society. First, the political 
system: 
“It is nothing but camaraderie. I hate politicians! The way they waste 
billions while common people — the ant in the system — is treated like 
garbage.” [32] 
Next, as he in vain tried to solve the debt problems by arguing with all involved par-
ties for years, distrust was finally extended to the “system” as a whole:  
“And I’ve been to meetings and meetings and meetings, and there’s 
been loads of waffle, and in the end I simply lost confidence in the 
whole system because I find myself without legal rights.” [32] 
Needless to say, people who see themselves as having no legal rights define their 
situation as one of exclusion. This is the only interview where distrust is explicitly 
generalised to the status of citizenship. However, one of the other informants comes 
close as he sees the termination of debt quagmires as a human right that is not pres-
ently observed in Norway. He wants an amnesty: 
 “There’s something wrong when someone can’t pay the interest rates 
from his salary .. There should be an amnesty in those cases — a simple 
rule giving the creditors automatically a right to a certain percentage 
of your income over a limited period of time, and that’s it. No court de-
cisions needed .. The rules of today are hopeless.” [94] 
The political system is also distrusted for the way that the debt crisis of the late 
1980’ies and early 1990’ies was handled.  In particular, it is referred to the absurdity 
in rescuing the banks from bankruptcies just to enable them to continue their crusade 
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against private — and just as bankrupt — borrowers. No money was ever transferred 
to help individual, innocent defaulters out of the quagmire. In other words, whereas 
the ‘system world’ helped itself by transferring public funds to wounded market 
agents, the ‘life world’ was left unattended. To somebody who has struggled with debt 
problems for more than a decade this is no less than a large-scale robbery and a 
source of true anger:   
“So who is to blame? It’s politics, the deregulation and release of 
credit .. The labour party Minister of Finance who weeded out the 
problems created by the former Right Wing Government in such a way 
that the banks went bankrupt and the government took over all the 
shares. And now they got billions up their asses, right? And the proper-
ties [we lost] are now owned by the banks.” [1] 
At the highest level of abstraction, individual debt problems are related to the way 
society manages its human resources. In particular, it is dysfunctional to deprive peo-
ple from being creative. The spirit of an entrepreneur shines through: 
 “Prosperity is generated by individual initiatives, by somebody start-
ing something .. And even when I fail, I make valuable experiences that 
society could make use of. But instead, I end up with my hands and feet 
tied .. The rules of today break our backs. The society we’d like to serve 
turns us into crooks.” [23]    
The message is clear: debt quagmires are a waste of human resources. Any society 
that evades the duty to implement new and flexible ways of taking better care of its 
human capital, is not worthwhile serving. The informant plans to emigrate to another 
country, simply leaving his debts behind.  
7.6. SUMMARY
As the default-debtors reach ‘stage three’ it is clear that they have become perma-
nently unable to pay their debts. This, however, does not exempt them from comply-
ing with the repayment norm. The fact that they do not manage their financial obliga-
tions must therefore be justified. This chapter has argued that the defence rests upon 
two elements: a distinction between ‘system world’ and ‘life world’ relationships, and 
a causal account of the financial situation. As for the first, the distinction serves to 
define two types of debts; viz. formal credit and debts of honour respectively. The 
analysis shows that the latter type of debt, which is owed to ‘life world’ actors, is 
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carefully managed. But when it comes to the formal credit to ‘system world’ organisa-
tions, a new normative principle is introduced; viz. “Pay what you can whenever you 
can”. This is the ‘debt quagmire moral’, which also is the source of the considerable 
cynicism by which banks, companies, public institutions and other formal creditors 
are treated.  
This turn in normative orientations is controversial — even in ‘life world’ contexts — 
and needs explicit justification. This is largely done by the help of causal explana-
tions. The analysis has identified two broad types of causal accounts; viz. ‘productive’
and ‘unproductive’ stories. The difference between the two is that the former places 
the responsibility for what happened in the ‘system world’ whereas the latter does not 
and instead leaves the default-debtors with the blame. The legitimising powers are 
found in the productive accounts; as long as ‘system world’ actors do not stand up to 
the responsibilities and come up with solutions to the debt problems, the default-
debtors have no other choice than prioritise their own needs and go by the new moral 
principle.  
Just how successful is the justification for not complying with the repayment norm? 
As far as non-productive accounts are concerned, they hardly offer any legitimacy at 
all; even though individual defaulters may have sympathy in limited social settings 
such stories leave them with a normative pressure that generates resignation, guilt and 
a need to prove their worth by changing their lifestyles. In that respect, productive 
accounts provide the default-debtors with a better position. But the problem is that — 
unlike the repayment norm — the new moral principle is not universal. As a conse-
quence, they have to argue their case whenever economy becomes an explicit issue. 
Also, as the ‘system world’ creditors do not act upon the alleged responsibility, these 
defaulters are left in the quagmire just as much as anybody else. This is particularly 
provocative to those who claim that they have been victimised by fraud or system 
level processes. Among these informants, the data suggest that anger and widespread 
distrust in social institutions loom large, and that some of them find themselves 
stripped of even their legal rights.  
8.   CONCLUSION 
8.1. INTRODUCTION
In the last three chapters, an equal number of aspects of coping with debt problems 
have been studied empirically; chapter 5 looked at the various stages in coping behav-
iour, chapter 6 dealt with the impact of resources in such processes, and chapter 7 
explored the normative implications of struggling with persistent debt problems. Now 
the time has come to bring it all together by addressing the fourth and last research 
question forwarded in chapter 2.6: 
To what extent do [the three above mentioned aspects] inform a gener-
alised understanding about how people cope with dept problems? 
The point of departure is the theoretical perspective developed in chapter 3, which is 
based on a division between two institutional domains; viz. the ‘system world’ and the 
‘life world’ — the former referring to market and state institutions and the latter to all 
non-state and non-market interaction networks made up by family members, 
neighbours, friends and work colleagues  (Habermas 2004b [1981] ). Within such a 
framework, coping with debt problems becomes a matter of handling commitments 
from both domains and prioritising between them. The empirical analysis is based on 
twenty qualitative interviews with people who are seriously involved in debt prob-
lems. The sample has been put together by implementing a ‘maximising for range’
principle whereby a broad array of causes and effects known from existing research 
on over-indebtedness and debt problems is covered (chapter 4). The procedure en-
sures that characteristic processes are included in the data as well as it enables a con-
trolled selection of informants with theoretically desirable characteristics.  
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Conclusions from the analyses are developed in four steps. Firstly, a generalised ac-
count of coping behaviour is offered in section 8.2. Next, the degree to which the 
empirical analysis supports the generalised description is assessed in section 8.3. 
Thirdly, in 8.4 conclusions are drawn by relating the analytical results to current re-
search. Fourth and final, some implications for policy making and practise are drawn 
in section 8.5.  
8.2. TOWARDS A THEORY ON COPING WITH DEBT PROBLEMS; A GENERAL-
ISED ACCOUNT
A common definition of disposable income is income plus subsidies minus taxes, 
rates and dues. The formula defines what is left for economic actors to consume and 
develop a lifestyle and social identity. This “surplus” can be further divided into two 
parts: fixed and variable expenses. The scheme reflects two important normative 
principles. Firstly, social orientations in economic life are implicitly defined as resting 
upon a notion of nimiety; one cannot spend more than one’s disposable income. Sec-
ondly, a general rank-order of bills follows. As fixed expenses are contractual com-
mitments and variable expenses are not, the former come into prominence — only 
second to taxes and certain highly prioritised responsibilities such as child mainte-
nance (chapter 1.3.2). This rank-order is also reflected — and further nuanced — in 
the legal system (Rokhaug 2004: 390-394). As a consequence, defaulters are expected 
to immediately reduce the variable expenses in order to pay higher-ranked bills. In 
addition, they are in the longer term required to renegotiate — and if possible: close 
— contractual commitments to improve the capability of paying outstanding claims. 
However rational, the defaulters do not always comply with the expectations; indeed, 
chapter 1 and again chapter 3 made the discrepancy between expected and actual 
behaviour the analytical challenge and point of departure for the study. 
A generalised account on coping behaviour rests on the view that social orientations 
cannot be residualised as in the just mentioned formula; quite the contrary, they are 
among the founding guidelines in economic action. In as much as that is the case, it 
follows that the way people think about and use economic resources is socially con-
strained. To account for these influences a concept about ‘standard packages’ is use-
ful. In its most tangible form it refers to lists of items — ‘packages’ — that covers the 
households’ needs in a broad sense, including goods and services that allow for sym-
bolic differentiation with respect to gender, age, roles and social affiliations (Parsons 
and Smelser 1984 [1956]; Roseborough 1960). This stratifying feature turns standard 
packages into more than mere lists; indeed, as prestige symbolisation is a major ob-
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jective in any consumption unit’s economic dispositions, complying with a given 
standard is decisive for achieving and maintaining social statuses. Moreover, even 
though it makes sense to speak about national packages as referring to the typical 
standard within given country settings (Riesman and Roseborough 1966  [1955]), the 
variation around such common multiples is vast. This calls for a more complex cul-
tural conception whereby the existence of a wide range of class- and status-specific 
packages is recognised. From such a perspective, economic action appears as a 
learned social skill based on sub-cultural, normative codes for appropriate use of 
disposable resources. Standard packages are, in other words, normative recipes for 
transforming economic resources into social status. 
Whereas such transitions may appear as “business as usual” whenever the expendi-
tures are reasonably well balanced against the incomes, standard packages represent 
very problematic sets of constraints in debt problem situations. For a start, they do not 
go away; they still signify forceful social divisions and as such appear as more or less 
coveted — and preferred — objectives for economic action. Also, they continue to 
constitute the body of knowledge by which financial difficulties are to be combated; 
indeed, one’s social belonging and identity largely hinge on continued compliance 
with the standards of one’s status layer. In addition, the presence of debt problems 
does not exempt the defaulters from ordinary, everyday commitments; they are still 
part of the same household, linked to the same social networks and expected to par-
ticipate in the same activities as before — not only as economic actors but also in the 
capacity of responsible role-persons; e.g. as partners, parents, sons, daughters, friends, 
colleagues, neighbours and citizens. Put boldly, the only change that initially takes 
place in the defaulters’ lives is that they can no longer afford the package they have 
pursued and become accustomed to — and by which they are known in their social 
environments. 
It follows that enduring debt problems not only threaten the defaulters’ economic 
achievements but also their social existence. For in as much as there are insufficient 
means to consume and develop lifestyles and social identities, the inevitable conse-
quence is that the defaulters must reorient towards cheaper standard packages. This in 
turn, implies a loss of status and hence mobility down the social ladder — in some 
cases to the extent that even traditional class divisions are trespassed. The disposable 
income formula as a point of departure for understanding coping behaviour falls short 
of recognising this dramatic aspect of debt quagmires. The standard package ap-
proach, on the other hand, clearly suggests that economic resources cannot simply be 
reallocated from consumption to unpaid contractual commitments without further 
ado; the social costs may be too high.  
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As shown by the analysis in chapter 5, coping with debt problems evolves in three 
stages. During the initial ‘stage one’ (chapter 5.3), the financial problems typically 
build up without being recognised as a serious threat. This does not mean that the 
accumulation of unpaid bills goes on unnoticed. Rather, it implies that ‘stage one’ is 
characterised by a certain risk perception; viz. that the problems can be handled 
within the leeway that any package offers with respect to alternative uses of re-
sources. Hence, under the ethos of keeping calm modest adjustments are made to 
preserve ‘status quo’. On the one hand, certain economic steps such as saving in on 
consumption and increasing the incomes through overtime and extra jobs are carried 
out. It is significant that more dramatic steps like using savings or asking family and 
friends for help to pay down loans are typically not implemented. On the other hand, a 
number of socially oriented strategies are used. One of them is the ‘ostrich approach’
whereby well-known routines are followed to uphold social images and simply hop-
ing that the problems will be sorted out. Another, related strategy is the ‘card-is-
played-logic’ whereby status positions — against any rational economic argument — 
are defended by borrowing more money to protect property and previous investments. 
‘Stage one’ is of course a decisive crossroads as the consequences of carrying on as 
before are bound to be devastating now as the economic foundation withers away. 
The alternative, however, is to change lifestyles and embark on downward social 
mobility. It is important to underline that the defaulters are not actually faced with the 
choice; even though they retrospectively may realise that they should have acted oth-
erwise, reliance on proven, institutionalised routines is a next-to innate human quality. 
In this sense, the largely pre-reflective practises associated with package pursuits 
make blind to the dangers ahead, and carrying on as before becomes a major route 
into the debt quagmire. 
If package pursuits make blind, the events that make the defaulters finally realising 
the full range of the threat are true eye-openers. This launches ‘stage two’ in coping 
behaviour which is characterised by a redefinition of the risks involved; from now on 
it is no longer a question of within-package adjustments but a matter of possible tran-
sitions from one package to another. The new situation challenges the defaulters with 
the unknown: economic losses, and with it restricted social participation, unattractive 
lifestyles and lower-status positions loom large. It also introduces a shift in normative 
constraints. Under normal conditions and even ‘stage one’ package orientations pre-
scribe ‘status quo’ or, alternatively, advancements in the status system. Downfalls, 
however, are precluded. Faced with the prospects of losing one’s social foothold at 
‘stage two’, package constraints now translate into an aversion against downward 
mobility. In that sense, package orientations continue to make blind; as the defaulters 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION          213 
now more or less actively resist taking any steps down the social ladder, economic 
sustainable alternatives tend to be overlooked or discarded altogether as being without 
current interest. In that sense, coping behaviour at ‘stage two’ tends to appear irra-
tional to creditors and others in the defaulters’ immediate social environments. 
As demonstrated in chapter 5.4, the defence for current socio-economic achievements 
are staged by implementing a wide range of economic as well as socially embedded 
coping strategies. As for the former, variable expenses are now cut to the bone. Con-
tractual debts are approached through measures such as refinancing and repayments 
using gains from sales of property, savings and even contributions from friends and 
relatives. Whenever possible, ways are found to increase incomes. But it is the so-
cially embedded strategies that signify the aversion against downward mobility the 
most. On the one hand, there is a continuation of habits that at this stage is obviously 
unaffordable including expensive house rents and use of credit if possible. On the 
other, avoiding social stigmatisation becomes increasingly important — varying from 
temporarily hiding away from creditors, friends and relatives to physically running 
away from it all by becoming a nomad in the periphery of society or moving  to a new 
geographical area or even abroad. Moreover, ‘stage two’ is also marked by a number 
of powerful life events, such as relationship breakdowns, job losses and deteriorating 
health. As the financial situation aggravates beyond the point of no return, key status 
signifiers such as job positions, housing and consumption patterns wither away. The 
end result is a fundamental change in the defaulters’ social reputation. 
When next-to everything is lost and the status downfall is a social fact, coping behav-
iour passes into its third stage. Again, the transition is marked by a significant change 
of risk perceptions; this time from prospects of considerable losses to a low-risk situa-
tion. As the defaulters reluctantly find themselves deprived of previously achieved 
status positions, they have little more to lose. In addition, they have become experts of 
their own cases; they know the extent to which the creditor side and the court system 
represent any further threat to their current situation. Coping behaviour at ‘stage 
three’ therefore aims at consolidating new status positions and coming to terms with 
the new and less attractive packages that have been inflicted upon them.  
The reorientation in package pursuits introduces fundamentally new sets of normative 
constraints. In particular, a sharp division between ‘system world’ and ‘life world’
relationships now dominates the defaulters’ coping behaviour. As for the former, 
contractual commitments to creditors in the market and state domains are neglected 
since such claims no longer have direct impacts; indeed, the defaulters cynically make 
themselves available and cooperative only in as much as they find it useful to the 
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shaping of their new social lives. Hence, they may still engage in negotiations but 
only if the creditors are willing to compromise. Similarly, they do not see any point in 
increasing the incomes and reducing the expenses unless it serves their own social 
ends (chapter 5.5). ‘Life world’ relationships, on the other hand, are highly prioritised. 
For instance, whereas debts to banks, firms and public creditors are largely neglected, 
money borrowed from friends and relatives are seen as ‘debts of honour’ and care-
fully maintained (chapter 7.2). Also, children’s demands and even personal needs 
such as holidays and evenings out are carefully observed at the expense of contractual 
commitments (chapter 5.5). Yet another key coping strategy is to apply for a debt 
settlement, which is attractive in as much as it secures their new social positions. 
Even though ‘stage three’ seems to bring about a certain leeway for creativity and a 
new start, there is every reason to underline that substantial shifts in standard package 
orientations and lifestyles have in fact taken place. The analysis in chapter 6 suggests 
that the nature and magnitude of the social downfalls largely depend on the resource 
situation at the time when the financial problems start to build up. On the one hand, 
assets such as property, job positions, education and social networks are utilised to 
significantly delimit the downward slide. On the other hand, higher-status and re-
sourceful defaulters typically have more to lose. But in any case, ‘stage three’ posi-
tions are qualitatively unique as they represent de facto downward slides into new and 
unwanted packages. Since original expectations from significant ‘life world’ others 
can no longer be met, the status loss is a daily issue associated with suffering, frustra-
tions, shame, stigma and reduced social participation — and more so the farther away 
the new ‘stage three’ package is from the packages of origin. Such gaps also represent 
a challenge for significant others from the pre-problem period as they now have to 
relate to new social identities. The obstacles and embarrassments involved in such 
processes tend to leave the defaulters deprived of many of the relationships they for-
merly enjoyed. The fellowship brought about by sharing the same abilities, aspirations 
and goals in economic life — the same ‘package’ — is no longer there. 
8.3. ASSESSING THE EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
The generalised account on coping behaviour is of course developed in a dialogue 
with the data. Still, the following sections offer assessments about the degree to which 
the twenty interviews support four major propositions coming out of the study; viz. 
that coping with debt problems evolve in stages, that the conduct is based on social 
orientations, that the nature and magnitude of the social downfalls vary across re-
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source situations, and that package orientations lead to counter-productive behaviour 
from an economic point of view. The propositions are addressed in turn. 
8.3.1. THE TIME LINE
The first element in the generalised account to consider is time line. More specifi-
cally, the proposition is that coping behaviour develops in three stages in step with the 
increasingly aggravated debt problem situation. As was shown in detail in chapter 5, 
most of the informants were able to date the event that made them realise that they 
were in serious economic trouble, and a corresponding event when they had to face 
the fact that they had lost the battle and most of what they had achieved in their eco-
nomic careers. This, in turn, formed the basis of defining a time line made up by three 
stages in coping behaviour; the initial stage one, the defending stage two and the 
reorienting stage three. These phases constitute the basic structure in the analysis of 
coping behaviour; the defaulters’ strategies qualitatively change as the objectives and 
impact of the conduct change in step with the escalation of the problems.  
At least two features of the data weaken the proposed timeline. Firstly, the sample is 
selective in the sense that the informants recruited for the analysis have volunteered to 
participate and are characterised by the fact that they have actually ended up in the 
debt quagmire. Secondly, the number of informants is small. Taken together, the 
timeline could in principle be both different and more complex — partly because the 
analysis does not account for all of those who escaped the quagmire by implementing 
different strategies than the ones used by the informants, and partly because the range 
of strategies is significantly wider than covered by the twenty interviews.  
Relevant as these objections may be, they do not violate the existence of a timeline as 
such. More particularly, they do not undermine the presence of a three-stage course 
among defaulters in contexts similar to those covered by the informants in the sample. 
Hence, as an analytical generalisation the proposition about a three-stage timeline 
should be considered as thoroughly supported by the data. It is reassuring that sixteen 
different persons who are not acquainted with one-another and have very different 
backgrounds and causal histories display the same general coping pattern. It is also 
reassuring that the remaining four informants diverge from it in ways that supports 
rather than undermines the model; either by being exposed to a powerful life event 
that throws them directly into stage two or by bad intent taking them directly to stage 
three. Moreover, the timeline is supported by the fact that the informants come from 
different layers of society and hence base their coping behaviour on different resource 
situations. In addition, the notion of stages has been externally validated by presenting 
it to various professional milieus including money collectors, lawyers and social 
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workers. The timeline identified for coping behaviour also resembles those found in 
corroborating studies of unemployment. 
8.3.2. SOCIAL ORIENTATION
The second aspect to consider is the assertion that coping behaviour is predominantly 
— yet not solely — based on social considerations. The alternative proposition is of 
course that defaulters primarily defend economic achievements. Firms, private prop-
erty and other investments are no doubt important. However, it is a major argument in 
this study that economic achievements are part of wider social projects, and that status 
concerns are fundamental to economic action — also in times of financial troubles.  
As shown throughout the empirical analyses in chapters 5 through 7, the proposition 
about a basic social orientation in coping behaviour is supported by the data. For a 
start, all twenty interviews are marked by an extensive focus on the social conse-
quences of being in severe economic difficulties. Also, at all stages of the debt prob-
lem career strategies grounded in social concerns seem to dominate the courses of 
event. Again, it is noteworthy that this pattern is observed across social divisions; 
throughout the debt problem career twenty informants with very different back-
grounds and resource situations all implement a multitude of strategies that are in-
tended to safeguard social ends such as children’s needs, lifestyle essentials and 
cover-ups to avoid stigmas and shameful situations. At ‘stage three’ the social aspect 
of coping behaviour dominates completely as the defaulters’ scarce economic means 
are almost exclusively used to cover ‘life world’ needs at the expense of most con-
tractual commitments. Even calls for debt cancellation and vindication are distinc-
tively grounded in social arguments. 
There are several critical points that may weaken the proposition coping behaviour is 
primarily about resisting status losses. One of them is that the sample is made up by 
informants that happen to be more concerned about their social reputation than others 
— which even could be the reason why they find themselves in debt quagmires. Al-
though the argument is a warning about the extent to which the finding may be gener-
alised to wider categories of defaulters, it does not undermine the analytical proposi-
tion as such; that people in contexts similar to those covered by the informants pre-
dominantly go by strategies that are embedded in social concerns. A more worrying 
objection, perhaps, concerns the relative impact of the wide range of strategies that 
are actually in use. Indeed, rational economic conduct may in principle be just as 
decisive for the courses of events as are the socially embedded strategies — at least in 
some phases of the debt problem career. Still, the proposition about a distinctive and 
decisive social orientation in coping behaviour is not necessarily violated even by that 
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objection. The point of departure for the study was the simple observation that de-
faulters do not always act according to an economic rationality. As failing to do so 
undoubtedly impact the courses of events, the absence of such strategies must also be 
explained. Faced with that challenge, the proposition about a social orientation in 
economic life is a plausible candidate. 
In conclusion, the analytical generalisation about a strong social orientation in coping 
behaviour should be considered to be reasonably well supported by the data. Still, a 
clarification of the impact of different types of coping strategies could be a topic for 
further research.  
8.3.3. THE IMPACT OF RESOURCES
In as much as coping behaviour is about avoiding status losses, resources are an im-
portant aspect of such conduct. On the one hand, any status situation represents an 
accumulation of assets in a broad sense. Also, in order to achieve and sustain statuses 
over time, the command and use of economic as well as socio-cultural resources is a 
prerequisite. Since serious debt problems arise in different layers of society, it follows 
that different achievements are at stake, and that different resources are called upon to 
defend them. Therefore, it is likely that coping behaviour varies considerably across 
defaulters with different social backgrounds and that the unequal distribution of re-
sources largely accounts for that variation. 
As accounted for in chapter 6, the proposition that resources are key elements in cop-
ing behaviour is strongly supported by the data. As the debt problems strike, infor-
mants with different class backgrounds possess different assets, which in turn define 
what is at stake and the costs associated with hanging on to given statuses. Also, ac-
cess to and command over resources lead to different courses in coping behaviour. 
For instance, property and other material assets such as incomes and savings clearly 
impact the way status positions are defended. The same goes for personal attributes 
such as education and marketable skills. In addition, social networks are important; 
access to other people’s resources provides a potential for a series of opportunities — 
including economic support, employment, holidays and exchange of goods and ser-
vices. It is also important to notice that the eye for strengthening certain aspects of the 
resource situation seems to vary across social divisions. In particular, whereas addi-
tional education is a strategy that is readily pursued by several informants with middle 
and upper class backgrounds, working class defaulters typically do not see this as an 
option.  
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It follows that resource inequality leads to different end results at ‘stage three’ of the 
debt problem career. Hence, whereas all twenty informants suffer very real and severe 
material and social deprivation, the magnitude and nature of the downfalls still vary 
considerably across social divisions. The overall impression is that the transition from 
‘stage one’ to ‘stage three’ is least dramatic among the informants with working class 
backgrounds; they largely retain more or less the same type of positions in the occu-
pational structure, they continue to live in the same kinds of neighbourhoods and they 
typically manage to keep a core of their lifestyles and social networks intact. Also, 
only a few of them feel a need to actively hide the financial problems from the social 
surroundings. This is in line with previous studies where working class people with-
out debt problems express more accommodating attitudes towards defaulters than do 
others (Tufte 2005: 235-265). Informants with middle and upper class backgrounds, 
however, are a different story as they normally face substantial status losses with 
respect to housing, lifestyles and sometimes employment conditions. Many of them 
have also lost significant parts of their previous social networks. Faced with these 
changes, nearly all of them make a point of hiding the truth about the economic situa-
tion from others. But the most dramatic instances of downward mobility are found 
among the working class climbers who had achieved middle class positions at the 
time when the debt problems started. With one exception, they all find themselves 
back into their class of origin at ‘stage three’. In line with classic sociologic theory on 
social mobility, the rollercoaster pattern illustrates the importance of resources; up-
wardly mobile persons may simply fall short of building up the resources needed to 
sustain new class positions (Keller and Zavalloni 1964). 
As an analytical generalisation based on twenty interviews the proposition about the 
impact of resources is rather trivial and well supported by the data. The critical ele-
ment lies instead in the fact that the sample is small and unable to account for the vast 
amount of variation that should have been considered in order to be conclusive about 
class- and status-specific coping behaviour. Indeed, as there is only one observation 
per status position the possibility to develop relevant categories of resource situations 
is limited. Even though the data has been theoretically systematised to distinguish 
between informants holding different positions in the Norwegian occupational sys-
tem, each of them still largely appears as unique cases of socio-economic deprivation. 
However, as the fragmented character of the data set does not provide an extensive 
basis for a class- and status analysis, the insights produced by the study are probably 
good enough as starting points for developing such research in the future.  
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8.3.4. INSTITUTIONALISATION OF PRACTISES; COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE ACTION
The fourth aspect to consider is the assertion that package orientations lead to 
counter-productive behaviour from an economic point of view. The proposition is 
based on the general human need to institutionalise practises in most realms of social 
life (Berger and Luckman 1984). From this perspective, the ‘standard package’ con-
ception refers to normative constraints that largely result in routinised practises de-
signed to develop and sustain socially acclaimed economic careers and lifestyles. Like 
most routines, economic practises reflect learned skills and largely fall into the cate-
gory of pre-reflective action (Østerberg 1980). Habitualised actions are rational as 
long as the structural and socio-economic conditions are stable. Once destabilised, 
however, existing routines are easily rendered counter-productive with respect to the 
goals they are designed to safeguard. In that sense, practises appear as being saddled 
with an inertial force; it takes time to realise that habits and routines must be changed.  
More specifically, the proposition is based on the idea that there are two types of 
goals involved in economic action — viz. economic achievements and the social 
prestige associated with them — and that the latter has  precedence over the former. 
Under normal, stable conditions economic practises typically hit both birds with one 
stone. Under debt problems, however, this is not the case anymore as the routinely 
pursued standard packages are no longer affordable. Faced with the gap between 
economic capability and social needs the proposition asserts that defaulters prioritise 
the latter. 
As demonstrated throughout the empirical analysis, these ideas are supported by the 
data in several ways. For a start, the informants generally rely on the skills, routines 
and habits that have been part of their repertoire of economic actions long before the 
financial difficulties started to build up. The interviews also show that the coping 
strategies are grounded in economic as well as social orientations, and that the latter is 
given supremacy over the former; first by falling back on known routines and prac-
tises to sustain achieved statuses through minor adjustments during ‘stage one’, then 
by actively defending their social positions with all resources at their disposal during 
‘stage two’, and finally by establishing new economic practises that safeguard new 
package orientations at the expense of the accumulated debts during ‘stage three’.
Unlike the routinised behaviour under stable conditions, social downfalls tend to 
bring influential norms and values to the front. Among these are the already noticed 
aversion against downward mobility and the corresponding desire to sustain ‘status 
quo’ in package pursuits. The interviews show that these beacon lights often result in 
priorities, actions and absence of actions that are costly in economic terms. But the 
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social costs of acting otherwise could be even higher. Although any status situation 
offers leeway for adjustments and alternative uses of assets under crises, rational 
economic concerns should not be taken to the point that a shift of package orienta-
tions is inevitable. Hence, many of the informants do not even consider alternative 
and more sustainable lifestyles as an option, and most of them simply resist the pros-
pects of downward mobility by implementing strategies that presuppose a continua-
tion of achieved lifestyles and ownerships — now and in the future. These endeavours 
are also marked by a strong emphasis on ‘life world’ relationships; in step with the 
escalation of the difficulties, the perceived needs of the household and immediate 
social surroundings are systematically prioritised over creditor claims all through the 
debt problem career. 
As an analytical generalisation, the proposition about counter-productive economic 
behaviour is well supported by the data. Still, several objections may be forwarded. 
One is that, even though nobody would deny the presence of normative constraints in 
economic action, the anticipated sharp barriers between qualitatively different pack-
age orientations as causing unproductive economic behaviour may be an unwarranted 
interpretation of the data. Indeed, it could be the other way around; given a set of 
powerful life events that completely overturn the economy, socially grounded actions 
may be the only option left for the defaulters to go by. This, of course, not only turns 
counter-productive economic behaviour into an effect rather than a cause of increas-
ing deficits, but also defines social orientations as activities that are largely discon-
nected from economic life as such. Even though the latter hardly finds broad support 
in the data, the social orientation in coping behaviour is more distinct at the later 
stages of the debt problem career than in the earlier phases. More detailed data would 
therefore be welcomed as it allows for more precise reconstructions of the courses of 
events and hence contributes to a further clarification of the mechanisms at work. 
A second objection is that nobody can “see” their package and explicitly tell us about 
it; hence the ‘standard package’ concept may be a theoretical construction that ob-
scures rather than illuminates the mechanisms that actually trigger coping behaviour. 
Even though better models may be developed in the future, the value of any concept 
rests on its ability to make sense of the data. The ‘standard package’ heuristic has 
drawn the attention to certain patterns of social orientation in coping behaviour. How-
ever, the model should be tried out in other areas of economic action in order to fur-
ther explore the usefulness of the concept. Such research would also retrospectively 
contribute to the validation of this study.  
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8.4. ADVANCES IN THE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT COPING WITH DEBT PROBLEMS
Besides evaluating the empirical support, the generalised account should also be as-
sessed with respect to existing works in the field; in what ways — if any — does it 
enhance the current knowledge about coping behaviour? As noticed in chapter two, 
both causes and effects of over-indebtedness and debt problems are accounted for 
theoretically as well as in numerous empirical studies. But when it comes to coping 
behaviour the contributions are fewer. Also, they normally treat the phenomenon as a 
consequence of the same processes that cause the economic difficulties. In as much as 
that is the case, there is hardly any need for specific theories about the phenomenon. 
Instead, coping strategies are typically recorded as add-ons in wider analyses of the 
causes and effects of non-payments (chapter 2.5).  
A major argument in this study is that coping behaviour is more than that. Rather, it 
refers to how people who are exposed to unfortunate chains of events actively respond 
to them, learn from them and recognise them as premises for future action. As a con-
sequence, coping behaviour must be analysed within the frameworks of a theory of 
action. Combining conceptions about institutional constraints in economic life with 
insights from existing research on over-indebtedness and debt problems, a theoretical 
understanding of how defaulters’ deal with their problems has been offered.  
This, in turn, has resulted in particularly two advances in the knowledge about coping 
behaviour. Firstly, it has been shown that such processes typically take place in three 
stages. Corresponding patterns have been identified in early studies of unemployment 
(Jahoda and Lazarsfeld 2002 [1933] ). Still, since unemployed persons handle their 
problems under different institutional conditions than do defaulters, coping behaviour 
is not identical in the two groups. Also, as demonstrated throughout the analysis, 
dealing with debt problems is submitted to forceful social constraints. Again, this is in 
line with certain studies of downward mobility (e.g. Newman 1989). Still, the notion 
of standard package orientations in economic life has shed new light on how social 
commitments specifically impact coping behaviour among defaulters. 
Secondly, the study has enhanced the knowledge about coping behaviour by estab-
lishing ‘stage three’ not only as part of a cohesive process, but also as qualitatively 
different from ‘stage one’ and ‘stage two’. As opposed to the earlier phases, the third 
stage is marked by the irreversible fact that substantial downfalls in social status have 
taken place — sometimes to the extent that class boundaries are crossed. This intro-
duces a fundamental change in coping behaviour; whereas the defaulters are basically 
accommodating towards the creditor side during ‘stage one’ and ‘two’ and try to bring 
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the economy back on track, this is no longer a point at ‘stage three’ since they now 
have lost next-to everything and de facto become permanently unable to repay their 
debts. Faced with the universal validity of the repayment norm they have no choice 
but to replace it with the alternative principle ‘pay what you can whenever you can’.
A major implication for coping behaviour is to exercise considerable cynicism to-
wards banks, firms, public authorities and other ‘system world’ creditors, and instead 
give ‘life world’ commitments priority over most contractual obligations. As a conse-
quence, people who previously appeared both willing and able to pay now seem to 
hold neither of the qualities; indeed, living by the new moral principle leaves the debt 
loads to accumulate for eternity — unless by luck or some formalised agreement. 
Another implication is that whenever non-payment becomes an issue the debt quag-
mire moral must be defended in social contexts in order to restore the defaulters’ 
personal dignity. This is largely done by reference to one of two types of causal ex-
planations; either ‘productive’ stories that blame the ‘system world’ for what hap-
pened, or ‘unproductive’ accounts that leave the individual defaulter with the respon-
sibility. The former type of explanation establishes social downfalls as highly unfair, 
which in turn serves to legitimise the new moral rule. But as ‘system world’ actors do 
not respond by actually putting an end to the alleged injustice, these defaulters find 
themselves left in the quagmire just as much as anybody else. Therefore, they typi-
cally grow bitter and angry, and eventually lose trust in major social institutions and 
even society as a whole. ‘Unproductive’ accounts, on the other hand, hardly offer any 
legitimacy for the debt quagmire moral at all. Even though these defaulters may gain 
sympathy in limed social circles, the result is resignation, strong feelings of guilt and 
coping patterns marked by social withdrawal and exclusion.  
Either way, ‘stage three’ is a highly undesirable situation — a deadlock for individual 
defaulters as well as for creditors and society as a whole. This is not only when the 
most severe levels of socio-economic deprivation occur, it is also the stage in which 
the defaulters become extremely difficult to deal with. From now on, even though 
only one or two of the twenty informants have deliberately acted with bad intent, all 
of them behave in ways that to outsiders may seem both immoral and careless; debts 
are not paid, social needs are prioritised over debt commitments and third-parties are 
blamed for the situation. A similar pattern was also noticed by Caplovitz’; even 
though only five percent of the cases in his material could be classified as irresponsi-
ble conduct, he found it highly misleading that this was the kind of conduct that 
tended to be generalised as the creditors’ prototype of a defaulter (Caplovitz 1974: 
54). At this point, the notion of a ‘stage three’ is a step forward as it systematically 
establishes undesirable coping behaviour as part of comprehensive, long-term proc-
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esses where the motives change in step with shifting institutional conditions. As a 
consequence, the moral issue must be framed within a contextual perspective and 
approached as a matter of different morals rather than immorality. Even though any 
alternative to the repayment norm is unacceptable from a societal point of view, this 
contributes to a better understanding of long-term defaulters and help identifying the 
ways forward. 
8.5. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTISE
The consequences of ending up in ‘stage three’ quagmires are severe. First of all, the 
data document dramatic effects on the individual level, including economic losses and 
deprivation, job insecurity, marital problems, impaired health and loss of social net-
works. The time aspect must also be mentioned; debt quagmires easily claim ten years 
or more of the defaulters’ lifetime. Secondly, the analysis suggests that there are dis-
cernible, unfortunate effects at the macro level. These include costly help programmes 
and health services, court expenses and substantial, aggregated economic losses. Also, 
the fact that defaulters no longer are able to fully participate in society as consumers, 
employees and holders of other roles is unproductive from an economic point of view 
and a waste of human resources in a broad sense. The political costs associated with 
debt quagmires should not be neglected, either; as defaulters may eventually lose trust 
in the institutional order it is politically hazardous for any society to develop wide-
spread financial problems.  
The message to creditors, money collectors, legislators, political authorities and prac-
titioners in the social services and elsewhere is therefore a clear warning against 
‘stage three’ and a call for systems that may help preventing people from ending up in 
such circumstances. It falls well beyond the scope of the study to draw up concrete 
propositions. However, a general comment on the responsibilities that ‘system world’
actors have to facilitate problem-solving processes is in place.  
Besides general steps such as regulating people’s access to credit and teaching econ-
omy in school, preventing defaulters from entering into ‘stage three’ is much about 
the institutionalisation of the debt recovery routines. Indeed, following Reifner 
(2000b) existing regulations may in fact contribute significantly to the development of 
aggravated debt situations. As pointed out in chapter one, the current system equili-
brates several principles. On the one hand, there is a need for maintaining the general 
payment moral and the corresponding right for all creditors to have their claims cov-
ered. Public authorities support these principles through legislation and by placing the 
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enforcement apparatus at the creditors’ disposal in cases of default. On the other hand, 
the debt recovery regime also aims at safeguarding the defaulters’ rights to a decent 
life and protection against excessive collection practises. This includes restrictions on 
the methods in use and the extent to which the defaulters’ possessions and incomes 
can be accessed. It also involves the institutionalisation of certain positive remedies, 
such as a free-of-charge economic counselling service in the municipalities and a 
wide range of public assistance programmes that may be called upon to help estab-
lishing renegotiated repayment plans. However, none of these elements explicitly 
address the need to preventing ‘stage three’ situations from developing.  
Such a challenge calls for establishing as many bridges between the ‘life world’ and
the ‘system world’ as possible. This is particularly due to three main characteristics of 
debt recovery practises. Firstly, they are founded on a real conflict of interests be-
tween ‘system world’ principles and ‘life world’ concerns, both of which has been 
demonstrated to be embedded in very different types of economic orientations. Sec-
ondly, the practises are indifferent to the totality of the defaulters’ life situation. This 
is probably how it should and must be; ‘life world’ conditions are too complex to 
imagine a highly differentiated system based on case-by-case tailored collection rou-
tines. The implication is, however, that the enforced routines have unlike effects 
across life situations and the three stages of the debt problem career. This is a critical 
point indeed as there is a direct causal relationship between instances of money col-
lection and the escalation of financial problems. Last, but not least, debt recovery 
practises focus on isolated bills and not total debt portfolios. Again, this is a critical 
point as the chances for avoiding debt quagmires depend on bringing the whole of the 
household’s expenses and incomes in balance.  
The most important instrument whereby these differences can be bridged is a profes-
sional, independent and free-of-charge debt counselling service where the total eco-
nomic situation is taken into account. Also, counsellors typically have a chance to see 
the debt problems as part of the defaulters’ life situation as a whole and connect them 
to other social services if necessary. But in spite of such links and potentials for bridg-
ing ‘system world’ claims and ‘life world’ conditions, there are few channels that 
actively recruit ‘stage one’ and ‘stage two’ defaulters to the service; largely, they 
must find their way to the helpdesk by themselves. As a result, many of them may 
never turn up, or ask for help too late. One of the most promising aspects to consider 
is therefore how to expand the contacting surface. This can probably be done in a 
number of ways. But a simple — and yet challenging — option is that creditors and 
money collection companies develop routines for systematically identifying repeated 
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cases of default and recommend them to contact an independent debt counselling 
service to get a full evaluation of their economic standing.  
Developing a prevention system in this direction depends on awareness of the differ-
ent responsibilities involved. A good illustration is the tipple role of the state domain 
agency; as regulator, creditor and protector of civic society institutions against de-
structive market forces. These sometimes contradictory responsibilities are generally 
safeguarded by assigning different organisations for each task. It is important for all 
parties that such roles are distinct and kept apart. As for debt problems, public credi-
tors should therefore not develop ambitions to solve both their own problems — i.e. 
lack of payments — and those of the defaulters. Instead, they should establish a for-
mal routine whereby repeated cases of default are not simply subjected to increasingly 
punitive debt recovery routines, but also systematically encouraged on a voluntary 
basis to contact the economic counselling service in their area. The same goes for 
private creditors and money collection companies; they should continue to enforce 
their claims at the same time as they routinely act upon the advantage of offering 
repeat-defaulters a chance to have the economy assessed in full by independent advi-
sors before it is too late.  
In addition, flexibility, the development of a widest possible range of emergency 
solutions and a readiness to implement them in case of over-indebtedness is vital if 
‘stage three’ situations are to be effectively prevented from developing. Needless to 
say, this goes for private and public creditors alike. 
8.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The empirical results substantiate a theoretical understanding of coping behaviour as 
based on a social rather than an economic orientation. The data have therefore been 
interpreted in terms of a conception about ‘standard packages’, which refers to con-
straints whereby economic resources are transformed into social status. In as much as 
people act according to such influences, the overall goal is to preserve ‘status quo’ or 
alternatively to achieve a higher status. Whenever debt problems occur, standard 
package orientations translate into a principle of avoiding social downfalls. The use-
fulness of the ‘standard package’ concept should be further explored by taking these 
ideas to other realms of economic life than debt problems — such as ordinary con-
sumption, borrowing and investments in different social groups and the preparedness 
among the population to implement lifestyle changes to comply with new external 
influences such as concerns for the environment. This kind of research would contrib-
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ute to a better understanding of the mechanisms governing economic life at the 
household level. 
As for debt problems, it should be noticed that there is in fact a ‘stage four’ to inves-
tigate; as defaulters eventually find solutions to the difficulties, they return to normal 
life as resituated consumers in new status positions. There are currently no studies 
about the aftermath of debt quagmires — at least not in Norway. This, of course, 
would not only serve as a systematic assessment about the success of existing help 
systems, but also add substantially to the knowledge about debt problem careers in 
particular and processes involving social downfalls in general. 
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APPENDIX A:
RECRUITMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
Dear receiver of this questionnaire, 
Adequate knowledge about debt- and payment problems depends on the extent to 
which those struggling with such difficulties are given the opportunity to come for-
ward with their own versions; what went wrong, what are the consequences and what 
is it like to live with financial problems over time. This is such an opportunity. We 
hope that you take the time to answer the questionnaire. There are not so many ques-
tions, and most of them have pre-defined answers to tick off. Some of them, however, 
invite you to give answers in your own wording. It is not necessary to write pages on 
end, but please feel free to use an extra sheet of paper if you need to. You may also 
give comments to the tick-off questions if you want. 
When you have finished, please put the questionnaire in the ready-stamped envelope 
and mail it to us. We guarantee full anonymity according to the requirements of the 
Data Inspectorate. 
The information you give is to be used in PhD-level analysis on debt- and payment 
problems. Your answers will contribute to extending the knowledge about the life 
situation that you and many other default-debtors are in, and could have an impact on 
future decisions by politicians and public authorities. 
Thank you very much for your time, 
     Christian Poppe 
     Researcher 
     National Institute for Consumer Research 
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1) What is your Age? ……………….. 
   
2)  Gender:   Female    Male 
3)  About when did your financial problems start? Year: ……………. 
4) Have you applied for, or do you currently have, a debt settlement? 
 Did not apply   Applied (Year):……  Have a debt settlement (Year):  
Turn to the next page ÆÆÆÆÆ
This survey is going to be followed up by a limited number of personal interviews. Each interview 
will last about one hour. If you would like to participate please write your telephone number below 
and we will contact you: 
Yes, I want to participate. Call me on this number ………………….  
And ask for ……………………………………… 
I would like to be contacted between  ………  o’clock  and  ……….  o’clock 
If you have any questions about the survey or the personal interview, please call Christian Poppe 
(Phone number) ……… during working hours. 
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The following questions are about your situation before you got debt problems, and how it is now. Tick off 
or write down your answer. 
Question Just before you got debt problems Current situation 
5. Job/ Profession   
6. Number of children 
living with you 
7. Income   
8. Marital status  Married/ co-habit  
 Single 
 Same as before  
 Re-married/ co-habit 
 Single again 
9. Highest completed 
education
 University level 
 Intermediary level  
 Primary level 
 Same as before 
 University level 
 Intermediary level 
10. Home  Villa 
 Terrace house 
 Flat  
 Bed-sit 
 Same as before 
 Moved to a villa 
 Moved to a terrace house 
 Moved to a flat  
 Moved to a bed-sit  
11. Home ownership  Yes 
 No 
 Yes 
 No 
12. Car  Yes 
 No 
 Same as before  
 Different, better car 
 Different, lower quality 
 No car 
13. Second home  Yes 
 No 
 Same as before  
 Different, higher standard 
 Different, lower standard 
 None 
14. Standard of living  High 
 Middle 
 Low 
 Same as before 
 Higher 
 Lower 
15. Has the occurrence of debt problems changed your circle of friends? 
 No  Yes, I have more friends now    Yes, I have fewer friends now 
16. Have you moved to a different neighbourhood after you got debt problems? 
 No 
 Yes, to a neighbourhood of the same or higher status 
 Yes, to a lower status area  
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Have you and your partner (if you have one) done any of the following to improve your economic situa-
tion? 
If yes, please indicate if you did it early after the problems started, later in the process or just recently. 
Do not include what you have done after you got a debt settlement (if you have one). 
If the answer is “No”, tick off the first answer column. If the answer is “Yes”, please tick off the adequate 
time column or columns (multiple answers possible).  
Some of the questions have pre-defined options. Please tick off the appropriate one. 
Have you and your partner (if 
any) done any of the following 
to improve the economy?  
No Yes, at the start 
of the problems 
Yes, after a while Yes, just recently 
17. Extra jobs, working overtime     
18. Black jobs     
19. Spent savings     
20. Refinanced loans     
21. taken on additional loans to 
keep creditors away 
    
22. Used multiple credit cards to 
keep creditors away 
    
23. Asked creditors to change 
repayment schedules 
    
24. Seek out advice at a profes-
sional counselling service  
    
25. Got economic advice at 
social security 
    
26. Replaced broken items by 
renting instead of buying them 
    
27. Received financial assistance 
from social security 
    
APPENDIX A: RECRUITMENT QUESTIONNAIRE          249 
28. Received financial assistance 
from family/friends 
 Family 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Friends 
 Family 
 Friends 
29. Sold property (home, second 
home) or car 
 Home 
 Car 
 Second home 
 Home 
 Car 
 Second home 
 Home 
 Car 
 Second home 
30. Saved in on food   A lot 
 Some 
 A lot 
 Some 
 A lot 
 Some 
31. Saved in on clothes   For grown-ups 
 For children 
 For grown-ups 
 For children 
 For grown-ups 
 For children 
32. Saved in on social activities   For grown-ups 
 For children 
 For grown-ups 
 For children 
 For grown-ups 
 For children 
33. Other, please specify     
34. Why and how did you ended up in debt problems, as you see it? 
35. What are the most difficult experiences living with debt problems, as you see it? 
[A blank sheet of paper was provided for each of the latter two questions]. 
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APPENDIX B:
THE INTERVIEW GUIDE 
The guide was implemented as described in chapter 4.4. It served as a structured plan 
to introduce general, overall topics to be developed by the informants. At the more 
detailed level, it functioned as a checklist to be consulted at the end of the interview, 
or on rare occasions when the conversation lost its dynamics and came to a halt. The 
interviews typically lasted about one and a half hours. Main topics 1 and 2 took up 
about one third of the time. 
1. POINTS FROM THE ENQUETE
Here, main impressions and points from the recruitment questionnaire were written 
down prior to each interview. Some of them were followed up during the interview. 
2. BEFORE THE DEBT PROBLEMS STARTED
Can you tell a little about your background? 
9 Born where?  
9 Grown up where?  
9 Parents’ education and profession?  
9 Housing condition? 
9 Living conditions? 
9 Own education? 
If you think about the time before the debt problems started, how would you describe 
your life at that time? 
9 What kind of life did you want to live? 
9 What ambitions and goals did you have? 
9 How did you want to see yourself at that time? 
9 How did you want others to see you at that time? 
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9 What was your plan, the dreams, the prospects for the future? 
9 How did you try to make these dreams/ambitions/goals come through? 
[Possible issues: family, job, home, car, clothes, “things”, lifestyle, social life, party 
life]. 
3. DEBT PROBLEM PERIOD
What went wrong? Why did not the plan work out? When did it go wrong? What 
were the causes as you see them? 
What losses occurred first? What losses were particularly hard to face? 
[Possible issues: family, job, home, car, clothes, “things”, lifestyle, social life, party 
life]. 
When did you realise you had to give up your ambitions? Some particular event that 
opened up your eyes to the difficulties? 
How did the debt problems affect your life style? 
What about the everyday life of your partner/children/close family? 
How did the debt problems affect your job/firm? 
What about friends? Is it really possible to lose friends because of financial problems? 
Possible consequences checklist [check the enquete]:
9 Domestic problems 
9 Loss of firm 
9 Loss of home 
9 Loss of car 
9 Loss of social status 
9 Loss of friends 
9 Loss of possibilities 
9 Social isolation 
9 Problems for children 
9 Too little money for bills, children’s needs, food, dentist 
9 Shame 
9 Fair of poverty 
9 More friends? New friends? Extended social life? 
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9 Problematic creditors 
9 Problematic public authorities 
9 Problematic social security 
9 Self-accusations 
9 Worries 
9 Bitterness 
9 Depression 
9 Feeling unsafe 
9 Drugs/ alcohol abuse 
9 Shock
9 Apathy 
9 Stress 
9 Health problems 
Life quality: what make debt problems so hard to live with? 
Have your aspirations changed as a consequence of the debt problems? 
How do you see your future prospects? 
If a debt settlement: How was the process? What did it solve/ not solve? 
How do you evaluate the difference between your life situation, dreams and aspira-
tions before the debt problems set in, and the prospects of the current situation? 
Did you acknowledge the risks involved in the economic steps you have taken prior to 
the debt problems? 
Who are to blame? 
Looking back, do you have any regrets/ should you have done anything differently? 
What about creditors/authorities — should they have behaved differently? 
4. SOCIAL STIGMA
As the problems set in, who knew about them? 
What about your partner/ children/ nearest family? 
What about colleagues/ friends/ neighbours — did they know? 
What about your employer/ business partners? 
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When the debt problems became permanent, who did you tell then? 
Do you think that many of those who you did NOT tell, knew about your difficulties 
anyway? 
Who did you NOT want to know? Why? How did you manage to hide the truth away 
from them? 
Do you think people in general look down on default-debtors? 
Have you any such experiences yourself? 
Have your beliefs about other people’s views on debt problems influenced your way 
of handling them? 
5. STRATEGIES
[Only a checklist to be used at the end of the interview — if at all necessary] 
9 Buying/selling of homes — when, why, what event? 
9 Buying/selling of car — when, why, what event? 
9 Buying/selling of valuables — when, why, what event? 
9 Reducing debts— when, why, what event? 
9 Refinancing debts— when, why, what event? 
9 New loans — when, why, what event? 
9 Credit card use — when, why, what event? 
9 Termination of insurances — when? 
9 Extra jobs — when, why, what event? 
9 Overtime — when, why, what event? 
9 New job — when, why, what event? 
9 Black job — when, why, what event? 
9 Social security — when, why, what event? 
9 Saving in on food — when, why, what event? 
9 Saving in on clothes — when, why, what event? 
9 Saving in on transport — when, why, what event? 
9 Saving in on consumption — when, why, what event? 
9 Saving in on social life — when, why, what event? 
9 Saving in on party life — when, why, what event? 
9 Creditor contact — when, why, what event? 
9 Economic counselling — when, why, what event? 
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9 Help from lawyers — when, why, what event? 
9 Checking out books — when, why, what event? 
9 Checking out the Internet — when, why, what event? 
9 Help from colleagues — when, why, what event? 
9 Help from friends — when, why, what event? 
9 Help from family — when, why, what event? 
9 Education — when, why, what event? 
9 Other losses — when, why, what event? 
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APPENDIX C:
TRANSLATION FROM TRANSCRIPT 
Transcript from Case[ 28] Translation as reported in 6.4.2 
[Topic: Moving from a small township into  Oslo] 
28: Nei, nei, jeg dro jo... for jeg hadde jo en 
[utenlandsk] jente som jeg hadde... vi hadde rotet 
litt i [hjembygda] tidligere. Så hun hadde jeg litt i 
bakhodet. Vi hadde litt sånn sporadisk kontakt. 
- Og hun bodde her [i Oslo]? 
28: Ja. Men hun hadde ikke... ikke sant, for hun var 
[fremmedkulturell], og de bor jo så tett inneknytta 
av familien, og det var ikke bare for en hvit fyr å 
komme rett inn i en [utenlandsk] familie. Det går 
ikke. Men hun hadde en yngre bror som var 
halvveis kastet ut av familien, for han hadde noe 
nerveproblemer og litt alkoholproblem, så han 
kunne jeg bo hos. 
- Ok, så du bodde hos han? 
28: Ja, en stund i hvert fall. Men det var jo helt på 
bunnen av... 
- Du følte du var på bunnen av samfunnet? 
28: Ja, helt... helt... 
- Kasta ut? 
28: Ja, ja. Men det var jo tross alt vekk i fra... det 
var deilig å komme seg vekk i fra... [egne 
problemer]. 
- Hvordan følte du det... det var den positive greia i 
“Actually, I looked for my immigrant 
girlfriend .. But immigrants don’t let 
white people into their families just like 
that. At the time when I arrived her 
younger brother had been thrown out of 
the household due to bad nerves and a 
drinking problem. So I could stay with 
him .. At that point in life I felt totally 
excluded — at the bottom of society .. 
But at least it felt good to have escaped 
my own problems ... They were refugees 
and had experienced war and death. It 
really wasn’t easy. But after a year I got 
a job.” [28] 
(Cf. section 4.5.4 for a discussion on 
citation practises and the standardisation 
rules that has been decided upon). 
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hvert fall at du var borte fra de nære problematiske 
forholdene, for å si det sånn... 
28: Ja, ja, ja. 
- Men så sa du da at du var på bunnen av 
samfunnet. Hvordan opplevde du det? Dette er 
storby etter norske forhold i hvert fall, og du bor 
hos en [flyktning-] familie eller... 
28: En [ikke-Europeisk nasjonalitet]... 
- En [immigrant] med alkoholproblemer? 
28: Ja, det var ikke helt greit. Men det var liksom... 
jeg ble jo etter hvert kjent med flere, og så er det 
vel også noe av den slekta... en nordmann som var 
sammen med en [fremmedkulturell] dame... eller 
hun kommer egentlig fra [et naboland]. Og det var 
også litt sånn problem med familie og en del fyll 
og problemer og kulturkollisjoner når det er litt... 
Og det er jo flyktninger også som har opplevd en 
del død og fordervelse før de kom hit, så... i tillegg 
til... Så det har ikke vært enkelt på noen måte. 
- Fikk du jobb her nede da [Oslo]? 
28: Etter litt over et år så fikk jeg jobb. 
